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Changing Conceptions of Property and
Sovereignty in Natural Resources:
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine
RichardJ. Lazarus*
With th[e public trust doctrine], the California Supreme Court
appears enthusiastically to have embraced a new legal
Renaissance, in which modem "humanists" rediscover old texts
and invoke the distant past to liberate the spirit from the confining "shackles" of a more conventional era. But we are not
witnessing Petrarch, mildly unorthodox in reviving Cicero, or
Boccaccio retelling irreverent stories borrowed from Ovid. Here,
the half-forgotten ancient models are the codes of the Emperor
Justinian and Alfonso the Wise of Castille, the Magna Carta
wrested from King John and the Treatise of Henry de Bracton.
We may question whether such a revolution, not in literature
or philosophy, but in the law of property, even on the claim of
returning to an earlier wisdom, is equally to be applauded.'
Natural resources law, historically concerned with the maintenance and
orderly exploitation of basic natural resources such as water, fossil fuels,
oil, natural gas, mineral deposits, and timber, has undergone a significant transformation in recent years. The emergence of "environmental
law" has been the primary focus of attention during this period. Certainly, that emergence has been nothing short of spectacular. The last fifteen
years have witnessed a fantastic effort to develop a framework of legal
rules reflecting this nation's increased awareness of the adverse impacts
of environmental pollution and degradation. 2 Through a pyramidical imposition of health- and technology-based standards and performance
criteria, environmental laws have strived to respond to the reordering of
social priorities that has resulted from an enhanced understanding of the
need for pollution control. A predecessor to and now contemporary of
environmental law, natural resources law is responding as well to increased
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington); B.S., B.A. 1976,
University of Illinois; J.D. 1979, Harvard University. I would like to thank Jeannette
Austin, Bryant Garth, Sheldon Plager, Bill Popkin, Arnold Reitze, Bill Rodgers, Carol
Rose, Richard Stewart, Dan Tarlock, and Frank Trelease for their valuable comments
on earlier versions of this Article and Barbara McKinney for her valuable research
assistance.
1. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Summa Corp. v. California
ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 104 S. Ct. 1751 (1984) (brief filed at Court's invitation).
2. See generally Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The
Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 313 (1985).
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societal environmental awareness and coficern. Both apart from and, in
certain respects, as a part of environmental law, legal rules governing
natural resources are increasingly changing to better accommodate the
now-perceived conflicts related to resource utilization. It is time, now,
to reexamine natural resources law in light of these developments.
To that end, this Article considers and evaluates the '"public trust
doctrine," one of the most remarkable legal bases upon which natural
resources law has relied in this ongoing transformation. The public trust
doctrine is based on an amorphous notion that has been with us since
the days ofJustinian-the notion that the public possesses inviolable rights
in certain natural resources. Commentators first hailed the doctrine in
1970 as offering the most promising legal basis upon which individual
members of the public could maintain a lawsuit to protect natural resources
from needless degradation and destruction. 3 In the seminal article on the
trust doctrine, Professor Joseph Sax reconstructed how the mostly dormant doctrine had historically functioned in the United States to safeguard
public rights in navigable waterways, and he predicted that the
doctrine
4
could expand to embrace broader environmental concerns.
Tantamount to an academic call to legal arms on behalf of the natural
environment, the public trust thesis has borne judicial fruit. 5 In circumstances radically beyond the trust doctrine's historical confines, courts
over the last fifteen years have repeatedly invoked the doctrine
in litiga6
tion brought to halt environmentally destructive activities.
In examining the doctrine, this Article will inquire, first, how the
doctrine has operated in litigation brought to further natural resource protection goals and, second, in light of changing conceptions of property
and sovereignty in natural resources, whether hindsight teaches that the
strategy of relying on the doctrine to promote those goals was sound and
should be continued. The first inquiry is addressed in section II, which
contains a review of public trust litigation since 1970 that presents an impressive record of achievements for the doctrine in a wide variety of conte:Cts. 7 The second, more fundamental inquiry concerning the doctrine's

3. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 474 (1970). See generally Comment, T,e Public Trust Doctrine
in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged TraditionalDoctrine, 79 YALE LJ. 762 (1970). The Sax
journal publication preceded a more broad-based work by Sax that included the public
trust doctrine thesis. See J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 158-74 (1971).
4. See Sax, supra note 3, at 557.
5. The impact of the public trust doctrine thesis contrasts with that of other less successful contemporaneous submissions offering various theories in support of a constitutional right to a healthy environment. See, e.g., Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What
to Do While V/aitingfor Washington, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 32, 45-51 (1970). See generally
Kirchick, Tte Continuing Searchfor a Constitutionally ProtectedEnvironment, 4 ENVTL. AFF. 515
(1975); Note, Towards a ConstitutionallyProtected Environment, 56 VA. L. REV. 458 (1970).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 10-55.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 56-163.

PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
viability, discussed in sections 1118 and IV, 9 defies an easy and positive
response. Most simply put, the historical function of the public trust doctrine has been to provide a public property basis for resisting the exercise
of private property rights in natural resources deemed contrary to the public
interest. In recent decades, however, especially during the last ten years,
modern trends in natural resources law increasingly have eroded traditional concepts of private property rights in natural resources and
substituted new notions of sovereign power over those resources. These
trends, reflected in a wide variety of legal contexts ranging from federal
environmental protection statutes and new state resource allocation laws to
evolving common-law principles of tort law, are currently weaving a new
fabric for natural resources law that is more responsive to current social
values and the physical characteristics of the resources. By continuing to
resist a legal system that is otherwise being abandoned, the public trust
doctrine obscures analysis and renders more difficult the important process of reworking natural resources law. Of even broader concern, the
doctrine threatens to fuel a developing clash in liberal ideology between
furthering individual rights of security and dignity, bound up in notions
of private property protection, and supporting environmental protection
and resource preservation goals, inevitably dependent on intrusive governmental programs designed to achieve longer-term collectivist goals.
I.

THE ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN AMERICAN LAW

The origins of the public trust doctrine, much belabored and debated
in other works, 10 need not be repeated in detail here. It is sufficient for
present purposes to mark out the path from the doctrine's initial development abroad to its current infusion into domestic law.
A.

Roman and English Common Law

The notion of a public trust doctrine finds its earliest expression most
clearly in the work of Justinian, whose celebrated compendium of principles of Roman law declared natural law communal rights in certain basic
and omnipresent natural resources: By natural law, these things are common property of all: air, running water, the sea, and with it the shores
8. See infra text accompanying notes 164-367.
9. See infta text accompanying notes 368-476.
10. See 1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 179-202 (1967); Sax, Liberating the
Public Trust Doctrinefrom Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 185, 189-93 (1980);
Sax, supra note 3, at 475-78; Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient PrerogativeBecomes
the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 195, 195-98 (1980); Comment, The
Public Trust Totem in Public Land Law: Ineffective-And Undesirable-JudicialIntervention, 10
ECOLOGY L.Q. 455, 463-64 (1982); Comment, supra note 3, at 763-74; see also Coquillette,
Mossesfrom an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Property Cases About the Environment,
64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 801-21 (1979). See generally Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and

the Public Trust: An HistoricalAnalysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976); Selvin, The Public Trust
Doctrine in American Law and Economic Policy, 1789-1920, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 1403.
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of the sea. I This declaration, likely reflecting less the true nature of public
rights during the Roman Empire than Justinian's own idealization of a
legal regime,12 was in all events mimicked practically verbatim in the
3
Spanish thirteenth-century code, Las Siete Partidas,1
as well as in the
"Recopilacion de leyes de los Reinos de los Indies" promoted throughout
the Spanish Empire,' 4 and eventually was reflected in the customs of most
15
European nations in the Middle Ages.
11. See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN bk. 2, tit. 1, pts. 1-6. at 65 (J. Thomas trans.
1975). The notion that in earlier times people lived in total harmony-sharing abundant
natural resources-is evident in the writings of many early writers, including Ovid, Hesiod,
Horace, and Vergil. I B. MORE & W. BREWER, OVID'S METAMORPHOSES 397-99 (rev.
ed. 1978). The expression "things common to all" is found in the works of the thirdcentury jurist Marcian as well as in biblical descriptions of life in Eden. See Deveney,
iupra nott 10, at 26-29.
12. Justinian intended The Institutes as an elementary textbook for first-year students
and the Digest as a "patchwork" ofjuristic commentary, not nece3sarily internally consisteni. See A. WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL LAv 12, 25 (1981); see also Deveney,
vupra note 10, at 24-26 (discussing The Institutes and the Digest). Neither amounted to what
today we consider binding precedent. Indeed, in practice, the Roman government
reportedly did not shy from conveying private rights in coastal resources to promote commercial exploitation of the sources. See id. at 33-34 (almost all coastal resources granted
outright or leased to privately held monopolies for development); see also Ker v. Couden,
223 U.S. 268, 276 (1912) ("Roman law is not like a deed or a modern code prepared
unoflatu. History plays too large a part to make it safe to generalize from a simple passage
in so easy a fashion."). For this reason, several commentators argue that no legal doctrine protecting public rights in natural resources, such as the public trust doctrine, existed during the Roman Empire. See, e.g., Deveney, supra note 10, at 17, 23-26; MacGrady,
The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines that Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 511, 559 (1975). But
see Comment, supra note 3, at 789 (arguing that Americans at least should be entitled
to those environmental rights guaranteed Roman citizens).
13. Las Siete Partidas, pt. 3, tit. 28, laws 3, 4, 6. Las Siete Partidas was greatly inIluenced by prior compilations of Roman law. See B. DOBKINS, THE SPANISH ELEMENT
IN TEXAs WATER LAW 74-75 (1959). Partida 3 was taken practically verbatim from Roman
law. See id. at 76; J. VANCE, THE BACKGROUND OF HISPANIC-AMERICAN LAWLEGAL SOURCES AND JURIDICIAL LITERATURE OF SPAIN 98 (1943); see also Ker v. Couden,
223 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1912).
14. This compilation of preexisting Spanish law was enforceable in all of Spain's
overseas territories, including the eighteen Spanish republics in South and Central America,
as well as territories now included in the United States (such as parts of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada, Utah, Oklahoma, Colorado, Kansas, and Wyoming).
See Jover Y. Costas v. Insular Gov't of Philippines, 221 U.S. 623, 629 (1911) (con,truing Las Siete Partidas as Philippino law); E. VAN KLEFFENS, HISPANIC LAW UNTIL THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES 27-28 (1968). Consequently, the precise import of cer-

tain provisions of Las Siete Partidas has not infrequently been at issue in American courts.
Sfe, e.g., Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 104 S. Ct. 1751, 1757

(1984).
15. Professor Sax more recently has suggested that eleventh-century French law may
offer the best historical precedent for the modern trust doctrine. See Sax, supra note 10,
at 189 (" '[T]he public highways and byways, running water and springs, meadows,
pastures, forests, heaths and rocks ... are not to be held by lords .

be maintained.
them.' ").

. .

.

. nor are they to

in any other way than that their people may always be able'to use

PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

The public trust found its way into our English common-law heritage
through the writings of Bracton in the mid-thirteenth century.' 6 Borrowing from the Roman notion of resources "common to all" or "res communes," 17 Bracton also declared the shores of the sea "common to all"
and inalienable."' Here too, however, practice appears to have departed
from pronouncement. More formal confirmation of the public's rights to
valuable coastal resources occurred only when the Crown, seeking a means
to increase the treasury, resurrected those rights to support its claim of
prima facie ownership of the shorezone to the high water mark, notwithstanding prior royal grants of littoral lands to private parties.' 9 Thus,
although in some sense English common law recognized public rights in
the shorezone area, they were, at bottom, rights controlled by the

sovereign

20

(quoting M. BLOCH, FRENCH RURAL HISTORY 183 (1966)). The wide-ranging influence
of The Institutes in European Law is described in A. WATSON, supra note 12, at 62-82.
16. See 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 39-40 (S. Thorne
trans. 1968). The Magna Carta is often cited as even earlier support in England for public
trust principles. See 4 R. CLARK, supra note 10, at 99-100; Rosen, Public and Private Ownership Rights in Lands Under Navigable Waters: The Governmental/ProprietaryDistinction, 34 U.
FLA..L. REv. 561, 565-67 (1982); Comment, supra note 10, at 765-68. The language of
the Magna Carta suggests, however, that originally it had a much more limited purpose
and the current interpretation is most likely the result of a much more generous reading by
commentators such as Blackstone, later picked up on by the English courts. See Gann
v. Free Fishers, 11 Eng. Rep. 1305 (H.L. 1865); Rosen, supra, at 565.
17. See 2 H. BRACTON, supra note 16, at 39-40; Coquillette, supra note 10, at 800-03.
18. See 2 H. BRACTON, supra note 16, at 39-40.
19. At the behest of Elizabeth I, who considered the private holdings in the English
shoreline in the sixteenth century an impediment to English naval power, her lawyer,
Thomas Digges, developed the theory that without proof of specific grant of the shorezone
(which almost never was found in royal deeds) the Crown was the prima facie owner of
the shore to the high water mark. See Digges, Arguments prooving the Queenes Majesties propertye in the Sea Landes, in S. MOORE, HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE 185-211 (3d ed. 1888).
The theory met with substantial resistance from the propertied class, who resented what
they perceived to be the Crown's blatant confiscation of private property. However, the
Stuarts advocated Digges' thesis to enhance the royal purse, and in time the courts fell
in line. Ironically, Charles I, who decided the first case formally adopting the prima facie
theory, see Attorney General v.Philpott, in S. MOORE, supra, at 895-907, ultimately lost
his head as a result. Among the causes specifically cited to support his beheading was
the " 'taking away of men's rights under colour of the King's title to land between high
and low water marks.' " See Article 26 of the GrandRemonstrancepresented to CharlesI on December
1, 1641, in S. MOORE, supra, at 310. See generally S. MOORE, supra, at 258-317 (discussing
reign of King Charles I); Deveney, supra note 10, at 41-49; Note, A Tidelands Trust for
Georgia, 17 GA. L. REv. 851, 855-56 (1983).
20. The sovereign could then convey these resources to private hands. This is selfevident from the mere notion of prima facie ownership. Both Lord Chief Justice Hale's
seminal treatise, see M. HALE, DE JURE MARIS, chs. 5-6, in S. MOORE, supra note 19,
at 384-406, and the rulings of English courts confirm this view. See, e.g., Attorney General
v. Emerson, 1891 A.C. 649, 649-51 (H.L.); see also Blundell v. Catterall, 106 Eng. Rep.
1190, 1199 (K.B. 1821) (rejecting claims based onjustinian's Institutes and Bracton's treatise
because claims disagreed with common law of England); Commonwealth v. Morgan, 225
Va. 517, 522-23, 303 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1983) (English Crown authorized to grant private
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Introducing the Public Trust Doctrine into the United States

The English common-law notion that the public retains certain inviolable rights to natural resources ultimately found its way into judicial
opinions in the United States. Adopting the distinction first expressed in
Lord Chief Justice Hale's treatise, nineteenth-century American jurists
divided the interests in navigable waters into three categories: (1) jus
publicum-the rights of the general public; (2)jus regium-the royal right
to manage resources for public safety and welfare (akin to our modern
police power); and (3)jus privatum-the private right of title.2 1 The dual
sovereign nature of our federal system, however, added a new twist to
the jus publicum. From the outset, the Supreme Court described the
sovereign interest of the national government in terms differing from the
state government's sovereign interest, even though it described the interests of both sovereigns in property law terms. The Court termed the
federal sovereign's paramount interest over commerce in interstate
navigable waters the "federal navigation servitude." In contrast, the Court
described the state interest generally in terms of the state's "sovereign
ownership" of the bed of certain navigable waters within each state's own
borders. Apart from the precise labels the Court employed, the common
interest of both sovereigns in those water resources was clear in the nineteenth century. Commerce was primarily waterborne; the rivers served
as highways for pioneers and supplied power for industry. Accordingly,
cities and towns invariably lined major waterways, and natural ports were
a prerequisite to developing a major metropolitan area. 22
1.

Federal Navigation Servitude

Federal insistence that navigable waterways were subject to special
public rights and, therefore, national sovereign authority, was first formal-

title to submerged lands in Virginia during colonial times). At most, the King lacked
authority to make such conveyances without Parliament's concurrence. See Deveney, supra
note 10, at 49-50; Rosen, supra note 16, at 569 n.50; Sax, supra note 3, at 476; see also
Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N.Y. 129, 155 (1883). Notably, only the properties of the "ancient desmesne" were historically inalienable under English law. These lands constituted
the "original endowment of the kingship" so designated at the time "settlement of the
Conquest ivas completed and was registered in the Domesday Book." I F. POLLOCK &
W. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF Er4GLISH LAw 383-84 (2d rev. ed. 1968). As "permanently
annexed to the kingly office," their dissipation into private hands was inappropriate. Id.
Of course, this restriction on sovereign alienship bore no relation to the natural resource
characteristics of the properties, but rather to their political significance.
21. See 2 R. CLARK, supra note 10, at 190-202; Deveney, supra note 10, at 44-46; Selvin,
sua note 10, at 1403-04 & n.4. On repeated occasions, the Supreme Court invoked Lord
ChiefJustice Hale's distinctions. See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1894);
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212, 220-24 (1845); Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 411 (1842).
22. See Fly, The Role of the Federal Government in the Conservation and Utilization of Water
Resources, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 274, 274-76 (1938).

PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

ized when states attempted to grant exclusive franchises to navigate their
waterways. Indeed, it was this type of arrangement between New York
and Robert Fulton (of steamboat fame) and Ambassador Livingston that
led Chief Justice Marshall to declare in Gibbons v. Ogden23 that commerce
in navigable waterways was of such great importance that maintenance
and availability of the waterways must be within the exclusive control of
the federal government. This ruling spawned a host of judicial decisions
concerning the scope and significance of this special federal power, 24 called
the federal navigation servitude. These decisions occurred as the national
government sought to expand the internal waterway system and in so doing often interfered with the specific plans of states and private parties. 25
2.

State Ownership of Beds of Navigable Waters

At the state law level, the public trust doctrine took on a different
character, suggesting not only that the state possessed special powers over
these water resources, but also that it owed certain enforceable duties to
the public as well. The Supreme Court ultimately described the nature
of this state authority in 1842 in Martin v. Lessee of WaddelW6 as state owner27
ship of the beds of navigable waters in their sovereign capacity.
The origins of the modern public trust doctrine thesis lie in the notio'n of "sovereign capacity" ownership. In particular, lurking in the
background of those early judicial rulings was the suggestion that state
power to alienate the resource or otherwise deny general public access
is sharply restricted. 28 This suggestion was critical to Sax' later thesis and

23. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). A previous circuit opinion written by ChiefJustice
Marshall in fact foreshadowed the ruling. See Wilson v. United States, 30 F. Cas. 239,
245 (C.C.D. Va. 1820) (No. 17,846).
24. See, e.g., Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409, 424 (1917); United
States v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U.S. 211, 215-16 (1900); Gilman v. Philadelphia,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1866); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,
54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 577-78 (1851).
25. Fly, supra note 22, at 278-81.
26. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
27. See id. at 410. This case concerned a dispute between two private parties over
their right to fish for oysters in Raritan Bay. The plaintiff claimed the right through mesnes
conveyances from the Crown, and the defendant claimed the right pursuant to a state
grant. Id. at 380-81.
28. The New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821),
cited by the Court in Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 417, is the earliest
public trust decision to suggest that the public possesses certain water resources access
rights that cannot be precluded by legislative alienation. Arnold also involved a dispute
over the use of an oyster bed in Raritan Bay. The state court based its decision-that
such legislative authority "never could be borne by a free people," see 6 N.J.L. at 13-on
the "law of nature," the "civil law," and the "common law of England," see id. at 11-12.
Although the United States Supreme Court followed Arnold in Martin v. Lessee of Waddell,
and subsequently relied on it in Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455-56 (1892),
which is discussed infra at notes 30-44, the New Jersey court chose to abandon Arnold's
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found its roots in judicial descriptions of sovereign ownership
of water29
ways as akin to the powers and duties of a trustee.
3.

The Illinois Central Railroad Decision

In Illinois CentralRailroadv. Illinois3O the Supreme Court squarely ad-

dressed the issue of the meaning of state sovereign ownership. The legal
issue raised in that case was fairly narrow-whether Illinois could, by
legislative enactment, repeal an earlier statute conveying huge portions
of the bed of Lake Michigan to Illinois Central without offending the federal
Constitution. 31 The Supreme Court's reasoning in upholding the state
legislature's subsequent action is not evident. The Court could have
relied easily on the theory that the initial enactment was devoid of legitimate
public purpose, especially given that the Court could have done so merely
by deferring to the subsequent legislature's considered judgment. 32 The
four-justice majority instead expounded at length on the special nature
of sovereign ownership of navigable waters to support its ruling that the
state grant had been revocable. 33 The thrust of the Court's far-reaching

rationale and effectively overruled it. See Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441, 458-60, aff'd, 23
NJ.L. 624 (1852). See generally Rosen, supra note 16, at 572-74. Moreover, the historical
accuracy of research the Arnold court relied upon in its decision is in doubt. See MacGrady,
supra note 12, at 590-91.
29. Indeed, in dicta, the Supreme Court in Waddelldescribed the sovereign's dominion over submerged lands as "in trust" and as a "public trust." See 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 411.
30. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). Two members of the Court did not participate in the case.
See id. at 476 (Fuller, C.J., & Blatchford, J.). Three justices dissented. See id. at 464 (Shiras,
Gray & Brown, JJ., dissenting).
31. See id. at 449, 452.
32. At the time Illinois Central was decided, the Court strictly applied a constitutional
requirement of "public purpose" to state and local laws, holding invalid laws that benefited
particular groups within society. See Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664 (1874)
(governmental expenditure favoring small class of individuals tantamount to "robbery").
Soon afterward, the Court overruled this line of precedent and adopted a more deferential view of the public purpose requirement. See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley,
164 U.S. 112, 160, 164 (1896); see also Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Dist., 262 U.S. 710,
723 (1923) (upholding assessment on abutting landowners the costs of building tunnel
for railroad)
33. The Court took pains to stress the special "trust" nature of the state's title:
[State title to the lands under navigable waters] is a title different in character
from that which the State holds lands intended for sale ....
It is a title held
in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the
waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed
from the obstruction or interference of private parties ....
[Grants that] do not
substantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters remaining [are
valid] ....

A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a State has

never been adjudged to be within the legislative power; and any attempted grant
of the kind would be held, if not absolutely void on its face, as subject to revocation. The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole
people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them ... than it
can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace ...

PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

opinion, though certainly unnecessary for the result, is unmistakable. According to the Court, at some level a state legislature is powerless to convey into private hands a natural resource as important as Chicago's harbor. 34 The decision, however, raises more questions than it answers.
First, the Court assumed that without title the state would be powerless
to prevent use of the harbor, which the state later determined was contrary
to the public interest. 35 But the lack of power hardly seems plausible, given
that state police power would regulate railroad uses of the resource and
the federal navigation servitude would still provide for both maintenance
of the navigability of the resource and public access.3 6 In all events, certainly no legal bar would prevent the state from exercising its eminent
domain authority to repurchase the property.
The decision raises a second, even more perplexing issue. It is far
from clear what source of law the Court was drawing upon to reach its
result. Language in the opinion suggests that the Court was announcing
37
a rule based on federal law universally applicable to all state legislatures.
The harbor of Chicago is of immense value to the people of the State of Illinois
...[T]he idea that its legislature can deprive the State of control over its bed
and waters and place the same in the hands of a private corporation created
for a different purpose, one limited to transportation of passengers and freight
between distant points and the city, is a proposition that cannot be defended....
Any grant of the kind is necessarily revocable ....

The position advanced

by the railroad company . . . would place every harbor in the country at the
mercy of a majority of the legislature of the State in which the harbor is situated.
146 U.S. at 452-55.
34. The significance the Court places on the doctrine is reminiscent of the commonlaw notion that certain lands are so intrinsically tied to the "Kingly office" that their
dissipation would threaten the very existence of the sovereign. These common-law lands,
referred to as the ancient desmesne, contrasted with those more temporary properties gained
through conquests. 1 F. POLLOCK & W. MArrLAND, supra note 20, at 383-84; see supra note 15.
35. The same judicial assumption that state title was necessary to support state sovereign
authority over a natural resource is evident in the Court's decisions that rejected the
"English Rule" and extended state sovereign ownership to the beds of nontidal navigable
waters. See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 337-38 (1876); Propeller Genesee Chief v.
Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457-58 (1851); Deveney, supra note 10, at 54; Rosen,
supra note 16, at 575. The test of navigability for title purposes is a matter of federal law,
see United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935), and looks to whether the waterway's
natural and ordinary condition was useful or susceptible to use in interstate commerce
when the state was admitted to the Union, id.; see also Utah v. United States, 403 U.S.

9, 9-10 (1971).
36. The dissenters stressed the state police power. See Illinois Central, 446 U.S. at 466-67
(Shiras, J., dissenting). The majority not only conceded the federal navigation servitude
in its opinion, see id. at 452, but stated that it was expressly provided for in the original
agreement between the State of Illinois and Illinois Central, see id. at 448-50.
37. No limiting language appears in the Court's opinion to suggest that its decision
was limited to Illinois law. The Court repeatedly referred to the power of a "state" in
the generic sense. The majority most likely assumed its decision applied to all states; this
is most clearly evident in its assertion that should the railroad's position prevail in this
case, it "would place every harbor in the country at the mercy of a majority of the legislature
of the State in which the harbor is situated." See id. at 455.
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Although the tone of the opinion nearly strikes constitutional chords, 38
the Court thirty years later described the39Illinois Central decision as merely
resting on a "matter of Illinois law."
Taking the Court's subsequent characterization as correct, as we must,
we then must fathom the basis for the Court's declaration of such a novel
rule of state law. The Court did not cite any relevant precedent in Illinois
law to support the decision. The Court merely referred vaguely to the
use of sovereign trust language by state courts in their decisions discussing state ownership of the submerged beds. 40 This in turn is followed only
by the Supreme Court's naked assertion that the trust arrangement is in41
alienable.
The Illinois Central decision remains today the "lodestar" 42 guiding
the modern public trust doctrine. State courts have repeatedly turned to
it in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to justify rejecting
or at least carefully scrutinizing shortsighted or even corrupt legislative
attempts to convey into private hands critical coastal or inland waterway
resource,..43 And still today courts rely on the Illinois Central Court's reason44
ing to support their rulings.

4.

Expansion of the Trust Concepts

The notion of sovereign ownership in trust originated but did not
remain confined to navigable waters and their beds. Similar language cropped up in judicial opinions describing the source of special governmental
authority over wildlife45 and public lands.4

6

In the case of public lands,

the Supreme Court went so far as to suggest that trust duties included
the responsibility to ensure that the resources were "not wasted." 4 7 Perhaps
38. See id. at 456-57.
39. See Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926). InAppleby the Court
rcversed the ruling of the New York Court of Appeals and held that under state law the
legislature could grant land under tidal water free of the jus publicum and had done so
in this cas,!. See id. at 383-84. Accordingly, the Court held that if the state wanted to
r,:assert its sovereign rights, it would first have to buy them back. See id. at 399.
40. See 146 U.S. at 455.

41. See id.
42. Sa:c, supra note 3, at 489.
43. See generally id. For a discussion of the Florida courts' adoption of Illinois Central,
see F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F. BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION-THE
FLORIDA ErPERIENCE 355-57 (1968).
44. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 227, 625 P.2d 239, 249, 172

Cal. Rptr. 696, 706, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981).
45. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896), ovemdsd, Hughes v. Oklahoma,
411 U.S. 2,22 (1979); see also La Coste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545,

519 (1924).
46. See, e.g., Emigrant Co. v. County of Wright, 97 U.S. 339, 342 (1877); Pollard
v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 224 (1845); see also Montgomcry, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law: Its Application in the Judicial Review of Land ClassiicationDecisions,
8 WILLAMETrE L.J. 135, 146-47, 151-70 (1972).
47. See Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 181 (1891); see also Cam-
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the most interesting early expansion of the trust concept, however, was
its application to city streets. 48 Many courts upheld municipal authority
to allow railroads use of the streets and other public trust property.4 9 These
courts often held that the trust doctrine exempted the city and its commercial licensees from liability for harm caused to adjoining property owners
by transit activities.5 0 Ultimately many state courts expanded this application of the trust to promote the use of city streets by elevated railroads.5"
Eventually the subsurface for the growing hidden infrastructure of the city
was represented in the form of subways, sewer pipes, gas lines, and electric cables. 2 California courts similarly utilized the trust concept to promote economic development, by ruling that growing cities in need of water,
such as Los Angeles, 53 had broad sovereign rights to waters within their
original land.5 4 Thus, the traditional trust doctrine concept in the United
States became
as much a legal basis for economic expansion as for resource
5
protection . 5
II.

THE PUBLIC TRUST THESIS IN THE COURTS

A.

The Public Trust Thesis

Promoters of the public trust doctrine, most prominently Professor
Joseph Sax, turned primarily to Illinois Central and its progeny to develop
field v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897); United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338,
342 (1888).
48. See Selvin, supra note 10, at 1417-18.
49. See, e.g., Chapman v. Albany & Schnectady R.R., 10 Barb. 360, 363 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1851); Drake v. Hudson River R.R., 7 Barb. 508, 547 (N.Y. App. Div. 1849).
50. See, e.g., People v. Kerr, 37 Barb. 357, 394-95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1862); Brooklyn
City & Newton R.R. v. Coney Island & Brooklyn R.R., 35 Barb. 364, 368 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1861).
51. See, e.g., Griffin v. Shreveport & Ark. R.R., 41 La. Ann. 808, 809-10, 6 So. 624,
624-26 (1889); Costigan v. Pennsylvania R.R. & N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R.,
54 N.J.L. 233, 237-43, 23 A. 810, 811-13 (1892); Jones v. Erie & Wyo. R.R., 151 Pa.
30, 45-47, 25 A. 134, 136-37 (1892).
52. See Selvin, supra note 10, at 1426-28. Although courts generally interpret the
sovereign trust authority to exempt the municipality from liability for harm caused when
city streets are used for ordinary street purposes, they have split on whether the trust
immunity extends to subways. Compare Sears v. Crocker, 184 Mass. 586, 589, 69 N.E.
327, 328 (1904) (no compensation) with In re Board of Rapid Transit, 197 N.Y. 81, 97-98,
90 N.E. 456, 460-61 (1909). Most courts have held that trust immunity does not extend
to elevated railroads. See Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R., 197 U.S. 544, 570-71
(1904); Lohr v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry., 104 N.Y. 268, 288, 10 N.E. 528, 531 (1887);
Story v. New York Elevated R.R., 90 N.Y. 122, 178-79 (1882).
53. In light of the California Supreme Court's most recent application of the public
trust doctrine to limit potentially the water rights of Los Angeles, see National Audubon
Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 440, 658 P.2d 709, 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346,
360, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983), this prior history takes on an especially ironic tone.
54. See City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 646, 57 P. 585, 601 (1899)
(pueblo right of city expands with needs of its inhabitants). Samuel Wiel has characterized the California court ruling as "state socialism in water." See Wiel, Political Water
Rights, 10 CALIF. L. REv. 111, 111 (1922).
55. Selvin, supra note 10, at 1422-37.
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the modern public trust doctrine thesis.5 6 Professor Sax thought the doctrine possessed or at least potentially possessed three characteristics essential
for an effective legal basis for environmental protection: (1) the legal right
had to be vested in the public; (2) the right had to be enforceable against
the government; and (3) the substance of the right had to be harmonious
with environmental concerns. 57 In support of this proposition, his article
described at great length the operation of the doctrine in several states
over the last century.5 8 The descriptions emphasized how courts had invoked the doctrine in certain circumstances to question the validity of executive agency action that threatened trust resources and, in particular,
public access to those resources.5 9 Judicial techniques included narrowly
reading both legislative delegations of authority over trust resources to
executive agencies 60 and governmental attempts to convey trust resources
to private parties, 61 as well as prohibiting outright certain governmental
62
measures that adversely affected the resource.
The precise legal basis for the doctrine's application, however, re63
mained fairly vague. The doctrine is squarely rooted in property law,
yet Professor Sax, for instance, rejected the property rationale as too inflexible. 6 4 Similarly, despite the substantive overtone of past judicial opinions applying the doctrine 65 (and arguably of portions of Sax' own 1970
article6 6) Sax chose to describe the doctrine as not substantive. According
56. See Sax, supra note 3, at 489.

57. See id. at 474.
58. See id. at 491-531.
59. See, e.g., id. at 494, 502.
60. See, e.g., id. at 502, 504-05, 523, 525-26, 531, 558-59.
61. See id. at 492-502, 527-28.

62. See id. at 485-89.
63. The trust doctrine originated with the notion of sovereign ownership of certain

resources in trust for the sovereign's citizens. See supra text accompanying notes 11-29.
Controversies over the doctrine historically have concerned ownership boundaries and
the existence of public access or easements. See supra notes 26-29, 40-43 and accompany-

ing text; infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text. The Illinois Central opinion is replete
with references to property law concepts. See 146 U.S. at 452-54.
64. See Sax, supra note 3, at 478-83. Professor Sax rejected the property rationale,
although he acknowledged its common use by the courts, because it could prohibit the

government from reallocating trust resources to accommodate changing public needs. Sef
id. at 482; see also Deveney, supra note 10, at 60. Sax has been criticized for this tactic
by at least one commentator. Professor Coquillette argues that the trust doctrine would

rest more firmly on a property law basis, because that is its historical basis, and rigid
prohibitions are not necessarily implicated by property law. See Coquillette, supra note

10, at 810-14.
65. The Supreme Court's Illinois Central ruling is a good example. See supra text ac-

companying notes 30-41.
66. Sax clearly suggests in several places that the doctrine has significant substantive
overtones. At one point, he summarizes the doctrine as disallowing grants of particularly
great "amplitude" to private parties. See Sax, supra note 3, at 488-89. At another, Sax
argues that judicial inquiry and standards to "minimize" harm to the natural resource
must be adequate. See id. at 545. Finally, Sax outlines four guidelines that trigger the

PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
to Sax' 1970 article the trust doctrine "has no life of its own and no intrinsic standards" 67 and does not represent "a substantive set of stan69
dards." 68 Instead, Sax characterized the doctrine as just a "technique"
or "name" 70 courts used to "mend perceived imperfections in the legislative
7
and administrative process" 1 or the "democratic process" generally.72
More recently, however, Professor Sax described the doctrine's operation in terms of property rights and did not shy away from attaching
substantive standards to judicial application of the doctrine. 73 The "central idea" of the public trust doctrine, according to Sax, has become
"preventing the destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common but without formal recognition such as title" and its "function" is
to "protect such public expectations against destabilizing changes" as con74
ventional private property is protected.
B.

Public Trust Litigation Since 1970

Since 1970 the public trust doctrine indisputably has had a major
impact on litigation brought by parties on behalf of natural resource protection, an impact more than sufficient to call for a close accounting of
its rise and an evaluation of its continuing vitality. Numerous parties have
relied on modern public trust theories to support their litigation objectives and in turn the courts have adopted those theories. In addition, in
many of the states in which public trust precedent was absent or difficult
to construct, a spate of law review commentators, most following up on
the Sax thesis, have argued for application of the trust doctrine in particular states. 75 Other law review progeny have focused not on particular
concern of the trust doctrine that are totally aimed at the substance of the controversy.
They include: (1) whether the property has been conveyed at less than market value when
no obvious reason for the subsidy exists; (2) whether the government has granted to a
private interest the authority to make resource allocation decisions that may subordinate
public resource uses to private interests; (3) whether an attempt has been made to reallocate
diffuse public uses to private uses or public uses of less breadth; and (4) whether the trust

resource is being used for a natural purpose, that is, a purpose consistent with the resource's
physical characteristics and natural state in the environment. Id. at 562-63.
67. See Sax, supra note 3, at 521.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See id. at
See id.
See id.at
See id.at
See id.at

509.
521.
509.
521.

73. See Sax, supra note 10, at 192-93.

74. See id.at 188-89 (footnotes omitted).
75. See, e.g., Jatte, The Public Trust Doctrine is Alive and Kicking in New Jersey Tidalwaters:

Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, A Case of Happy Atavism, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 309
(1974); Livingston, Public Access to Virginia's Tidelands: A Frameworkfor Analysis of Implied
Dedicationsand Public PrescriptiveRights, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 669 (1982-1983); Olson,
The Public Trust Doctrine: Proceduraland Substantive Limitations on Governmental Reallocation of
Natural Resources in Michigan, 1975 DET. C.L. REv. 161; Wyche, Tidelands and the Public

Trust: An Applicationfor South Carolina, 7 EcOLOGY L.Q. 137 (1978); Note, The Public Trust
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states, but on furthering specific resource protection or public access goals. 76
All of this commentary has further increased the doctrine's impact in litigation. Over the last fifteen years in half of the states, approximately one
77
hundred cases have been reported involving the public trust doctrine,
many of which refer explicitly to Professor Sax' article.

il Massachusetts Land Law, II B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REvX. 839 (1984); Comment, The Penn-

sylvania Public Trust Doctrine: Its Use as a Restrainton Government, 13 DuQ. L. REv. 551 (1975);
Comment, California Beach Access: The Mexican Law and the Public Trust, 2 EcOLOCY L.Q.
571 (1972); Note, supra note 19; Comment, The Public Trust Doctrineas a Basisfor Environmental
litigation in Louisiana, 27 Loy. L. REV. 469 (1981); Note, Cahfornia's Tidelands Trustjr
Modifiable PublicPurposes, 6 Lov. L.A.L. REV. 485 (1973); Comment, The MississippiPublic
Trust Doctrine: Public and Private Rights in the Coastal Zone, 46 Miss. L.J. 84 (1975); Comment, "Public Trust" as a ConstitutionalProvision in Montana, 33 MorNT. L. REV. 175 (1975);
Note, State Citizen Rights Respecting GreatwaterResource Allocation: From Rome to New Jersey,
25 RUTGERS L. REv. 571 (1971); Comment, The Emergence of the Public Trust as a Public
R ght to Environmental Preservationin South Dakota, 29 S.D.L. RE\'. 496 (1984); Comment,
The Public Trust Doctrine:A New Approach to Environmentalism, 81 W. VA. L. REV.455 (1979).
76. See, e.g., Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, "Common Property" as a Concept in Natural
Reource Property, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713 (1975); Dunning, The Significance of California's Public Trust Easementfor California Water Rights Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 357 (1980);
Fellig, Pursuit of the Public Trust: Beach Access in New Jerseyfrom Neptune v. Avon to Matthews v. BHIA, 10 CoLumn. J. ENVTL. L. 35 (1985); Johnson, Public Trust Protectionfor
Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 233 (1980); Nanda & Ris, Public Trust
Doctrine: A Viable Approach to InternationalEnvironmentalProtection, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 291 (1976);
Schoenbaum, Public Rights and Coastal Zone Management, 51 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1972); Weiss,
The Planetary Trust: Conservation and IntergenerationalEquity, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495 (1984);
Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 269 (1980);
Y annacone, AgriculturalLands, FertileSoils, PopularSovereignty, the Trust Doctrine, Environmental
Inpact Assesment, and the NaturalLaw, 51 N.D.L. REV. 616 (1975); Note, ProprietaryDuties
of the Federal Government Under the Public Land Trust, 75 MICH. L. REv- 586 (1977); Comment, PublIs-Trwt Doctrine Expansion & Integration:A ProposedBalancing Test, 23 SANTA CLAR.%
L. Rav. 211 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Expansion & Integration]; Comment,
Public Beact, Access Exactions: Extending the Public Trust Doctrine to Vindicate Public Rights, 28
UCLA L. REv. 1049 (1981). For an interesting twist in the public trust concept in a nonnatural resource context, see Comment, Protecting the Public Interest in Art, 91 YALE L.J.
121 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Public Interest in Art].
77. A I sting by state of just some of the more recent or important public trust doctrine decisions is impressive. Alaska: State Dep't of Nat. Resources v. City of Haines,
627 P.2d 1047 (Alaska 1981); California: Amigos de Bolsa Chica, Inc. v. Signal Properties, Inc., 190 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (opinion omitted from 142 Cal. App. 3d
166); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189
Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d
240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981); State v. Superior
Court, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981);
Colorado: People v. Emmert, 198 Colo. 137, 597 P.2d 1025 (1979); District of Columbia
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land, 514 F.2d 1350 (D.C
Cir. 1975). But see District of Columbia v. Air Fla. Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1085-86 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (questioning whether public trust doctrine applies in District of Columbia).
Gtorgia: State v. Ashmore, 236 Ga. 401, 224 S.E.2d 334, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976);
Florida: Skipper v. Phipps, 483 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Fla. 1980); Hawaii: Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 65 Hawaii 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982); State v. Zimring. 58 Hawaii 106, 566
P.2d 725 (1977); Idaho: Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc.,
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1.

Parties Invoking the Trust Doctrine

The cases since 1970 fall into three basic categories: (1) private citizens
suing the government for allegedly violating the doctrine; 78 (2) private
105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983); State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 594
P.2d 1093 (1979); Illinois: People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 360
N.E.2d 773 (1976); Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 46 Ill. 2d 330, 263 N.E.2d 11
(1970); Wade v. Kramer, 121 Ill. App. 3d 377, 459 N.E.2d 1025 (1984); Mamolella
v. First Bank, 97 Ill. App. 3d 579, 423 N.E.2d 204 (1981); Louisiana: Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984); Maine:
James v. Inhabitants of West Bath, 437 A.2d 863 (Me. 1981); Opinion of the Justices,
437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981); Massachusetts: Opinions of the Justices, 383 Mass. 895, 424
N.E.2d 1092 (1981); Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629,
393 N.E.2d 356 (1979); Michigan: Bott v. Comm'n of Nat. Resources, 415 Mich. 45,
327 N.W.2d 838 (1982); Superior Public Rights, Inc. v. State Dep't of Nat. Resources,
80 Mich. App. 72, 263 N.W.2d 290 (1977); Montana: Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984); Nevada: State v. Bunkowski, 88 Nev.
623, 503 P.2d 1231 (1972); New Hampshire: Appeal of Comm. to Save the Upper Androscoggin v. New Hampshire Water Resources Bd., 466 A.2d 1308 (N.H. 1983); New
Jersey: Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355, cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 93 (1984); City of Newark v. Natural Resource Council, 82 N.J. 530, 414
A.2d 1304 (1980); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J.
296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972); New York: Evans v. City of Johnstown, 96 Misc. 2d 755, 410
N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1978); North Carolina: State v. Forehand, 367 N.C. 148, 312 S.E.2d
247 (1984); North Dakota: North Dakota State Water Comm'n v. Board of Managers,
332 N.W.2d 254 (N.D. 1983); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water
Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976); Ohio: Thomas v. Sanders, 65 Ohio
App. 2d 5, 413 N.E.2d 1224 (1979); State ex rel. Brown v. Newport Concrete Co., 44
Ohio App. 2d 121, 336 N.E.2d 453 (1975); Oregon: Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands,
285 Or. 197, 590 P.2d 709 (1979); Brusco Towboat Co. v. State, 30 Or. App. 509, 567
P.2d 1037 (1977); Pennsylvania: Warren Sand & Gravel Co. v. Commonwealth Dep't of
Envtl. Resources, 20 Pa. Commw. 186, 341 A.2d 556 (1975); Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa.
Commw. 14, 312 A.2d 86 (1973); Texas: Lower Colo. River Auth. v. Texas Dep't of
Water Resources, 689 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. 1984); Wisconsin: Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade,
Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Nat. Resources, 115 Wis. 2d 381, 340 N.W.2d 722 (1983);
State Public Intervenor v. State Dep't of Nat. Resources, 115 Wis. 2d 28, 339 N.W.2d
324 (1983); State v. Village of Lake Delton, 93 Wis. 2d 78, 286 N.W.2d 622 (1979);
see also Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 398 F.Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975);
Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
In addition to case law, the modern public trust thesis has spawned legislation in
Michigan. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1202 (1979). See generally Slone, The Michigan
Environmental Protection Act: Bringing Citizen-InitiatedEnvironmental Suits into the 1980's, 12
EcoLoGY L.Q. 271 (1985). It has also likely influenced the adoption of trust language
in several state constitutions. See, e.g., PA. CONsT. art. 1, § 27; see also MASS. CONST. amend.
XLIX; R.I. CONST. amend. XXXVII, § 1.
78. See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 519-20, 606 P.2d
362, 363-64, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 328-29, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); Paepcke v.
Public Bldg. Comm'n, 46 I. 2d 330, 331-32, 263 N.E.2d 11, 13 (1970); Superior Public
Rights, Inc. v. State Dep't of Nat. Resources, 80 Mich. App. 72, 75-76, 263 N.W.2d
290, 292 (1977); Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495, 501-03 (Sup. Ct.
1972); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n,
247 N.W.2d 457, 458-59 (N.D. 1976); Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. 14, 16-17,
312 A.2d 86, 88 (1973).
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citizens suing other private parties for allegedly violating the doctrine; 79
and (3) the government suing private parties for allegedly violating the
doctrine. 8 The doctrine's early promoters were concerned primarily with
promoting the first category of cases, with some related discussion of the
need for promoting the second. For this reason, the potential ability of
the public trust doctrine to provide private citizens with the needed legal
interest to confer standing was of foremost concern. The experience of
the last fifteen years reveals that here the doctrine succeeded; courts
generally have held that groups of private citizens can maintain actions
against governmental and private parties to vindicate public trust doctrine interests.8 1
The third area of public trust litigation, involving governmental initiatives based on public trust doctrine authority, however, has been one
of the most important areas of development for the doctrine, if not the
most important. 82 Governmental enforcement is the principal means by
which environmental and natural resource protection standards are enforced. The government's ability to enforce these standards is necessarily
tempered by the deference due private property rights in the resources.
To the extent that the public trust doctrine suggests that private property
rights in trust resources are limited, however, the doctrine effectively advances governmental authority in the resource protection area.
Undoubtedly for this reason, one of the major shifts in trust doctrine litigation over the last fifteen years has been the increase in cases brought by
the government to enforce the doctrine or, alternatively, brought initially
by a private party challenging the validity of a governmental enforcement
3
action based on the sovereign's trust power.

79. Se.i,e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 256-57, 491 P.2d 374, 377-78, 98
Cal. Rptr. 790, 793-94 (1971) (en banc); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle
Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622, 624, 671 P.2d 1085, 1087 (1983); Montana Coalition
for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 164-65 (Mont. 1984); Thomas v. Sanders,
65 Ohio App. 2d 5, 6, 413 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (1979).
80. See, e.g., Maryland Dep't of Nat. Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp.
1060, 1062 (D. Md. 1972); New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power
& Light Co., 125 N.J. Super. 97, 98-99, 308 A.2d 671, 671-72 (Law Div. 1973).
81. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 261-62, 491 P.2d 374, 381-82, 98
Cal. Rptr. 790, 797-98 (1971); Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 46 Ill. 2d 330, 340-41,
263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (1970). In contrast, it is well settled in the courts that citizens cannot
enforce the federal navigation servitude. See Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125
U.S. 1, 12 (1888). Roman law provided for "popular injunctions" whereby citizens had
the equivalent of standing, regardless of individual damage, to protect public rights in
coastal areas. See Deveney, supra note 10, at 23-25.
82. The public trust decisions in the last fifteen years reveal that the government was
the party invoking the doctrine in the vast majority of cases. See, e.g., Boston Waterfront
Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979); State ex rel. Brown
v. Newport Concrete Co., 44 Ohio App. 2d 121, 336 N.E.2d 453 (1975); Warren Sand
& Gravel Co. v. Commonwealth, 20 Pa. Commw. 186, 341 A.2d 556 (1975).
83. See infra text accompanying notes 157-63.
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The most noteworthy developments for the public trust doctrine,
however, do not concern the nature of the party invoking the doctrine,
but rather the geographical reach of the doctrine and the judicial tests
for compliance with the doctrine's mandate. For the former, the doctrine's
scope has expanded markedly. For the latter, judicial viewpoints have proliferated remarkably on the meaning of the doctrine and, in particular,
on what constitutes governmental or private activity inconsistent with trust
restrictions.
2.

The GeographicalReach of the Trust Doctrine

The public trust doctrine historically concerned public rights (traditionally, commerce, navigation, and fishing8") in navigable waters and
their submerged beds. 5 Accordingly, the geographical application of the
doctrine turned on the meaning of "navigable water." Although both the
federal navigation servitude and state sovereign ownership share common
roots, the definition of navigability differs for each. The federal expression of the trust doctrine-the navigation servitude-applies to waters that
are "navigable in fact," that is, used or susceptible to being used in their
natural condition or with reasonable improvements for purposes of trade
or commerce. 86 State sovereign ownership of submerged beds under the
equal footing doctrine similarly applies to waters that are "navigable in
fact," but with the added restriction that navigability is determined by
considering the condition of the waters only at the time the state was admitted to the Union. 87 Both of these inquiries raise matters of federal law.88
The geographical reach of the public trust doctrine has expanded both
within the domain of waters and to other resources, although the
geographical reach of the navigation servitude has not extended in a parallel
manner. 89 Gradually, application of the public trust doctrine has shifted
to include navigable waters that do not meet the federal test of navigabil84. Comment, supra note 3, at 777-78.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 23-29.

86. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870); see United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 406-09 (1940).
87. See, e.g., Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); United States v. Oregon,

295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
88. State law, however, determines both the extent of a riparian landowner's title,

Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 380 (1891); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669 (1891),
and the disposition of lands below the high water mark, Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.

1, 40 (1894).
89. Changes in the meaning of navigable waters for the purpose of defining the federal
navigation servitude did occur, however, much earlier. In 1921 the Supreme Court
broadened the definition to include bodies of water that in the past were subject to commercial use, but no longer were because of subsequent physical or economic changes.
See Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 123-24 (1921). In 1940
the Court expanded the definition even further to include those bodies of water which
through "reasonable improvements" could be made navigable. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377,407-09 (1940). The current definition of navigable
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ity for the purposes of state sovereign title, but instead satisfy the lesser
state law standard of navigability.90 The result has been a dramatic movement in the geographical application of the trust doctrine away from
submerged navigable beds to water resources generally. Recent judicial
applications of the doctrine to water rights generally has reflected this
trend.91

Abandoning a jurisdictional test rooted in sovereign resource ownership has not led to abandoning the operations of the doctrine historically
bound up in notions of property law and equitable trusts. For instance,
although the original roots of the state's duty as trustee were linked to
its sovereign ownership of the beds, 92 courts have nonetheless found the
duties in the absence of state ownership.9 3 Perhaps even more remarkably,
the courts have not necessarily read this geographical expansion as having any impact on the relationship of the taking issue to the public trust
doctrine. A major factor promoting the public trust doctrine as a sound
means to achieve natural resource goals has been the argument that asserting the doctrine creates no problems of unconstitutional takings. 9 4 The

waters is set out in United States Army Corps of Engineers regulations. See Definition
of Navigable Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. §§ 329.1-.16 (1985).
90. The trend in recent case law is toward a standard requiring only that the water
body be susceptible to recreational uses. See, e.g., People ex tel. Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal.
App. 3d 1040, 1046, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448, 451 (1971); State ex rel. Brown v. Newport Concrete Co., 44 Ohio App. 2d 121, 127, 336 N.E.2d 453, 457 (1975); see also National
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 435 n.17, 658 P.2d 709, 720 n.17.
189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 356 n.17, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). But see Bott v. Commission of Nat. Resources, 415 Mich. 45, 71-74, 85-86, 327 N.W.2d 838, 846-48, 853 (1982)
(public trust not applicable to nonnavigable recreational waters). See generally Comment,
Expansion & Integration, supra note 76, at 223-24; Note, RecreationialRights in Public Water
Overlying Private Property, 8 VT. L. REv. 301 (1983).
91. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 435, 658 P.2d
709, 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 356, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Robinson v. Ariyoshi,
65 Hawaii 641, 673-77, 658 P.2d 287, 310-12 (1982); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North
Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 462-64 (N.D. 1976).
92. Indeed, in the Supreme Court's most recent public trust case, Summa Corp. v.
California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 104 S. Ct. 1751 (1984), all the parties and the
Court assumed that the trust applied only to submerged beds that the state owned in
its sovereign capacity under the equal footing doctrine. The only issue in Summa was whether
the doctrine also applied to property when never in sovereign ownership because it had
been the subject of a grant by Mexico to a private party prior to California's admission
to the Union. See id. at 1754-56. The clear thrust of the entire litigation was that the trust
doctrine aplied to beds that the state actually owned in its sovereign capacity or that
otherwise would have been owned if they were not the subject of a prior sovereign grant.
No members of the Court contended that the public trust doctrine would ever apply to
other categories of submerged lands.
93. See supra note 90.
94. See Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, supra note 76, at 725-26; Wilson, Private Property
and the Publi'.Trust: A Theoryfor Preservingthe Coastal Zone, 4 UCLA J. ENVTL. & POL. 57,
91 (1984); Comment, Can New York's Tidal Wetlands Be Saved? A Constitutionaland Common
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doctrine, courts and commentators alike have argued, merely reflects the
assertion of public rights that preexist any private property rights in the
affected resource. Its application, therefore, cannot be deemed a taking
of private property. 9 Without the ownership rationale, one would have
expected the taking problem necessarily to reemerge. 96 That the public
trust doctrine has expanded, without a concomitant reassertion of the taking
issue, apparently confirms the validity of promoters' predictions that the
doctrine was capable of adapting to broader environmental concerns.
The doctrine's expansion to resources other than water resources
evinces even greater confirmation of the modern public trust thesis. First
spreading within the aquatic environment to include marine life, 97 and
sand and gravel in water beds, 98 the trust doctrine has steadily emerged
from the watery depths to embrace the dry sand area of a beach, 99 rural
10 2
archaeological remains, 10 3
parklands, 100 a historic battlefield, 10 1 wildlife,
and even a downtown area.10 4 Litigants, arguing for even further extensions, have gone so far as to assert that the doctrine should apply to air

Law Solution, 39 ALB. L. REy. 451, 474-89 (1975); Comment, supra note 3, at 764, 787
n.113.
95. "[P]arties acquiring rights in trust property generally hold those rights subject
to the trust, and can assert no vested right to use those rights in a manner harmful to
the trust." National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 437, 658 P.2d
709, 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 358, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); see also Sax, supra
note 10, at 186-89. This type of argument is akin to that advanced by the federal government in cases involving the federal navigation servitude. See United States v. Gerlach
Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 736 (1950). See generally Note, Federal-State Conflicts Over
the Control of Western Waters, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 967, 979 (1960).
96. Wisconsin and Michigan courts have concluded that this type of a constitutional
issue is presented. See Bott v. Commission of Nat. Resources, 415 Mich. 45, 80-81 &
n.43, 327 N.W.2d 838, 851 & n.43 (1982) (compensation to private parties required to
extend public access to all recreational waters); Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 425-27,
334 N.W.2d 67, 71-72 (1983) (compensation to private parties required for extension of
public trust beyond existing level of lake); see also In re Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass.
681, 690, 313 N.E.2d 561, 568 (1974) (legislation authorizing public access to privately
owned beaches would amount to taking of private property requiring compensation).
97. See New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co.,
125 N.J. Super. 97, 101-02, 308 A.2d 671, 673 (1973).
98. See Warren Sand & Gravel Co. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Envtl. Resources,
20 Pa. Commw. 186, 193-94, 341 A.2d 556, 560 (1975).
99. See Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 181, 393 A.2d 571, 574 (1978).
100. See Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 46 Ill. 2d 330, 336, 263 N.E.2d 11, 15
(1970); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 421, 215 N.E.2d 114,
121 (1966).
101. See Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193,
197-98, 311 A.2d 588, 591 (1973).
102. See Wadev. Kramer, 121 Ill. App. 3d 377, 379-80, 459 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (1984).
103. See id., 459 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (1984). But see San Diego County Archaeological
Soc'y, Inc. v. Compadres, 81 Cal. App. 3d 923, 927, 146 Cal. Rptr. 786, 788 (1978)
(doctrine does not apply to archaeological remains).
104. See Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Nat. Resources, 115
Wis. 2d 381, 388-89, 340 N.W.2d 722, 726 (1983).
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resources 10 5 and cemeteries.1 0 6 One state supreme court recently has construed the trust doctrine to apply to all natural resources, including air
and water, and, consequently, to govern state agency decisions that implement state hazardous waste control legislation.10 7 Although the court
gleaned these trust principles from constitutional and statutory law, the
court explicitly relied as well on a separately identified "public trust concept."1108 Other courts have declined invitations to extend the doctrine
to an alley adjoining a junkyard' 0 9 and to man-made showers and
bathhouses on the seashore." 0
3.

Restrictions on Governmental Actions Adverse to Trust Concerns

Advocates of the public trust doctrine have been concerned primarily with the ability of the doctrine to impose enforceable restrictions on
the authority of the sovereign to act in a manner potentially harmful to
the trust resource."' Predictions that the doctrine would provide courts
with the needed legal basis to restrict such governmental acts have borne
out. Still, the doctrine's precise meaning to those courts has varied considerably. Some courts diverge from the mainstream to find that the doctrine places an affirmative duty on the government to protect or conserve
trust resources in the first instance." 2 Most, however, find it restricts
governmental actions that adversely affect trust concerns. Within this lat-

ter category, courts differ considerably over the precise standards to apply to the challenged governmental action. The decisions gravitate around

three types of standards: (1) a requirement that the challenged governmental action satisfy a public trust purpose;" 3 (2) a requirement that the
105. See Evans v. City of Johnstown, 96 Misc. 2d 755, 769-71, 410 N.Y.S.2d 199,
207-08 (Sup. Ct. 1978); cf. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419,
430-31, 435, 658 P.2d 709, 716, 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 353, 356 (commenting on advene
impacts on air quality of trust resource), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
106. See Washington Metro Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land, 514 F.2d 1350,
1352 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
107. See Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152,
1154 n.102, 1157 (La. 1984).
108. See id. at 1154.
109. See Mamolella v. First Bank, 97 Ill. App. 3d 579, 582-83, 423 N.E.2d 204, 206-07
(1981).
110. See Hyland v. Borough of Allenhurst, 148 N.J. Super. 437, 442-43, 372 A.2d 1133,
1136 (1977), modified, 78 N.J. 190, 393 A.2d 579 (1978).
111. This focus on suits against the government is evident, for instance, throughout
Sax' article and is most clearly stated in the list of three characteristics the doctrine must
possess to be meaningful. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. One of those
characteristics is that the public right must be "enforceable against the government."
Sax, supra note 3, at 474.
112. See, e.g., State v. Zimring, 58 Hawaii 106, 121, 566 P.2d 725, 735 (1977); People
of Smithtown v. Poveromo, 71 Misc. 2d 524, 534, 336 N.Y.S.2d 764, 776-77 (Suffolk
County Ct. 1972); Lower Colo. River Auth. v. Texas Dep't of Water Resources, 689
S.W.2d 873, 875, 882 (Tex. 1984).
113. See infra text accompanying notes 116-28.
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disputed action occur only after consideration of any adverse impact on
the trust resource and then only if such impact is either minimal or
necessary; 114 and (3) a requirement that if the action challenged is that
of an executive branch agency, the proposed action has specific legislative
authorization. 115
a.

Requirement of a Public Trust Purpose

For some courts, the requirement of some public trust purpose is
satisfied quite easily. These courts simply look for some relationship be116
tween the proposed governmental action and a legitimate public purpose.
This standard apparently does not require significantly more than would
the normal police power inquiry for a valid public purpose.1 1 7 Other courts,
however, have gone further and required the public purpose to have
some connection with the substantive concerns of the trust doctrine. For
some judges, this means a relation to the traditional public trust purposescommerce, navigation, and fishing. 118 For others, the requirement extends
further and calls for a relation to the resource in its natural condition.
For example, some courts have suggested that the proposed use of a
navigable waterway or its banks should bear some direct relation to and
be consistent with the aquatic characteristics of the resource.1 19
In either event, the tests have proved susceptible to flexible application. Courts have found diverse activities such as production of oil120 and
construction of bridges, 121 a YMCA, 122 restaurants, bars, and a shopping

114. See infra text accompanying notes 129-48.
115. See infra text accompanying notes 149-54.
116. See, e.g., State v. Zimring, 58 Hawaii 106, 120-21, 566 P.2d 725, 734-35 (1977)
(access to lava extensions a valid public purpose); Opinions of the Justices, 383 Mass.
895, 905-06, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1100-01 (1981) (desire to clear titles satisfies public purpose requirement); New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super.
457, 472-76, 292 A.2d 580, 589-91 (1971) (sports and racing facility a valid public purpose); Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 200-01,
311 A.2d 588, 592 (1973) (development a valid public purpose); Town of Ashwaubenon
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 22 Wis. 2d 38, 49-50, 125 N.W.2d 647, 653 (1964) (private
structures and filling in waterbeds a valid public purpose).
117. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1978).
118. See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 521, 606 P.2d 362,
364-65, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 329-30, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); see also People ex
rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 77-81, 360 N.E.2d 773, 779-81 (1976)
(promotion of plant facilities and jobs not valid trust purpose).
119. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y y. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 440-41,
658 P.2d 709, 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 360, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); State ex
rel. State Lands Comm'n v. County of Orange, 134 Cal. App. 3d 20, 23-24, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 423, 424-25 (1982); see also Sax, supra note 3, at 512, 514, 520-21 (describing tests
applied by Wisconsin state courts).
120. See Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 189-93, 273 P. 797, 815-16 (1928).
121. See Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Public Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 417-18,
432 P.2d 3, 9, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 407 (1967) (dictum), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968).
122. See People v. City of Long Beach, 51 Cal. 2d 875, 879-80, 338 P.2d 177, 179 (1959).
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complex 123 to meet these heightened trust standards. More recently, one
court concluded that developing a public trust water resource to build an
airport runway does not offend trust concerns, with one member of the
court reasoning that the airport would promote "commerce" and possible air "navigation. "1 24 So too, highways, 125 driving ranges,126 and shopping malls 127 have in recent years passed public trust muster. One court
even ruled that granting licenses to commercial enterprises for areas of
23
a public lake does not run afoul of public trust purpose restrictions.1
b.

Requirement of Prior Consideration and Minimization of Adverse Impacts
on Trust Values

The most meaningful construction the courts have given the public
trust doctrine has been to require the government to consider the adverse
impacts cf a proposed action on trust resources. The impact of this consideration requirement is at its greatest when coupled with the additional
mandate that only minimal or "necessary" harm is permissible. Courts
have held that consideration of trust concerns occurs in advance of proposed governmental action, 129 requires prior comprehensive resource
planning'3 0 or specific cost/benefit balancing, 13 1 and includes a continuing duty to reconsider when circumstances and knowledge change. 32 The
consideration requirement asks courts to scrutinize more carefully the basis
133
of administrative agency decisions when trust values are at stake.
Some courts add the restriction that the government is always barred
from inflicting more than a modicum of harm to trust interests. This
restriction is expressed in several forms. Most courts, borrowing language

123. See Martin v. Smith, 184 Cal. App. 2d 571, 578, 7 Cal. Rptr. 725, 728 (1960).

Professor Sax not only recognized this phenomenon, but apparently endorsed it, arguing
that the water-relatedness requirement may be satisfied by cafes, restaurants, motels, hotels,
and the like. See Sax, supra note 3, at 531-32, 535.
124. See Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 285 Or. 197, 217, 590 P.2d 709, 716

(1979) (Bryson, J., concurring).
125. See Wade v. Kramer, 121 INl. App. 3d 377, 378-79, 459 N E.2d 1025, 1026 (1984)
126. See Clement v. Chicago Park Dist., 96 Il.
2d 26, 31, 449 N.E.2d 81, 83-84 (1983).

127. See Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Nat. Resources, 115
Wis. 2d 381, 388, 410-12, 340 N.W.2d 722, 726, 737-38 (1983).
128. See State v. Village of Lake Delton, 93 Wis. 2d 78, 81-82. 106, 286 N.W.2d 622,

624-25, 636 (1979).
129. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 446-47, 658 P.2d

709, 728, 189 Cal, Rptr. 346, 365, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
130. See United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n,
247 N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976).
131. See Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. 14, 29-30, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (1973); see
Stevens,

supra note 10, at 224.
132, See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 446-47, 658 P.2d

709, 728-29, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 365-66, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
133, Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152,

'1159-60 (La, 1984).
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from the Illinois Centraldecision, 134 have required that there be no "substantial impairment" of the trust resource. 1 35 Other courts have stated that
only a "small percentage" of the trust resource 36 may be harmed or that
only "limited encroachments" may be made on the resource. 137 Finally,
many courts have held that the public trust doctrine requires that the public
have access to the resource, regardless of the public or private character
of the nominal owner of the resource. 138 Accordingly, even if governmental alienation of a coastal shoreline into private hands is otherwise permissible, these courts would rule that such alienation must not prejudice
the public right of access to the resource. 39 Beach access cases have been
a frequent subject of public trust litigation over the last fifteen years as
courts have extended trust interests to include recreation, 140 the temporary
14
use of adjacent private property for the placement of a beach towel, '
even to the use of municipal toilet facilities. 1 42 On the basis of the dochave struck down laws restricting public actrine, moreover, state courts
143
cess to beach facilities.

The courts, in more recent decisions, have recognized that destruction of trust resources is sometimes necessary, and therefore, they will
134. See 146 U.S. at 453 ("without any substantial impairment of the public interest
in the lands and waters remaining").
135. See, e.g., Superior Public Rights, Inc. v. State Dep't of Nat. Resources, 80 Mich.
App. 72, 84, 263 N.W.2d 290, 295-96 (1977); Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands,
285 Or. 197, 202-03, 590 P.2d 709, 711 (1979); Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Nat. Resources, 115 Wis. 2d 381, 391-94, 340 N.W.2d 722, 728-29 (1983).
136. See, e.g., Orange County v. Heim, 30 Cal. App. 3d 694, 723-26, 106 Cal. Rptr.
825, 849-52 (1973); Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 46 Ill. 2d 330, 343, 263 N.E.2d
11, 19 (1970); State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 118, 81 N.W.2d 71, 73-74
(1957).
137. See, e.g., Hixon v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 32 Wis. 2d 608, 618, 146 N.W.2d 577,
582 (1966).
138. See, e.g., Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629, 649-50,
393 N.E.2d 356, 367 (1979); Saetz v. Heiser, 240 N.W.2d 67, 72 (N.D. 1976).
139. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 326, 471 A.2d
355, 365-66, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984); Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629, 649, 393 N.E.2d 356, 367 (1979). But see Opinions of the
Justices, 383 Mass. 895, 902, 905, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1098, 1100 (1981) (public trust does
not bar legislature from extinguishing public interest in submerged lands). Similarly, in
feudal times the sovereign's grant of the ancient desmesne, see supra note 20, might be
valid, but the grant was subject to the privileges of the ancient desmesne tenants and
therefore those tenants retained their special liberties and immunities. I F. POLLOCK &
W. MAITLAND, supra note 20, at 385.
140. See Selvin, supra note 10, at 1439-40; Stevens, supra note 10, at 221-23. But see
Livingston, supra note 75, at 681-82 (Virginia public trust does not extend to recreation
in navigable waters).
141. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 326, 471 A.2d 355,
365-66, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984).
142. See Hyland v. Borough of Allenhurst, 78 N.J. 190, 196, 393 A.2d 579, 582 (1978).
143. See, e.g., Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 180, 393 A.2d 571, 574
(1978). One court wisely held that the doctrine does not void a state law restricting motorboats on a lake during Sunday. See Menzer v. Village of Elkhart Lake, 51 Wis. 2d 70,
84, 186 N.W.2d 290, 298 (1971).

71

IOWA LAW REVIEW

631

[1986)

impose a public trust standard that calls for heightened administrative
justification for the action. 144 This standard is implemented, for instance,
by reversing the presumption of agency regularity and expertise, 145 allowing
only "necessary" harmful activities,1 46 or requiring that the government
take all "reasonable"

14

7

or "feasible"'1 48 steps to minimize the harm. Each

of these standards by their terms stops short of declaring an absolute environmental quality standard.
c.

Requirement of Clear Statutory Authority to Impinge on Trust Values

The third type of public trust standard the courts have utilized to
check governmental activities that threaten trust resources requires strict
statutory construction of legislative delegations of authority to administrative
agencies. Professor Sax emphasized particularly this technique.

49

The

underlying substantive thrust of this standard holds that only the legislature
can properly decide to have the government take action that may substantially harm trust resources, because the legislature most closely mirrors
the will of the public. Although a few courts have interpreted this mandate literally and have stated that only the legislature can interfere with
trust interests,150 most permit the power to be delegated, requiring only
varying degrees of clarity when the legislature delegates authority to the
relevant administrative agency. The general test is whether the legislative
delegation of authority to the agency is clear, express, and specific.' 5'
Specificity may require that the legislature identify the trust property at
issue and expressly acknowledge the existing use of the resource that the
144. This assumption of administrative irregularity apparently was an explicit object
of Professor Sax' public trust thesis, see Sax, supra note 3, at 490, and was the focus of
much scholarly criticism, seeJaffe, Book Review, 84 HARV. L. Rev. 1562, 1564-69 (1971);
Tarlock, Book Review, 47 IND. L.J. 406, 411-14 (1972); see also Butler & Cameron, Book
Review, I COLOGY L.Q. 228, 231 (1971).
145. See Sax, supra note 3, at 514.
146. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 446, 658 P.2d
719, 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 365, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
147. See Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. 14, 28-29, 312 A.2d 86, 94-95 (1973).
148. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 446, 658 P.2d
709, 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 364, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
149. See Sax, supra note 3, at 542-43.
150. See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629, 648-49,
393 N.E.2d 356, 366 (1979); Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495, 511
(Sup. Ct. 1972).
151. See State Dep't of Nat. Resources v. City of Haines, 627 P.2d 1047, 1052 (Alaska
1981); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 528, 606 P.2d 362, 367, 162
Cal. Rptr. 327, 332, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral
Bd., 317 So. 2d 576, 586 (La. 1974) (statutes should be interpreted in light of state's
public polity). The United States is not unique in reading narrowly conveyances of trust
property. Under German dynastic law, property the Crown held in its sovereign capacity, such as artwork, could be disposed of only with the express authorization of the Diet
(Parliament). See Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1153-54 (2d
Cir. 1982). Recently, one commentator has argued that public trust-like principles should
be applied to art. See Comment, Public Interest in Art, supra note 76, at 129-36.
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proposed governmental action will harm. 152 The Wisconsin courts have
further required that legislative delegations of authority to harm trust
resources must be delegations to governmental bodies of statewide conpossibility of parochial
cern. 5 3 This restriction's purpose is to minimize the
154
interests.
statewide
broader
interests neglecting
4.

Promotion of Governmental Authority

As discussed above, 155 recent developments in the public trust doctrine arena have not been confined to suits in which the private citizen
is the plaintiff asserting the doctrine and the government is the unwilling
defendant resisting the trust's application. Indeed, the proponent of the
trust doctrine has quite often been the government. Typically, the government has argued that the public trust doctrine expands sovereign authority over natural resources covered by the doctrine. In particular, the government asserts that the doctrine limits the nature of valid private property
rights in those resources, rendering permissible governmental measures
5 6
that impinge on those private interests.
Many courts have adopted this theory of enhanced sovereign authority.
These courts refer to the sovereign's greater regulatory authority over trust
resources as the "great police power of the people." 157 Some courts, possibly
in anticipation of takings challenges to strict governmental resource protection measures, have ruled that there are no "vested rights" to act contrary to the trust. 58 Courts also emphasize that all conveyances of trust
resources to private parties are subject to the sovereign's retained supervisory authority; 159 private property rights in the resource are "impressed"
with the public trust,1 60 fee simple absolute notwithstanding.
152. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d 576, 578-79 (La. 1974); Opinions of the Justices, 383 Mass. 895, 919-20, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1108 (1981); Gould v.

Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 419-21, 426, 215 N.E.2d 114, 121-23,
126 (1966).
153. See Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 515, 53 N.W.2d 514, 524

(1952).
154. See Sax, supra note 3, at 521-23.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
156. See id.
157. See, e.g., People of Smithtown v. Poveromo, 71 Misc. 2d 524, 534, 336 N.Y.S.2d
764, 776 (Suffolk County Ct. 1972).
158. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 424, 658
P.2d 709, 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 349, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) ("[The public
trust] authority ... bars any party from claiming a vested right to divert waters once

it becomes clear that such diversions harm the interests protected by the trust"); see also
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 50 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting);

Warren Sand & Gravel Co. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 20 Pa. Commw.
186, 193-94, 341 A.2d 556, 560 (1975).
159. See, e.g., United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass.
1981); Bortz Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 2 Pa. Commw. 441, 453-54, 279 A.2d 388,
396 (1971).
160. See People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 588, 138 P. 79, 84 (1913); see
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Courts have used the trust doctrine in a variety of other ways to
enhance state enforcement efforts. For example, several courts have held
that the doctrine confers standing on the government to seek injunctive
relief to prevent threats to trust resources, 161 or when the harm has already
occurred, to sue for monetary relief. 162 At least one court has held that
the doctrine eliminates any laches defense to a state enforcement action
163
based on the trust.

III.

THE PAST AND FUTURE ROLES OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

The persistent role that the public trust doctrine has played in natural
resources and environmental law over the past fifteen years has established the doctrine as an important subject for study and academic in-

quiry. Whether the doctrine is a viable legal concept worthy of continued
advancement by public spirited litigants, however, is not answered by the
doctrine's persistence alone. The remainder of this Article addresses this
more fundamental question.
Assessment of the future value of the public trust doctrine must start
with the candid premise that the doctrine rests on legal fictions. Notions
of "sovereign ownership" of certain natural resources and the "duties
of the sovereign as trustee" to natural resources are simply judicially created

shorthand methods to justify treating differently governmental transactions that involve those resources. Like most legal fictions, 1 64 the purpose
of the public trust doctrine at various periods of American legal history
and in recent years has been to avoid judicially perceived limitations or
consequences of existing rules of law. The precise object of concern varied;
in Illinois Central, it was corrupt or shortsighted state legislatures;165 in the
nineteenth-century water rights and city street matters, it was inadequacies

in absolute private property rights that denied public needs 166 or private
tort remedies that threatened municipal development;1 67 more recently,

also State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 228, 625 P.2d 239, 250, 172 Cal. Rptr.
696, 706, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981).
161. See Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commw. 441, 453-54, 279
A.2d 388, 396 (1971), appealafter remand, 7 Pa. Commw. 362, 299 A.2d 670 (1973); State
v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 224 N.W.2d 407, 413 (1974).
162. See State Dep't of Nat. Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060,
1065-67 (D. Md. 1972); New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power
& Light Co., 125 N.J. Super. 97, 102, 308, A.2d 671, 673-74 (1973).
163. See Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. v. State Land Bd., 250 Or. 319, 325-26, 439
P.2d 575, 578 (1968). The Supreme Court recently rejected a state's claim that its ownership of sovereign lands held in public trust eliminated the need for compliance with an
otherwise applicable federal statute of limitations in an action brought by the United States
to quiet title to a riverbed. See Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983), which
ik discussed infra at note 471.
164. L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 53 (1967).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 30-44.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
167. Set supra text accompanying note 52.
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the source of worry in the environmental arena has, as Professor
Sax put
1 68
it, been with "insufficiencies of the democratic process.")
To be sure, courts and commentators alike invariably refer to the
ancient law origins of the doctrine,1 69 thereby suggesting that the legal
basis upon which they rely is long settled and not a matter of judicial
creation. Still, even assuming the doctrine existed in ancient times, which
may be doubtful,17 0 the courts have made no effort to discover the doctrine's ancient bounds or to remain confined to those bounds. Indeed,
the thrust of current "protrust" commentary is to the contrary; 71' 1 the
viability of the ancient roots is largely irrelevant to the doctrine's current
17 2
application, apart from presenting "seeds of ideas.'
Characterizing the public trust as a "legal fiction," however, is not
intended, by itself, to suggest a negative verdict on the doctrine's worth
or vitality.1 73 Although undoubtedly the term "fiction" has negative connotations, it is far too late in the day to condemn legal fictions as mere
"fictions" and ignore that they quite often play a significant role in the
law's development, as they must for any sort of system that strives for
comprehensiveness in the face of limited and changing knowledge. 174 As
Professor Lon Fuller has described in his classic work on legal fictions,
they "are, to a certain extent, simply the growing pains of the language
75
of the law.'

'

Instead of immediately casting the fiction aside, recognizing the fictional nature of the trust doctrine is necessary to frame the debate on the
doctrine's continued usefulness in natural resources law. Just as the need
for legal fictions arises in the wake of changing circumstances that strain
existing legal norms, so too the need dissipates when, over time, the fabric
of the law is woven in a more coherent and systematic fashion in response
to those initial changes. Or, alternatively, new changes may occur that
similarly remove the initial justification for the fiction's creation. In this
manner, a time comes when the fiction is no longer necessary. Even more
fundamentally, the fiction's continued use obscures analysis and thus impedes the law's coherent development. 76 On this basis, the future of the
public trust doctrine in natural resources law must be assessed.
168. Sax, supra note 3, at 521.
169. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 429, 658
P.2d 709, 718, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 355, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Stevens, supra

note 10, at 195-98.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 11-20.
171. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 10, at 195-98; Wilkinson, supra note 76, at 298-304.
172. Sax, supra note 3, at 485.
173. In contrast, Bentham, according to Professor Fuller, took just such a harsh stand
on the use of fictions in law: " 'Fiction of use to justice? Exactly as swindling is to trade.' "
L. FULLER, supranote 164, at 3 (quoting BENTHAM WORK at vii, 283 (J.Bowring ed. 1843)).
174. L. FULLER, supra note 164, at x, 94.
175. See id. at 22.

176. Id. at 70, 121-22.
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Assessing the public trust doctrine on this basis leads to the conclu&ionthat the day of "final reckoning' ' 1 77 for the doctrine is here, or soon
will be, and reliance upon it is no longer in order. As shown in the following sections, the law of standing, tort law, property law, administrative
law, and the police power have all evolved in response to increased societal
concern f'or and awareness of environmental and natural resources problems and are weaving a new and unified fabric for natural resources law.
Whether these developments are viewed as totally independent of the doctrine or, alternatively, as somehow having subsumed the doctrine's principles does not matter. The conclusion is the same from either perspective: much of what the public trust doctrine offered in the past is now,
at best, superfluous and, at worst, distracting and theoretically inconsistent with new notions of property and sovereignty developing in the current reworking of natural resources law. Section IV will consider in detail
78
these adverse consequences of continued reliance on the doctrine.1
A.

The Law of Standing and the Public Trust Doctrine

The law of standing illustrates the doctrine's current demise. 79 Promoting the public trust doctrine was in part based on its potential for providing citizens with the "legal interest" or "legal right" necessary to confer
standing to bring a lawsuit. 80 At the time Professor Sax wrote his article,
a litigant had to demonstrate an injury to a legal interest to possess standing to sue, particularly with regard to judicial review of governmental
agency action. 8" The legal right, moreover, had to be either "one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion,
or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege. 1812 Whether concern about environmental harm or waste of natural resources satisfied this
standing requirement was in serious doubt; at least it had not been satisfactorily resolved in favor of environmental interests. The public trust doctrine, by providing a formal legal right to environmental quality, addressed
the standing concern.

177. Id. at 121.
178. See infra text accompanying notes 368-476.
179. The issue of standing to sue asks whether a particular plaintiff is entitled to have
a court consider the merits of a dispute. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 79
(1978). It i:; a question of justiciability, derived mostly from article III of the Constitution, which extends judicial power only to "cases" or "controversies," see U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, but is also derived partly from limitations that the judiciary has self-imposed.
L TRIBE, supra, at 52-53. Standing is thus related to other concepts of justiciability, including tho3e concerning advisory opinions, political questions, ripeness, and mootness,
but it is theoretically distinct in its focus on the plaintiff, rather than on the issues presented.
Id. at 79.
180. See Coquillette, supra note 10, at 814-16; see also supra text accompanying note 57.
181. See, e.g., Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118,
137 (1939).
182. Id. at 137-38.
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Hindsight teaches, however, that this aspect of the doctrine was not
needed. Soon after the Sax article was published, the Supreme Court
dramatically liberalized standing requirements, 18 3 responding in large part
to the need to recognize the legitimacy of the new type of injury reflected
in environmental cases. The Court abandoned the legal interest test on
the ground that it improperly based a litigant's right to sue on a preliminary
determination of the merits 84 and read the Constitution's case or controversy requirement to restrict federal court jurisdiction to cases in which
a plaintiff alleges an "injury in fact, economic or otherwise."1 8 5 Justice

Douglas, writing for the majority in Data Processing, stressed that the requisite injury could encompass injury to a broad range 1of
values, including
86
aesthetic, conservational, and recreational interests.
In a host of subsequent cases involving allegations of environmental
injuries, the Court further opened the avenues to these lawsuits. 187 Although
denying standing to the Sierra Club in 1972 for the lack of any allegations that developing a national forest would affect any of the club's activities, the Court stressed that the Sierra Club would clearly possess standing by suing in its own name on behalf of its members who were injured
in fact. 188 When stating in another case that the injury must be personal,18 9
the Court added that "standing is not to be denied simply because many
people suffer the same injury." 190 On that ground the Court upheld standing even though "all persons who utilize the scenic resources of the country,
and indeed, all who breathe its air" shared the alleged harm.' 9' Finally,
in environmental cases, the Court has liberally construed the standing
requirement that a fairly traceable causal connection must exist between
the defendant's alleged illegal conduct and the plaintiff's injury to ensure
that the relief sought will redress the injury.1 92 In one case, the Court
183. See Association of Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
184. See id. at 153.
185. See id. at 152. Many commentators have viewed the "injury in fact" test established
in Data Processingas a substantial liberalization of standing requirements. See, e.g., Scott,
Standing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 662-69 (1973);
Note, Standing to Challenge the Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act: The Effect
of a CongressionalAttempt to Relax Standing Requirements, 65 GEo. L.J. 1231, 1249 & n.100,
1252-53 & n.116 (1977).
186. See 397 U.S. at 154.
187. See, e.g., Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 161 (1981); Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 81 (1978); United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 685 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as United States v. SCRAP].
188. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972). One year later in SCRAP
the Court upheld the standing of an organization apparently formed for the purpose of
bringing the suit in question. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 685 (1973).
189. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975).
190. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973).
191. See id.
192. Cf. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976); Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-18 (1973).
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found standing when the plaintiffs alleged that a proposed across-the-board
railroad freight fare increase would result in increased pollution because
it would reduce the cost-effectiveness of recycling. 19 In another, the Court
found the required causal nexus was met when plaintiffs alleged that a
federal statute limiting liability in the event of a major nuclear accident
would lead, through a chain of causation, to potential water pollution from
a propo,3ed nuclear power plant. l94
The law of standing, in short, has dramatically evolved to embrace
the particular characteristics of a case or controversy involving environmental injuries, the lack of a formal legal right and the often attenuated nature
of the causation chain in environmental cases being two typical
characteristics. The rationale of the trust doctrine was unnecessary. Indeed, the doctrine's emphasis on formal legal rights is inconsistent with
the rationale of the modern standing decisions that have fostered environmental protection goals.
B.

Nuisance Law and the Public Trust Doctrine

Examining nuisance law similarly casts doubt on the continuing role
of the public trust doctrine. 195 Promoters of the public trust doctrine such
as Professor Sax rejected nuisance law in favor of the public trust doc96
trine because the former was "encrusted" with antiquated requirements.'
The strict limits on private citizen suits based on public nuisance law,
historically a basis only for suits brought by the attorney general, and
the traditional relationship between nuisance and actions irrelevant to
natural resource issues, such as suits against brothels and gambling dens,
1 97
were two explicit concerns.

Neither of these concerns with the limits of nuisance law, however,
was realized. First, the substantive scope of both public and private nuisance
law has quite willingly embraced environmental and natural resource
concerns. 19 In public nuisance cases, courts have had no difficulty find193. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 678 (1973).

194. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 73 (1978).
195. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a public nuisance is the "unreasonable

interference with a right common to the general public." See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF

ToRrs § 821B (1977). "A private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another's in-

terest in the private use and enjoyment of land." Id. § 821D. See generally PROSSER AND
KEETON OIVTHE LAW OF TORTS §§ 86-91, at 616-54 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER

AND KEETON].

196. See Sax, supra note 3, at 485 n.45.
197. See id.
198. This is not surprising. Courts historically have treated the public trust doctrine
and nuisance law as equivalents in the context of interference with public rights in navigable
waterways. See, e.g., United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 1126, 1130 (E.D.
La. 1978), af#'d, 627 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1980); Hartford Elec. Light Co. v. Water Resources
Comm'n, 162 Conn. 89, 101, 291 A.2d 721, 729-30 (1971); Mamolella v. First Bank,

97 I1. App. 3d 579, 582-83, 423 N.E.2d 204, 206-07 (1981); Dumont v. Speers, 245
A.2d 151, 155 (Me. 1968). Commentators also have pointed out the close relationship
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ing that threats to the natural environment and to public health from environmental pollution implicate "rights common to the public."' 99 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts quite clearly draws the connection between public
nuisance doctrine and environmental protection. 200 Moreover, the relevance
of environmental protection to private nuisance law is axiomatic. Private
nuisance law by definition restricts activities that interfere with the use
and enjoyment of land. 01' Land is such a fundamental natural resource
that most environmental threats, whether directed at natural resources
or public health, can easily be read as interfering with the land's use and
20 2
enjoyment, and thereby potentially raising private nuisance claims.
The second concern, that only the attorney general could maintain
a public nuisance lawsuit, similarly was not realized. Courts have not confined public nuisance lawsuits to the domain of the attorney general.

between the two doctrines in the natural resource area. See M. HALE, supra note 20, at
338-39 (King does not have power to convey public rights in navigable waters to private
parties because he possesses no power to license a nuisance); W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK
ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.16, at 175, 177 (1977) ("For the most part, public nuisance
is the inland version of the public trust doctrine although, not surprisingly, history records
public trust theory being applied in the classical nuisance contest, nuisance theory being
applied in the classical public trust context, and both theories being applied together.")
(footnotes omitted); Deveney, supra note 10, at 46.
199. See, e.g., Village ofWilsonville v. SCA Serv., Inc., 86 Ill.
2d 1, 21-22, 426 N.E.2d
824, 834 (1981) (licensed chemical waste dump); City of Chicago v. Commonwealth Edison,
24 111. App. 3d 624, 631, 321 N.E.2d 412, 418 (1974) (air pollution); Helmkamp v. Clarke
Ready Mix Co., 214 N.W.2d 126, 129 (Iowa 1974) (noise and air pollution from cement
plant); Wood v. Picollo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1247 (R.I. 1982) (exposure to toxic chemicals);
Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc. 657 P.2d 267, 274 (Utah 1982) (groundwater contamination); Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101 Wash. 2d 307, 331, 678 P.2d 803, 816 (1984)
(city disposal of raw sewage into waterbody); see also Miller v. Cudahy Co., 21 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1549, 1571 (D. Kan. 1984) ("Elements of a public nuisance also mingle
in this controversy, because the pollution released by the defendants has wrought substantial
damage to a precious natural resource.").
200. "Some courts have shown a tendency ... to treat substantial interference with
...established principles of conservation of natural resources as amounting to a public
nuisance. [The Restatement language] is not intended to set restrictions against developments
of this nature." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 821B comment e (1977). Many commentators have promoted use of nuisance doctrine to further environmental protection
and resource conservation goals. See, e.g., Bryson & Macbeth, Public Nuisance, The Restatement (Second) of Torts, and Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241, 281 (1972); Warren,
Nuisance Law as an Environmental Tool, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 227-29 (1971); Comment, Obstruction of Sunlight as a Private Nuisance, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 94, 106 (1977);

Comment, FederalJurisdiction,EnvironmentalLaw, Nuisance, State Ecological Rights Arising Under
Federal Common Law, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 597, 612.
201. See generally PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 195, at 619-20.
202. A recent case is illustrative. In Miller v. Cudahy Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)

1549 (D. Kan. 1984), the district court awarded 33 plaintiffs-farmers and their families-S3
million in damages for harm caused to area groundwaters by a salt company. The court
ruled that the plant was primarily a private nuisance, but that "[e]lements of a public
nuisance also mingle in th[e] controversy." See id. at 1571. The court added that the defendant company was liable for an additional $10 million in punitive damages. See id. at 1573.
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Rather, the rule in most jurisdictions has been that a private citizen must
20 3
allege some "special injury" to maintain a public nuisance action.
Although courts have occasionally dismissed public nuisance lawsuits
brought by citizens for lack of special injury, 20 4 courts generally have relaxed
the injury requirement, much as the Supreme Court has relaxed the
"generalized grievance" limitation on standing in environmental cases.105
Some courts rely on the relationship of public nuisances to private nuisances
to minimize the "special injury" requirement. Specifically, these courts
hold that a citizen who can allege a private nuisance injury satisfies any
special injury requirement necessary to maintain a public nuisance action.206 In any event, the clear trend in the law, endorsed by the Restatenent, is to dispose of any special injury requirement when the private
litigant's public nuisance action is seeking to enjoin or abate the nuisance,
as opposed to seeking money damages. 20 7 Private litigants need satisfy
only the normally applicable standing requirements, 2 8 which9 the courts,
20
as discussed above, have relaxed in environmental cases.
203. See, e.g., City of Birmingham v. City of Fairfield, 375 So. 2d 438, 441 (Ala. 1979);
Helix Land Co. v. City of San Diego, 82 Cal. App. 3d 932, 949, 147 Cal. Rptr. 683,
692-93 (1978); Mamolella v. First Bank, 97 Il.App. 3d 579, 582, 423 N.E.2d 204, 206
(1981); Stop & Shop Co. v. Fisher, 387 Mass. 889, 894, 444 N.E.2d 368, 372 (1983);
Raymond v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 Or. 629, 634, 488 P.2d 460, 463 (1971); Solar Salt
Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 555 P.2d 286, 288 (Utah 1976); Roy v. Farr, 128
Vt. 30, 37, 258 A.2d 799, 803 (1969).
204. See, e.g.,
Town of Rome City v. King, 450 N.E.2d 72, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983);
Frady v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 55 Or. App. 344, 358, 637 P.2d 1345, 1349 (1981).
Some courts similarly apply a special injury standing requirement to public trust litigation brought by private parties. See, e.g., Kerpelman v. Board of Pub. Works, 261 Md.
,136, 443, 276 A.2d 56, 60 (1971); see also W. RODGERS, supra note 198, at 177 & n.52.
205. Among its stated prudential limitations on standing, the Supreme Court has stated
that "when the asserted harm is a 'generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal
measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant
exercise of jurisdiction." See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). This limitation
appears to have carried little weight in the Court's standing cases concerning environmental
iights. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973) ("standing is not to be
denied simply because many people suffer the same injury"); supra text accompanying
notes 190-91.
206. See, e.g., B & W Management, Inc. v. Tasea Inv. Co., 451 A.2d 879, 882 (D.C.
1982); City of Monticello v. Rankin, 521 S.W.2d 79, 80-81 (Ky. 1975); see also Miller
v. Cudahy, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1549, 1571 (D. Kan. 1984). which is discussed
supra at note 202; Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101 Wash. 2d 307, 332, 678 P.2d 803,

817 (1984).
207. "In order to ...enjoin or abate the public nuisance, one must... have standing
tosue as a representative of the general public, as a citizen in a citizen's action or as
a member of a class in a class action." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 821C(2) (1977).
See generally W. RODGERS, supra note 198, at 105-06.
208. See, e.g., Akau v. Olohana Corp., 65 Hawaii 383, 386-90, 652 P.2d 1130, 1133-35
(1982); see also Comment, Public Nuisance: Standing toSue Without Showing "Special Injuy , "
26 U. FLA. L. REv. 360, 365-66 (1974) (discussing Florida decision relaxing standing
requirements).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 187-94.
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Finally, underlying the rise of nuisance law is a basic judicial reformulation of the relationship between tort and property law in the natural
resources context. This reformulation is inconsistent with the general thrust
of the public trust doctrine. In the past, the outcome in nuisance cases
was often predetermined by judicial reliance on property-based rules that
purportedly dictated the rights of various parties in the use of their respective
property. 210 With increasing frequency, courts have abandoned rigid
property-based rules in favor of balancing the competing considerations,
including both individual equities and broad societal interests, of each
party's legal position. 21' A party's entitlement to the protection of nuisance
law no longer turns so much on the possession of an identifiable "legal
interest" that has been harmed. Totally apart from these legal labels, the
precise gravity and nature of the individual's injury is relevant to the judicial
inquiry. Just such an approach to nuisance law recently led one court
to conclude that an individual's economic interest in access to solar energy
merited some protection in a nuisance action brought against a neighbor
who threatened to cut off access. 21 2 Previously, courts had ruled that
210. See Coquillette, supra note 10, at 769-72; Horwitz, The Transformation in the Concept
of Property in American Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 248, 249 (1973).
211. With industrialization and urbanization, conflicts occurred increasingly between
property owners and it became clear that applying absolute property rules could no longer
resolve those conflicts. It was necessary to consider the interest of society and not just
the private parties in formulating a legal rule. See Coquillette, supra note 10, at 778-79;
Donahue, The Future of the Concept of Property Predictedfrom Its Past, in PROPERTY: Nohios
XXII 28, 53 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1980); Horwitz, supra note 210, at 290;
Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 691, 724 (1938). See
generally Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules & Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972) (various legal relationships integrated in a
model that suggests solutions to pollution problem). A demise in the formalistic approach
to the protection of contractual rights occurred for many of the same reasons. See Note,
Tortious Interference of ContractualRelations in the 19th Century: The Transformation of Property,
Contract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1510, 1537-38 (1980); see also Holmes, Privilege, Malice,
and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1894) (external standards rising in tort law). There
too, the courts began to balance the competing interests, including the interests of society
in alternative resolutions, to resolve conflicts. See Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations, 41 HARV. L. REv. 728, 745-46 (1928). In the past, this balance has often led to
denial of injunctions against polluting businesses because of the adverse socioeconomic
consequences of a shutdown, see, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,
228, 257 N.E.2d 870, 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 319 (1970), but changing social attitudes
toward pollution have rendered shutdown more palatable, see, e.g., Aberdeen v. Wellman,
352 N.W.2d 204, 205-06 (1984) (permanent injunction on operation of gravel and road
construction company as public nuisance).
212. See Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 240, 321 N.W.2d 182, 191 (1982). In extending the protection of nuisance law to solar access, the Prah court considered the three
policy justifications that historically had justified a denial of protection and found each
obsolete. All three related more to the concerns of society than to those of the individual.
The first concern was the traditional notion that a landowner had the right to use her
property as long as she did not cause physical damage to a neighbor. The Prah court rejected that rationale, looking to how "society has increasingly regulated the use of land
by the landowner for the general welfare." See id. at 236, 321 N.W.2d at 189. The second
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nuisance law provided no protection
because an individual had no legally
2 13
protected interest in solar energy.

The public trust doctrine, however, is still rooted in the old propertylaw terminology now being rejected by modern nuisance analysis. Consequently, as with standing, relying on the doctrine is not only unnecessary
when nuisance law could better achieve the same objectives, but also the
doctrine's formalism is theoretically inconsistent with the advances in tort
law that aid environmental protection and resource conservation goals.
C.

Conceptions of Sovereignty and Propery and the Public Trust Doctrine

Advances in standing and nuisance law, however, do not go to the
heart of the public trust doctrine's shortcomings. At bottom, the trust doctrine is premised on a view of the nature and role of the sovereign that
has little in common with the current style of government, at least in the
areas of environmental protection and natural resource conservation. In
particular, the doctrine assumes that absent its sovereign ownership and
trustee duties, governmental powers over important natural resources would
be inadequate and governmental accountability to the public for its decisions affecting those resources too limited. Recent developments in natural
resources and environmental law question both of these assumptions.
To be sure, governmental power to protect the environment is not
currently absolute, nor is governmental accountability for its environmentally destructive activities total. A negative assessment of the continuing
utility of the public trust doctrine does not require either such extreme
result. The relevant inquiry looks to the net impact of the doctrine. Here,
that means asking whether in the face of recent changes in the nature
and scope of governmental power, the doctrine continues to play a significant, independent role. Here again, the trust doctrine falls short.

jutification was that society historically had given little weight to the value of sunlight,
viewing it merely as a matter of aesthetic enjoyment. The court rejected this reason and
concluded that sunlight had substantial value to society as an energy source. See id., 321
N.W.2d at 189. Finally, the court noted that although society historically had favored
unrestricted land development, "the policy of favoring unhindered private development
in an expanding economy is no longer in harmony with the realities of our society." See
id. at 237, 321 N.W.2d at 190.
213. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959):
There being, then, no legal right to the free flow of light and air from the adjoining land, it is universally held that where a structure serves a useful and
beneficial purpose, it does not give rise to a cause of action, either for damages
or for an injunction under the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, even though
it causes injury to another by cutting off the light and air and interfering with
the view that would otherwise be available over adjoining land in its natural
state, regardless of the fact that the structure may have been erected partly for

spite.

PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
1.

The Rise of the Modern Police Power State
a.

Expansion of Police Power Authority

First, there currently is little room or need for the public trust doctrine to play a meaningful role in promoting sovereign authority over environmental quality. The trust doctrine arose at a time, long since gone,
when sovereign power depended on ownership and, accordingly, when
courts interpreted the scope of governmental police powers quite
narrowly. 21 4 Then, the validity of a governmental police power restriction that adversely affected private property expectations depended on fictional categories. For example, if a court deemed the private property
a "qualified ' 21 5 property or a property "affected with the public interest, ' 2 16 then the court would uphold the governmental restriction,
regardless of the restriction's impact. 21 7 Courts reasoned that these properties were the subject of a limited grant from the private party back
to the government. 218 Courts similarly saw governmental control over
21 9
natural resources as resting on sovereign ownership of those resources.
Today, the extent of sovereign authority does not turn on such strained
fictions of property law, which are all contemporaries of the public trust
doctrine. 220 It is now well settled that the police power is the most fundamental source of governmental authority to prevent needless environmental harm and related risks to human health and welfare. To be sure, the
214. See Rosen, supra note 16, at 610-12; see also Selvin, supra note 10, at 1404-05 (trust
doctrine evolved because of limits to power of eminent domain). See generally H. HARTOG,
PUBLIC PROPERTY

AND

PRIVATE POWER (1983) (describing how during eighteenth century

basis of municipal authority shifted from property rights to legislative power).
215. E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 402, at 422 (1904). For example, courts considered dogs to be "qualified property" and on that basis upheld governmental police
power measures requiring licenses for dogs and allowing extermination without legal process or a right of damages for failure to comply with those requirements. See, e.g., Sentell
v. New Orleans & C. R.R., 166 U.S. 698, 701-02 (1897); Mayor of Hagerstown v. Witmer,
86 Md. 293, 300, 301 (1897). See generally E. FREUND, supra, § 21, at 16-17. The notion
of qualified property in natural resources is also expressed in 2 W. BLACKSTONE, CONMENTARIES *395.
216. E. FREUND, supra note 215, 5 402, at 422.
217. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an
interest, he, in effect, grants the public an interest in that use and must'submit to public
control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. See Munn
v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877). See generally E. FREUND, supra note 215, §§ 372-88,
at 380-401.
218. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877).
219. See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 527-29 (1896) (state power over wildlife
a matter of sovereign ownership).
220. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 951, 954-56 (1982)
(rejecting characterization of state power over water resources as matter of ownership in
favor of state police power view); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 333-38 (1979)
(same for wildlife); see also Maddox v. Georgia, 252 Ga. 198, 199, 312 S.E.2d 325, 327
(state law barring sale or purchase of game fish, even if cultivated in private pond, does
not amount to unconstitutional deprivation of property), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984).
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"police power" too could be described as a legal fiction, but unlike the
trust doctrine, the police power is a live fiction that reflects current legal
analysis and social values. The extent of police power authority does not
depend on the application of formalistic categories of property law, but
ultimately on the precise nature of both the governmental interest and
the private property expectations at odds in a particular case.
Increased awareness of the acute condition of modern resource allocation and environmental pollution problems provided the most recent trigger for police power expansion, but its rise in importance has much earlier
and pervasive origins. 221 Most importantly, expanding governmental police
power is but one significant expression of the dramatic shift that occurred
during this century concerning the appropriate role of government. 222 This
country was in large part founded by individuals with a narrow view of
government and a firm belief that the sphere of governmental activity was
distinct from and must not tread on the private realm of the individual.
At the core of this private realm was the exercise of private property
rights. 223 The sanctity of these rights derived from various philosophic
and economic theories, ranging from those embracing natural law224 or

a Kantian/Hegelian view of the relation of property to individual
personality 225 and dominion, 226 to Benthamite utlitarianism 227 and the
Indeed, the repudiation of these fictions seriously questions the continuing vitality of the
public trust doctrine because they were all so closely related. The Supreme Court derived
it's notion of "property affected with a public interest" from the same source in which
it found the public trust doctrine-the writings of Lord ChiefJustice Hale, including De'
Jure Mars, which is discussed supra at note 20. Compare Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,
125-30 (1877) with Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 456-58 (1892). Public
trust property, moreover, was often referred to as "qualified" property. See E. FREUND,
supra note 215, § 404, at 423. Those cases, now overturned by the Supreme Court, see
infra note 470, that characterized state power as resting on sovereign ownership of the
resource, invariably relied on the same principles of Roman and French law upon which
the public trust doctrine relies. CompareGeer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 523-24 (1896).
with Comment, supra note 3, at 763-64; Sax, supra note 3, at 475; Sax, supra note 10.
at 185-88; Stevens, supra note 10, at 195-98. For further discussion of the doctrine's continuing vitality, see infra text accompanying notes 469-76.
221. See infra text accompanying note 231.
222. Cf. Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programsand PrivateRights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193,
1204 (1982). See generallyJ. HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 36-41
(1977) ("The focus changed from enabling organized action to injecting more public
management or supervision of affairs and providing more sustained, specialized means
of defining and enforcing public policy.").
223. See Philbrick, supra note 211, at 712-13.
224. See id.; Oakes, "Property Rights" in ConstitutionalAnalysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV.
583, 624 (1981).
225. See L. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS 62-64 (1977); Oakes, supra note 224, at 587;
Soper, On Relevance of Philosophyto Law: Reflections on Ackerman's Private Propertyand the Constitution, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 44, 64 (1979); see also Smith, The Unique Nature of the Concept
of Western Law, in THE WESTERN IDEA OF LAw 35 (J. Smith & D. Weisstub eds. 1983)
(in archaic law, property was manifestation or extension of personality).
226. See Oakes, supra note 224, at 587, 624; Philbrick, supra note 211, at 710-11.
227. See Philbrick, supra note 211, at 710-11.
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laissez faire beliefs of Adam Smith. 228 In all events, the basic function
of government was quite narrow-to preserve private property by pro229
viding security from domestic crime and protection from foreign invasion.
The economic and wartime turmoil of the first half of the 1900's,
spurred by rapid industrialization and social urbanization, severely eroded
this traditional view of government 230 and in the process laid the foundation for the developments in environmental law that occurred in the last
decade and a half. Antitrust law and labor law, followed by a host of ambitious New Deal programs, challenged the notion of limited government
and sought to infuse new economic theories and social values into the
laws. 23I The sovereign authority to tax, spend, and regulate formed a

powerful triad indispensable to this systematic process. 232 Sovereign power
to hold and dispose of its own property served only a relatively minor
role in the process.
The environmental protection and natural resource conservation laws
of the last fifteen years broke dramatically from the traditional view of
limited government and incorporated much of the New Deal vision of
the rightful role of government. At the outset, the validity of the newer
laws does not, as it did in the past, turn on their furthering narrow health
and safety concerns; 233 courts require only a rational relation to a goal
of some "conceivable public purpose," 234 including, for example, aesthetic
values, conservation goals, or public welfare in general. 235 Because environmental and natural resources laws do not always translate easily into
228. See id. at 713.
229. J. LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT: SECOND TREATISE, 115 (R. Kirk ed. 1955):
The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without

his own consent. For the preservation of property being the end of government,
and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires
that the people should have property ....
See also Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1093 (1980); Oakes,

supra note 224, at 584-86; Philbrick, supra note 211, at 713-14.
230. See generally H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 1-45 (1983).
231. See Oakes, supra note 224, at 623 (historically hands-off government evolved into
New Deal intrusive government); Philbrick, supra note 211, at 716.
232. All three types of governmental measures have played significant roles in environmental and natural resources policy. See infra text accompanying notes 360-66.
Although they are treated differently by the courts, the impact of each is essentially the
same: each effectively transfers control of resource development from the private sector
to the government. See A. CHURCH, CONFLICTS OVER RESOURCE OWNERSHIP 7, 9 (1982).
233. See, e.g., E. FREUND, supra note 215, § 8; see also id. §§ 616-620. Even economic

goals, now a common object of police power measures, previously were suspect. See id.
§ 12, 15.
234. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2329 (1984); see also
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862, 2879-80 (1984).
235. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980); Berman v. Parker,

348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365, 386-87
(1926); see also Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of PrivateProperty, 58 WASH. L. REv. 481,

491 (1983).
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health and safety goals, especially those of an immediate nature, 238 this
substantive expansion in the police power's scope has been extremely important, at least in facilitating the adoption of the laws.
b. Erosion of Private Property
The relationship of the sovereign police power to private property
has been marked by the steady erosion of private property's sanctity in
the face of the sovereign police power's growth.2 37 Events in the first half
of this century established certain basic legal principles necessary to this
decline, most importantly, the propriety of manipulating property rules
to promote evolving social goals.2 38 The full import of those principles
has begun to take hold only with the developments in the environmental
arena over recent years.
The clash between governmental authority and private property rights
has been fought over the last century on several constitutional fronts, including the takings, due process, and contract clauses. 239 Invariably, the
tests are worded differently, 24° but the basic issue at stake is essentially
the same: the degree to which the government may interfere with privately
236. For example, commentary at the beginning of this century suggests that conservation of natural resources and protection of visual beauty might well have fallen outside
the traditional health and safety confines of the police power. See, e.g., E. FREUND, supra
note 215, §§ 12-13, 15.
237. See generally B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 1-5 (1977)
(discussing whether just compensation clause of Constitution is basically sound or whether
it is ripe for change; determination turns on whether clause is viewed from a scientific
policymaker's perspective or from ordinary observer's perspective); H. BERMAN, supra note
230, at 36-2.7 (Western law experiencing a break with its emphasis on private property
and moving toward emphasis on state and social property).
238. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926):
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing
conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century
ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary
and oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions
of our day .... And in this there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning
of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly
coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible
that it should be otherwise.
See also A. CHURCH, supra note 232, at 11-12; Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL
L.Q. 8, 22-23 (1927); Philbrick, supra note 211, at 695, 696; Sax, Why We Will Not (Should
Not) Sell the Public Lands: Changing Conceptions of PrivateProperty, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 313,
325-26; Yandle, Resource Economics: A Property Rights Perspective, 5 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y

1, 2-8 (198,).
239. See Alexander, The Concept of Property in Privateand Constitutional Law: The Ideology
of the Scientiic Turn inLegalAnalysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1545, 1555-60 (1982) (describing
Ackerman thesis in B. ACKERMAN, supra note 237).
240. The judicial due process inquiry asks whether the challenged governmental measure
is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor
of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1978). To determine whether a taking has occurred, the

PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

held expectations.2 4 1 Because the taking issue has been the most pervasive
(and elusive) throughout this century, the context of that constitutional
clause best highlights the shift in governmental authority.
When the legitimate scope of the police power was quite narrow and
was essentially confined to restricting activities that were clearly harmful
or noxious, 242 courts had little difficulty disposing of takings or comparable
constitutional challenges. The right of private individuals to exercise their
property rights and so create common-law nuisances hardly appeared constitutionally sacrosanct. 243 The relative equities implicated by the clash
9 f public and private values became less clear, however, as the scope of
legitimate governmental police regulation broadened during this century. 244
This shift in the equities is illustrated by the classic confrontation
between Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis in the most celebrated takcourt considers additionally the precise character of the governmental interference, whether
it is a "physical invasion" by the government or the result of a "public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life. . .

."

Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New

York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The court next considers the economic impact of
the challenged governmental action and, in the case of a public program, determines whether
any "economically viable use" of the property remains. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 n.36). In a contract clause
challenge, the Court asks whether the challenged law serves a legitimate public purpose
and does not simply provide a benefit to "special interests." See Energy Reserves Group,
Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 (1983). See generally United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21-32 (1977) (discussing limitations contract clause
places on police power to provide transportation).
241. Oakes, supra note 224, at 621. Indeed, legal academics currently are debating the
proper constitutional basis for challenging governmental measures that a party believes
are unduly oppressive. Some commentators believe that the due process clause and not
the takings clause is the proper basis upon which to attack governmental police power
regulation. See Sterk, Government Liability for UnconstitutionalLand Use Regulation, 60 IND.
L.J. 113, 124 (1985); see also Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 1057, 1058-61, 1097-99 (1980). Others attack these proposals as advocating
an unwarranted and unworkable return to substantive due process. See Kelso, Substantive
Due Process as a Limit on Police Power Regulatory Takings, 20 WLLAMETTE L. REv. 1, 41-42
(1984).
242. See supra text accompanying note 233.
243. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887):
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared,
by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of
property for the public benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in
the control or use of his property for lawful purposes .... but is only a declaration by the State that its use by any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests .... The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use
in a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very different
from taking property for public use .

.

..

244. See Wickersham, The PolicePower, A Productof the Rule of Reason, 27 HARV. L. REv.
297, 315 (1914) ("[T]he pressure is very great on the part of social reformers to compel
legislation which transcends constitutional restrictions, and seeks justification under the
elastic boundaries of the police power.").
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ings case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.245 Pennsylvania Coal involved a

constitutional challenge to a state law that prevented the owner of subsurface coal rights from mining coal in a manner that caused the surface
estate to subside. 24 6 The state legislature intended the restriction to override any prior express agreements between the surface and subsurface estate
owners concerning the rights of the latter to mine even in the event of
subsidence. 247 In the majority opinion, which struck down the state law
as an unconstitutional taking, Justice Holmes revealed his great concern
with the expansion of governmental intrusions into the marketplace of
private property. Holmes apparently questioned whether the law served
any public purpose at all ,248 and expressed his concern with the tendency
of' government to erode gradually private property interests in the name
of the collective good or public interest. 249 In sharp contrast, Justice
Brandeis, writing for the dissent, had no difficulty accepting the appropriateness of the governmental action. 2 0 In his view, the government
could interfere with private agreements when those agreements substantially implicated public health and safety concerns. 251 The parties' private
could not bind the legislature and impede its power
contract to the contrary
25 2
to enact the law.
Although Pennsylvania Coal is nominally still good law, 25 3 the underlying
245. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For an excellent recent discussion of the case, see Rose,
Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CA.L. L. REv. 561 (1984).
246. The "statute forb[ade] the mining of anthracite coal in such way as to cause the
subsidence of... any structure used as a human habitation. . . ." 260 U.S. at 412-13.
247. In Pennsylvania Coal, the Mahons' title to the surface originated in a deed from
the Pennsylvania Coal Company, in which the company had retained all subsurface mineral
rights and the Mahons had specifically waived any right to claims based on subsidence.
See id. at 412.
[U]sually in
248. See i. at 413-14 ("This is the case of a single private house ....
ordinary private affairs the public interest does not warrant much of this kind of interference.
[I]t [is] clear that the statute does not
The damage is not common or public ....
* .
").
disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction .
249. See id. at 415 ("[Tlhe natural tendency of human nature is to extend the [police
power] qualification [of private property] more and more until at last private property
disappears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way under the Constitution of the
United Statc s."). Justice Holmes' ruling may have been influenced by contemporaneous
writings of Roscoe Pound, who expressed analogous concerns. See Pound, The End of Law
as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARV. L. REv. 1905, 225-34 (1914); infra notes
428-35 and accompanying text.
250. CompareJustice Brandeis' favorable view of the police power in Pennsylvania Coal
with his unfavorable view of notions of heightened sovereign trust authority to reallocate
water resources, as expressed in a law review article he coauthored in 1888. See Warren
& Brandeis, The Wattupa Pond Cases, 2 HARV. L. REv. 195, 211 (1888); infra note 465.
251. See 260 U.S. at 417 ("[R]estriction imposed to protect the public health, safety
or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in question is
merely the prohibition of a noxious use.").
252. See id. at 420 ("If public safety is imperiled, surely neither grant, nor contract,
can prevail against the exercise of the police power.").
253. The Court still consistently cites Pennsylvania Coal in its more recent takings cases.
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rationale of modern takings law is more consistent with the views of the
Pennsylvania Coal dissenters. 254 While unable to develop any "settled formula" to resolve takings challenges, 25 5 the current Supreme Court's ad
hoc inquiry into the "justice and fairness" considerations of particular
cases reflects a broad acceptance of governmental police power measures
that "impair or even destroy recognized property interests." 25 6 Whether7
the governmental restriction treats similarly situated property alike,25
balances the benefits and burdens of a civilized society, 258 or promises
See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127-28 (1978).
254. For example, recently the Court explicitly rejected the rationale, basic to Pennsylvania Coal, that a takings inquiry can focus on particular segments of the property rather
than the property as a whole. In Penn Central the Court refused to focus on just the interference of a challenged historic preservation law on the full use of air rights, dismissing
any contrary contention that might be based on Pennsylvania Coal. See Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 & n.27 (1978); see also Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51, 66 (1979) ("[T]he destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle [of property rights]
is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety."). Similarly, Pennsylvania Coal appears to endorse a judicial takings inquiry that focuses solely on economic
impact: "[Wihile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking." See 260 U.S. at 415. In recent decisions, however,
the Court has expressly held that impact alone cannot establish an unconstitutional taking. See infra text accompanying notes 262-66. In light of all these subsequent qualifications, it is not surprising to see courts today discounting Pennsylvania Coal and upholding
against takings challenges police power measures that impose restrictions remarkably similar
to those at issue in Pennsylvania Coal. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 581 F. Supp. 511, 513 (W.D. Pa. 1984). But see Commonwealth v. Stearns
Coal & Lumber Co., 678 S.W.2d 378, 381 (Ky. 1984) (suggesting that state wild and
scenic rivers law did not effect a taking of coal miner's land only because courts prevented
full execution of law), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 3549 (1985).
255. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980).
256. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978) ("[Iln instances in which a state tribunal
reasonably concluded that 'the health, safety, morals, or general welfare' would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld landuse regulations that destroyed or adversely affected recognized real property interests
.... ") (quoting Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
257. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133 n.29, 135 n.32
(1978).
258. See id. at 124. This criterion is reminiscent of the Court's scrutiny of a state tax
under the commerce clause to determine whether the tax creates an impermissible burden
on interstate commerce. The dispositive issue is whether the state has given anything for
which it can ask return, not whether some rough equivalence exists between what the
state has given and what it is asking. See Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S.
609, 625-29 (1981); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 440-41 (1964).
As the Court has stated in the context of a constitutional challenge to the amount of a tax:
A tax is not an assessment of benefits. It is, as we have said, a means of distributing
the burden of the cost of government. The only benefit to which the taxpayer
is constitutionally entitled is that derived from his enjoyment of the privileges
of living in an organized society, established and safeguarded by the devotion
of taxes to public purposes.
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a general "reciprocity of advantage" among private parties 25 9 are prime
factors for judicial consideration. Economic impact alone is insufficient
to show a taking260 and lost profits are a "slender reed" upon which to
2 61
base a takings claim.
Moreover, even though the Court considers the impact of the
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 521-22 (1937); see also Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 373 (1974).
259. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist, dissenting
in Penn Central and relying on Holmes majority opinion in Pennsylvania Coal, apparently
was willing to read into the takings clause an "exception" for "prohibition[s that] appl[y]
over a broad cross section of land and thereby 'secure an average reciprocity of advantage.' " Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104. 147 (1978) (Rehnquist, J,, dissenting) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415). Ironically, had the Court
adopted tie view of the dissenters, which also included an exception for police power
measures that forbid uses that are "dangerous to the safety, health, or welfare of others,"
see 438 U.S. at 145 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), environmental regulations might have
fared extremely well, even better than under the takings formulation Justice Brennan had
to adopt to uphold the historic landmark designation at issue in Penn Central. Most environmental restrictions apply to a broad cross section of natural resources and thus
guarantee precisely the reciprocity Justice Rehnquist apparently endorsed. In contrast,
under the takings analysis in Justice Brennan's majority opinion, the takings clause has
no such exceptions, even for police power measures that prohibit noxious uses. See 438
U.S. at 133-34 n.30. Under the Penn Central majority view, it is not even clear, for instance, that an environmental protection measure prohibiting a traditional noxious use
would surlvive a takings challenge if it "denies an owner economically viable use" of the
property. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (emphasis added). Justice
Brennan apparently based his rejection of the reciprocity criterion on his concern that
it would rcsult in the striking down of laws that burdened certain individuals more than
others. In his view, "[l]egislation designed to promote the general welfare commonly
burdens some more than others." See 438 U.S. at 133.
260. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
261. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) ("Prediction of profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned speculation that courts are not especially competent to perform. Further, perhaps because of its very uncertainty, the interest in anticipated gains
has traditionally been viewed as less compelling than other property-related interests.");
see also Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct.
3108 n. 12, 3119-20 (1985) (suggesting that "economic profitability" of development of
restricted parcel "in light of previous reliance expenditures" not correct touchstone for
takings analysis). But see Sax, Takings, PrivateProperty, and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149,
151 n.7 (1971) (right to profit of highest concern in takings analysis). Consideration of
economic impact and profitability is especially problematic now that government plays
such a substantial function in the national economy. In myriad ways, the government
takes actions that affect the relative value of private property. There is no suggestion that
an unconstitutional taking has occurred when the result is a reduction in value. See Donahue,
supra note 211, at 30 (inflation does not directly affect traditional property rights, privileges,
or powers). Judicial appreciation of the current role of government is also reflected in
recent takings cases in which the Court has considered the beneficial impacts of the governmental action together with the harmful impact in evaluating the overall economic impact.
See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980) ("The zoning ordinances benefit
the appellants as well as the public by serving the city's interest in assuring careful and
orderly development .... In assessing the fairness of the zoning ordinance, these benefits
must be considered along with any diminution in market value that the appellants might
suffer.").
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challenged governmental measure on reasonable private investment-backed
expectations, 262 it has recently sharply limited the import of this countervailing consideration. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. ,263 a 1984 decision,

the Court announced a rule of law which, read broadly, suggests that
"reasonable investment-backed expectations" cannot exist in activities that
the government may declare contrary to environmental protection and
resource conservation goals. 264 In Monsanto the Court held that when parties

engage in an area that they know is of public concern and regulated by
government, they are on notice that the government may regulate in the
future, Consequently, they cannot complain when their investments are
adversely affected by subsequent regulations.2 65 The great public concern
with private decisions that affect the quality of the natural environment
and relative abundance of natural resources apparently would place most
environmental legislation within the scope of Monsanto's generous rule of
262. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862, 2875 (1984); Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. at 175 ("reasonable investment backed expectations"); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) ("distinct investmentbacked expectations").
263. 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984). This case concerned a takings challenge to the disclosure
provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136-136y (1982). The law requires disclosure of trade secrets and other commercial
and financial information under certain circumstances. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a, 136h (1982).
264. In Monsanto the Supreme Court asserted that the factor of "reasonable investment backed expectations" was "so overwhelming" that it did not need to consider either
the character of the governmental action or its economic impact on the party claiming
the unconstitutional taking. See 104 S. Ct. at 2875. The Court's opinion, however, clearly
expresses that its evaluation of the "reasonableness" of the expectation depended on the
character of the governmental action. Indeed, the gist of the Court's decision, that any
expectations of nondisclosure were unreasonable, was based on the character of the governmental action challenged. The Court stressed that the action involved the regulation of
an industry of concern to the public. See id. at 2876. The Court also noted that consideration of the economic impact of disclosure should not account for any drop in market value
caused by disclosing that the product is harmful; only market losses due to competitive
losses would be adverse impacts relevant to a takings determination. See id. at 2878 n. 15;
see also Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411
(1983) ("In determining the extent of the impairment [to reasonable contractual expectations], we are to consider whether the industry the complaining party has entered has
been regulated in the past.").
265. Monsanto had submitted information to the federal government under three
separate statutory programs because FIFRA was substantially amended in both 1972 and
1978. The Court, therefore, separately considered the reasonableness of Monsanto's expectations for each of those three periods. Prior to 1972, the federal law had been primarily
just a labeling and licensing statute. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act, ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947). It generally prohibited the disclosure of product formulae, but did not state whether disclosure of health and safety data submitted with a
license application would occur. See id. §§ 3(c)(4), 8(c), 61 Stat. 163, 167, 170. Between
1972 and 1978, the statute regulated the pesticide industry much more closely, but explicity prohibited the EPA from disclosing trade secrets and other commercial and financial information. See Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-516, § 10(b), 86 Stat. 973, 989. After 1978, the law allowed EPA disclosure under
certain circumstances, such as the agency's belief that disclosure was necessary to protect
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constructive notice. 266 As a result, private property owners adversely affected by the legislation may find little constitutional protection, at least
under the takings clause.
In all events, this most recent opinion highlights how the Court's
current threshold acceptance of the legitimacy of pervasive governmental
regulation undermines expectations in private property rights. In particular,
Monsanto strongly questions judicial assertions that state law can define
the extent of private property rights 267 and that federal law cannot preempt
those rights. 268 The clear thrust of the Monsanto opinion is that the takings
protection extends only to affected private expectations that are reasonable,
which in turn depends largely on the substance of federal law.
c.

Significance of the Public Trust Doctrine

With the emergence of this modern police power, the public trust
doctrine retains little importance in promoting governmental authority
to protect and maintain a healthy and bountiful natural environment. The
substantive embrace of legitimate governmental police power goals is no
longer narrow; indeed, it is broader and more flexible than the embrace
of the trust doctrine both in terms of permissible ends and the natural
resources to which it applies. 269 The doctrine similarly adds little to the
against unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a,
l'6h (1982).
For all three periods, the Court based its determination of the reasonableness of Monsanto's expectations on the statutory provisions. Thus, because after 1978 the statute clearly
stated that disclosure would occur in certain circumstances, Monsanto could have no
reasonable expectation that it would not. 104 S. Ct. at 2875. Similarly, because the statute
had made certain guarantees of nondisclosure between 1972 and 1978, the government
could not later claim that Monsanto's expectation of confidentiality based on those
guarantees was unreasonable with respect to the information Monsanto turned over in
that interim period. Id. at 2877-78. The most significant aspect of the Court's opinion
is its treatment of the pre-1972 period. The Court held that any expectations Monsanto
might have had, based on nondisclosure, were unreasonable, although the government
had not indicated in the statute that disclosure would be necessary. According to the majority, the pesticide "industry [had] long [been] the focus of great public concern and
significant governmental regulation. [Consequently,] the possibility was substantial that
the Federal Government ... would find disclosure to be in the public interest." See id.
at 2876.
266. See generally Sax, supra note 235, at 494 ("We are already so far along in diminishing
developmental rights that owners are viewed, in important respects, as already on notice.").
267. See 104 S. Ct. at 2872; see also Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
268. See 104 S. Ct. at 2878 ("If Congress can 'pre-empt' state property law... , then
the Taking Clause has lost all vitality.").
269. The public trust doctrine historically applies only to a few natural resources and
areas of public importance, such as city streets. See supra text accompanying notes 21-55.
Only recently has the doctrine expanded beyond those traditional concerns. See supra text
accompanying notes 85-128. Because of its historical ties, the doctrine is necessarily less
flexible than the police power, the mandate of which is purely substantive: the promotion
of the public health, safety, morals, and welfare. Professor Sax and other promoters of
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degree of governmental immunity from takings challenges to governmental
environmental protection and conservation measures. It is generally unnecessary to argue against the challenges on grounds that preexisting
sovereign rights survived conveyance of the affected property into private
hands or that the government implicitly has reserved certain legal interests.
Indeed, entering this sort of legal discourse is risky because then the validity
of important governmental measures ultimately depends on judicial acceptance of arguments based on antiquated legal fictions that misfocus
the judicial inquiry. 270 The Supreme Court has made it quite clear in the
context of various constitutional challenges to governmental actions based
on trust notions of resource ownership, including the takings clause, that
these fictional ownership claims do not change the nature of the Court's
271

constitutional analysis.
Moreover, the public trust tactic is not only risky, it is unnecessary
in this regard. Police power authority is well settled and requires no comparable judicial discovery of prior sovereign reservation.27 2 The government may, pursuant to its police powers, change the rules of the game
at a later time. 273 The Supreme Court's Monsanto opinion assumes just
such continuing regulatory authority. 274 To be sure, the Court's analysis
of takings challenges to police power measures is far from clear. Still, at
least that analysis depends on candid consideration of relevant competing
concerns and when applied in recent decisions, the analysis suggests that
the courts appreciate the special need for strict, yet evolving, natural
resource and environmental protection laws. Since its inception, the public
trust doctrine has been premised on the notion that absent title or reserved
trust authority, the government would not possess the necessary regulatory

the doctrine acknowledge this essential weakness. See Coquillette, supra note 10, at 816-17;
Sax, supra note 10, at 185-86; see also infra text accompanying notes 452-60.
270. The risks inherent in attempting to achieve important policy objectives through
a legal fiction such as the public trust doctrine is discussed infra text accompanying notes
368-476.
271. See infra text accompanying notes 469-75.
272. A primary feature of the public trust doctrine is that the limited original sovereign
grant provides the government with continuing authority over the resource. For e,:ample,
in National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 437-40, 658 P.2d 709,
721-23, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 358-60, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983), the California Supreme
Court relied on this aspect of the public trust doctrine to support its decision that the
water rights Los Angeles had obtained to the feeder streams were not absolute, but were
subject to continuing regulation and restriction. To a large extent, the court could have
achieved the same result without resorting to the public trust doctrine, simply by relying
on existing statutory provisions and the police power authority. See Walston, The Public
Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context: The Wrong EnvironmentalRemedy, 22 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 63, 82 (1982).

273, See generally E. FREUND, supra note 215, § 24, at 20.
274. An even more recent decision by the Court, also rejecting a takings challenge
to a federal regulatory scheme, rests on a similar rationale. See United States v. Locke,
105 S. Ct. 1785, 1798 (1985) ("Claimants . . . take their mineral interests with the
knowledge that the Government retains substantial regulatory power over those interests.").
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authority to protect important natural resources.275 This original premise
276
clearly i:3 no longer valid.

This potential for governmental authority absent sovereign ownership or trusteeship interest is not merely academic, but is in large part
being realized in environmental and natural resources law. At the federal
level, the government has established complex permit schemes that restrict
the allowable impact of traditional private property rights on the quality
and quantity of essential natural resources, such as air, minerals, certain
animal species, surface and subsurface water supplies, and in turn on public
health and welfare. 277 The federal Clean Air Act, for example, has effectively "zoned" the country into areas of different levels of air quality 278
and regulated the operation of sources of air pollution, ranging from in27 9
dustrial plants to private automobiles, in those zones.
The practical effect of these laws is to superimpose onto the existing
scheme of private property obtained in the private marketplace a new set
of property rights, the distribution of which the federal government controls. These new rights are often indispensable to meaningful exercise of
prior traditional property rights. For example, the Clean Water Act
eliminates the right of any person to discharge any substance into waters
275. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) ("The control
of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost ....

"); id. at 454 ("[L]ands

under navigable waterways ... cannot be placed entirely beyond the direction and control of the State."); id. at 455 ("Any grant of this kind is necessarily revocable ....
The ownership of the navigable waters of the harbor and of the lands under them is a
subject of public concern to the whole people of the State. The trust ... is governmental
and cannot be alienated . .

").

276. The Illinois Central Court apparently regarded the police power, which it agreed
was inalienable just as the trust, see Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453
(1892), as involving only matters such as the "administration of government and the preservation of the peace." See id. In contrast, those dissenting from the opinion argued that
the majority had jumped the gun in claiming that the state was powerless to protect public
rights in the resource. See id. at 474 (Shiras, J., dissenting) ("To prevent misapprehension, it may be well to say that it is not pretended in this view of the case that the State
can part, or has parted, by contract, with her sovereign powers.").
277. SeeFIFRA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136),( 1 982); Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z
(1982); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982); Federal Power
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1982); Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.
§§1361-1407 (1982); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §5 1531-1543 (1982);
Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1982); Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1,76 (1982); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 300f to 300j-10 (1982); Solid
Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
7401-7642 (1982); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8484
(1982); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1982); Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982).
278. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7470-7479 (1982) (prevention of significant deterioration);
id. § 7491 (visibility protection); id. §§ 7501-7508 (nonattainment areas).
279. See id. § 7411 (new source performance standards); id. §5 7521-7551 (motor vehicle emission standards).
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of the United States, regardless of impact on water quality, without a permit

from the government. 280 The undeniable import of this restriction, like
28 2

281
similar restrictions in the Clean Air Act and Safe Drinking Water Act,
is to provide the government with the power to grant, in the first instance,
the essential right to discharge substance. 283 Other statutory restrictions
cover a host of private activites, including the use of privately owned oil
and natural gas to supply energy, 28 4 the taking of certain animal species
use,
or the destruction of their habitat, 285 the creation, transportation,
28 7
286
and hazardous wastes.
and disposal of toxic substances

The proliferation of these laws is not confined to the federal government, but extends to state and local governments. Analogues to the federal
laws generally exist, 288 and in addition, a host of state and local laws regulate
private use of natural resources traditionally held more in the domain of
those governments. 28 9 The most familiar of these resources is land-the

Court has referred to local zoning as the "classic example" of valid police
power regulation. 290 Even with land, however, the nature and depth of
governmental regulation of use is increasingly bold. Land use regulations

280. See 33 U.S.C. §§1311(a), 1362(5), 1362(12), 1362(14), 1362(16), 1362(19) (1982).
Notably, it is neither just water quality that is increasingly under federal control nor always
the executive branch that formulates these new "federal property rights." In the guise
of equitable apportionment decrees, the United States Supreme Court has found itself
in the business of assigning rights to interstate waters, based on the Court's own notions
of fairness and efficiency. The Court has held squarely that its decree is not predetermined by preexisting state property laws that provide private rights in the aquatic resource.
See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183-88 (1982); see also Wiel, Natural
Communism, 47 HARV. L. REV. 425, 438 (1934). The Court, moreover, has even invited
congressional oversight of groundwater overdraft, describing it as a "national" problem.
See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982).
281. See 42 U.S.C. iS 7401-7642 (1982).
282. See 42 U.S.C. 55 300f to 300j-10 (1982).
283. In effect, the government becomes the sole supplier of the resource. See generally
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 736-37 (1964); Comment, Markets in Air: Problems and Prospects of Controlled Trading, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 377, 379, 399-401 (1981).
284. See Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8484
(1982) (restrictions on use of natural gas and oil as fuel in existing and new electric

powerplants and major fuel burning installations).
285. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1982).
286. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §9 2601-2629 (1982).
287. See Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
288. Indeed, most of the federal laws contemplate, assist, and sometimes even effectively require a substantial state law role. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(g),
1281-1299, 1313, 1315, 1319(a), 1342(b), 1370 (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410,
7416 (1982); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6926, 6929, 6931, 6941-6949 (1982).
See generally Currie, State Pollution Statutes, 48 U. Cri. L. REV. 27 (1981); see also Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1196 (1977).
289. Groundwater pollution, for example, is an object of increasing state regulation.
HENDERSON, J. TRAUBERMAN & T. GALLAGHER, GROUNDWVATER: STRATEGIES
FOR STATE ACTION (Envtl. Law Inst. 1984).
290. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978).

See generally T.
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are no longer confined to general designations of residential, industrial,
and business zones as in the past, 291 but now extend much further into
the realm of private decisionmaking. Community aesthetics, 292 historical
preservation, 293 energy conservation, 294 architectural norms, 2 95 and open
space values 296 all are enforced through land use restrictions.
Consequently, regulators increasingly view land itself as a fragile
resource, the ecological value of which can be destroyed and the preservation of which is important to both the public at large and ultimately
to future generations. 297 This perception is in large part responsible for
the recent proliferation of laws restricting the conversion or destruction
of farmlands 298 and protecting wetlands and estuaries. 299 Soil loss

291. See generally 1 R.

§§ 1.02-.07 (2d ed. 1968
& D. RATHKOPH, THE LAW O ZONING AND PLANNING,
§§ 1.01-.24, 2.01-.03 (4th ed. 1985 & Supp. 1985); Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1427 (1978) [hereafter cited as Developments].
292. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (zoning power can
legitimately be used to create a "quiet place where yards are wide, people few, . . . and
the blessings of quiet seclusion and clear air make the area a sanctuary for people"). See
g, nerally Developments, supra note 291, at 1447-57.
293. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1979) ("[Pjreserving structures and areas with special historic, architectural, or cultural significance

& Supp. 1985); 1 A.

ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING

RATHKOPH

is an entir-.ly permissible governmental goal .

").

294. See Corbett & Hayden, LocaIAction for a Solar Future, 2 SOLAR L. REP. 953, 955-57
(1981).
295. See Village of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 9 Ohio St. 3d 69, 74, 458 N.E.2d 852,
857 (1984) (zoning power includes village code providing architectural review board authority to review application for building permits and to regulate architectural design), appeal
dismisied, 104 S. Ct. 3503 (1984).
296. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980).
297. See F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL
314-18 (1971); Bosselman, Property Rights in Land: New Statutor Approaches, 15 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 681, 681-83 (1975); Houck, Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies, 58 TUL. L. REV. 3, 4-12 (1983); Sax, supra note 238, at 323-24.
Leopold's classic work on an emerging land ethic, published originally in 1949, laid the
early foundation for these more recent developments. See A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY
ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 202-04, 214-16 (1968). see also Grossman, Prim'
Farmlandand the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act: Guidancefor an Enhanced Federal
Role in FarmlandPreservation, 33 DRAKE L. REV. 209, 254-59 (1983-1984) (describing host
of federal laws affecting land use). In the past, the apparent solid, unchanging nature
of the land resource made it appear to be the paradigm natural resource appropriate for
exclusive private ownership. See McDougal, Lasswell, Vlasic & Smith, The Enjoyment and
Acquisition of Resources in Outer Space, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 572 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as Outer Space].
298. See generally I J. JUERGENSMEYER &J. WADLEY, AGRICULTURAL LAW 65-130 (1982),
S. REDFIELD, VANISHING FARMLAND: A LEGAL SOLUTION FOR THE STATES 95-130 (1984).
Rose, FarmlandPreservation Policy and Programs, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 591 (1984); Torres.
Helping Fanners and Saving Farmland, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 31 (1984).
299. See generally Want, Federal Wetlands Law: The Cases and The Problems, 8 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 1 (1984).
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restrictions 30 0 and bans on corporate farming,301 the latter partly based
30 2
on the belief of poor corporate stewardship of long-term productivity,
reflect the same general public concern. The upshot is that now even for
land, undoubtedly the most central object of private property rights, the
cut back
legitimate scope of private expectations has been significantly
30 3
pursuant to state and local police power measures.
2.

Modern Administrative Law

The tremendous expansion in the nature of sovereign authority and
the degree of governmental oversight does more, however, than undercut
any meaningful role for the public trust doctrine in promoting governmental authority. The implications of this expansion question the central
premise of the trust doctrine's origins-that the doctrine provides a needed
legal basis to ensure public accountability for governmental decisions that
adversely affect the environment.
Here again, hindsight suggests that the modern public trust thesis
is wide of the mark. First, it did not account for developments in ad-

300. See Massey, Land Use Regulatory Powerof Conservation Districtsin the Midwestern States
for Controlling Nonpoint Source Pollutants, 33 DRAKE L. REv. 35, 78-91 (1983-1984).
301. For a survey of state laws restricting corporate ownership of farmland, see 1 J.
JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 298, at 146-51.
302. Absentee Ownership of Farmland: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Family Farms,
Rural Development, and Special Studies of the Comm. on Agriculture, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21
(1980) (testimony of Jim Wolf, Neb. Sandhills Resources, Inc.); id. at 32 (testimony of
Jo Anne Neuzil, Agri Research and Information Services, Inc.).
303. Commentators argue that a constitutional right to develop land in the United States
no longer exists or should no longer exist. See, e.g., Caldwell, Rights of Ownership or Rights
of Use?-The Needfor a New Conceptual Basisfor Land Use Policy, 15 Wm. & MARY L. REv.
759, 769-73 (1974); Comment, Regulation of Land Use: From Magna Cartato a Just Formulation, 23 UCLA L. REv. 904, 905 (1976). Recent judicial decisions upholding state statutes
that regulate landowners' rights to use their property certainly support that conclusion.
See, e.g., Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1382 (Fla.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1083 (1981); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 232-35,
284 N.E.2d 891, 898-900 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Just v. Marinette
County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 22, 26, 201 N.W.2d 761, 770-72 (1972); cf. Prah v. Maretti, 108
Wis. 2d 223, 237, 321 N.W.2d 182, 190 (1982). But see Silva v. Ada Township, 416 Mich.
153, 160-61, 330 N.W.2d 663, 666 (1982) (preventing natural resource extraction from
land invalid absent extremely serious consequences from proposed extraction). Indeed,
many landowners today perceive that they benefit from restrictions on development.
Bosselman, supra note 297, at 682-83; see supra note 261. It has long been settled in other
countries that private property owners do not possess a right to develop their land. See
Lefcoe, The Right to Develop Land: The German and Dutch Experience, 56 OR. L. REv. 31,
32-36, 41 (1977); Roberts, Land Storage- The Swedish Example, 38 MOD. L. REv. 121, 123-24
(1975); Sax, supra note 238, at 324. Of course, traditional notions of private ownership
of land are not the only interests currently being undermined. Water rights, especially
groundwater rights in the West, increasingly are coming under strict state regulation.
Rights once considered absolute under traditional common-law principles are fast becoming revocable gratuities controlled by the government. See infra text accompanying notes
402-12.
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law brewing back in 1970,304 in particular, the impact of envalues on administrative law. Second, it missed the fundamenoccurred after infusing environmental values into the governin enforcing environmental protection programs.

a. Administrative Agency Decisionmaking and Accountability
Prior to and during the 1970's, administrative law underwent a significant reformation 305 that obviated any meaningful role for the public trust
doctrine. Administrative law responded to changing societal demands
without resort to the doctrine's origins in Roman law public trust principles. As the subject matter of the administrative agencies' decisions steadily expanded beyond the traditional scope of purely "administrative" matters to substantive issues that affect the behavior of persons in all aspects
of their social and economic lives, the basic methodology of administrative
agency lawmaking fundamentally changed. 30 6 At the most abstract level,
administrative law relatively abandoned the traditional mode of incremental
agency decisionmaking, exemplified by case-by-case adjudication, 307 and
a new synoptic model of administrative lawmaking emerged, which the
commentators dubbed "comprehensive rationality.' '3° 8
'304. The discussion below is directed primarily to federal, not state, administrative
law. Admittedly, this has several drawbacks. First, clearly state administrative law is more
relevant to the public trust doctrine. Second, developments in the state arena are not identical to those in the federal domain and undoubtedly state reforms have generally not
bc,'n as extensive as federal reforms. In addition, certain concerns about administrative
ag,. ncy decisionmaking are likely to be greater at the state level: for example, risk of agency
capture and problems associated with scarce agency resources are more serious at the
state level. Still, the general focus on federal administrative law here is not only necessarily expedient, but highly pertinent. Although perhaps not as extensive as federal law, state
administrative law has undergone a reformation over the last fifteen years that has in
large part pzaralleled that occurring in federal administrative law. In all events, the potential for state administrative law advances certainly exists, which, by itself, bears on the
viability of and independent need for the public trust doctrine. For a general discussion
of state versus federal administrative law, see Bonfield, State Law in the Teaching of Administrative Law: A CriticalAnalysis of the Status Quo, 61 TEX. L. REv. 95, 103, 110-13, 123,
127-31 (1982); Bonfield, Rule Making Under the 1981 Model State AdministrativeProcedureAct:
An Opportuniy Val Used, 35 AD. L. REv. 77 (1983). But see I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREArIsE 36-37 (2d ed. 1978) (state judges lag far behind federal judges in developing administrative law, and both state and federal judges look to federal administrative
law when confronted with difficult problems).
305. See generally Chayes, The Role of theJudge in Public Law Litigation, 39 HARV. L. REv.
1281 (1976); Diver, Polic)making Paradigmsin Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 393
(1981); Stei.art, The Reformation of American Administratie Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667
(1975); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 222.
306. See Diver, supra note 305, at 401-21; Stewart, supra note 305. at 1676-88.
307. See Diver, supra note 305, at 399-402.
108. See id. at 396-99; see also Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 105 S.Ct. 1102, 1126-28 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disagreeing that EPA can
allow exceptions to Clean Water Act standards). The synoptic model, epitomized by generic
rulemaking, possesses four typical characteristics: (1) articulation of specific goals to be
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Congress, courts, and the Chief Executive each have encouraged and
responded to this shift toward administrative lawmaking by the headless
fourth branch30 9 in ways designed to ensure a more complete record before
3 10
the decisionmaker and to increase agency accountability to the public.
Greater agency accountability itself, to be sure, leads to a more complete
administrative record because it facilitates the airing of competing views
before the agency,3 11 but it also serves an important independent func-

tion. Specifically, as the subject matter of agency lawmaking becomes
broader and more substantive, concern necessarily grows about the purity
of the process through which the agencies make their ultimate determinations. 312 At the same time, however, statutorily prescribed agency pro-

cedures for rendering generic 31 3 rather than adjudicatory rules routinely
31 4
provide for less, not more, rigorous public and judicial scrutiny. The
original procedures were written with the traditional model of agency
lawmaking in mind, that is, agencies decided all important substantive
attained; (2) identification of alternate methods of attainment; (3) evaluation of the effectiveness of each alternative; and (4) selection of the optimal alternative. See Diver, supra
note 305, at 396.
During the 1970's, agencies increasingly implemented decisions through generic rulemaking proceedings instead of through case-by-case adjudications. For example, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission conducts individual adjudicatory proceedings on applications to
construct or operate a nuclear power plant. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 526-27 (1978). In recent years,
however, the Commission has removed certain sensitive environmental issues common
to all licensing proceedings, such as the environmental impact of the nuclear fuel cycle,
and addressed the issue through a generic informal rulemaking proceeding. See id. at 528-30.
The rule the agency promulgates after notice and comment is applied in each of the individual adjudicatory proceedings. There is no opportunity in the formal setting to question the substance of the rule. The result is to remove from the adjudicatory setting extremely sensitive questions of environmental impact. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 100-01 (1983); Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S.
at 538-39. See generally Wright, The Courts and The Rulemaking Process: The Limits ofJudicial
Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1974).
309. See Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 581-83 (1984).
310. Diver, supra note 305, at 409-21.
311. See id. at 415; Jaffee, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Action: The Non-Hohlfeldian
or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1044-45 (1968); Stewart, supra note 305,
at 1748-56.
312. See Diver, supra note 305, at 408-09; Stewart, supra note 305, at 1681-88. According to Professor Stewart, not only the widening scope of substantive agency regulation
triggered closer judicial scrutiny; a growing judicial perception that the agencies were
not adequately carrying out their legislative mandates to protect certain social interests
also led to more expansive regulation. Stewart, supra note 305, at 1682. In particular,
there was the concern that agencies are eventually "captured" by the private sector entities whose behavior the agencies regulate. See id. at 1685-86.
313. See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
314. Compare Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-554 (1982) with id. §
556-557. See generally Fuchs, Development and Diversification in Administrative Rule Making, 72
Nw. U.L. REV. 83 (1977); Pedersen, FormalRecords and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J.

38 (1975).
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issues at the adjudicatory or otherwise incremental level. 315 Many judicial
opinions, legislative enactments, and executive orders over the last decade
and a half reflect this concern for more rigorous public and judicial scrutiny
and generally aim to increase agency accountability in informal agency
decisionmaking that involves matters of particular societal importance.
Congress passed statutes that, although still containing vague mandates, took strides to dictate procedures the agency should follow in implementing the statute. Or, Congress increasingly laid out those explicit
substantive matters that the agency must consider and weigh when formulating its policy. 316 The President, similarly, in recent years has exercised his executive authority to prescribe promulgation rules for agency
rulemaking procedures. 31 7 The courts, however, have taken the most farreaching strides to increase agency accountability, both in response to
legislative and presidential directives and at the court's own initiative.
Courts have responded in two principal ways. First, judges have
strictly enforced requirements designed to promote and enhance public
participation in the agency decisionmaking process, 3 s and have made it
easier for a private citizen to seek judicial review of the agency's decision." 9 At the same time, courts perceptively tightened their own stan-

315. See Diver, supra note 305, at 405; cf. Chayes, supra note 305, at 1285 (traditional
concept of adjudication reflecting assumption that major social and economic arrangements
resulted from activities of autonomous individuals).
316. See Diver, supra note 305, at 409, 411, 413, 415-17, 419; see also, e.g., Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982) (requiring preparation of regulatory impact appraisals and regulatory flexibility analyses as part of agency decision to promulgate rules
with certain potential economic impacts); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §
2603 (1982) (requiring testing of chemical substances); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. f
1314(b)(1)(B), (2)(B), (4)(B) (1982) (effluent limitation guidelines); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C
§i 741 1(a)(1), 7607(d)(1) (1982) (standards of performance); see also Schoenbrod, Goals
Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA. L. REv. 740, 827-28 (1983)
(favoring specific congressional directives to administrative agencies).
317. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), provides for agency preparation of a regulatory impact analysis for all "major" rules-those which may result in
an "annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more," see id. § 1(b), 46 Fed. Reg.
at 13,193, and bars promulgation of any rule if the potential societal benefits of the rule
do not "outweigh" the potential societal costs, see id. § 2(b), 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,193.
See generally Rosenberg, Be'ond the Limits of Executive Power: PresidentialControl ofAgency Rulemaking Under Evecutive Order 12,291, 80 MicH. L. REv. 193 (1981). The executive order expressly states that it does not provide an independent basis forjudicial review of challenged
agency action. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 9, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,198 (1981).
318. See Diver, supra note 305, at 409-21; Fuchs, supra note 314, at 108-11. See generally
Stewart, supra note 305, at 1711-60 (expansion of traditional model, extension of hearing
rights, and expansion of standing).
319. The courts have relaxed traditional principles of ripeness and standing and the
courts have narrowed notions that prosecutorial discretion or other matters committed
to agency discretion by law are unreviewable. Both make it easier for litigants to obtain
judicial review of the agency action. See Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional
Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 645, 648-58 (1973); Stewart, supra note 305, at 1723-56. For
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dards of judicial review of the merits of agency decisions by requiring
320
adequate consideration of all interests affected by the agency decision.
The courts deferred to agency expertise, perceiving that agency decisions
turned as much on questions of social policy and politics as on matters
of technical expertise, 3 2 1 and more willingly demanded, as a matter of
agency rulemaking procedure, that an agency provide a more fully reasoned
and articulated basis for its decision. 322 In particular, judges compelled agencies to prepare more complete administrative records of decisions, 323 explain publicly the underlying factual bases of their decisions, 324 respond
to all significant comments raised by members of the public, 325 consider
explicitly all factors relevant to their determinations, 326 and refrain from
ex parte communications with interested parties. 327 The frequent result of
these heightened procedural requirements is a record the sheer detail of
which cannot help but invite even closer judicial scrutiny. Moreover, this
heightened judicial scrutiny has not been confined to challenges to agency action, but increasingly extends to challenges of agency inaction as
3 28
well.

an excellent discussion of ripeness, exhaustion, and standing requirements, see generally
Fuchs, Prerequisitesto JudicialReview ofAdministrative Agency Action, 51 IND. L.J. 817 (1976).
320. See Diver, supra note 305, at 411-12; Stewart, supra note 305, at 1756-60; Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sop. CT. REV. 177, 181-84; Verkuil,
Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185, 207-10 (1974).
321. See Stewart, supra note 305, at 1702-11.
322. See 5 K. DAVis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 410-13 (2d ed. 1984); see also id.
at 298-307 (lower courts narrowly reading "no law to apply" exception to judicial review
of agency action).
323. Courts have been concerned that agencies discuss alternatives to their chosen course
of action and state explicit reasons for rejecting other alternatives. These concerns have
led to more extensive administrative records that include discussions of alternatives. See
Diver, supra note 305, at 412.
324. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 691
F.2d 565, 574 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 926 (1983); Connecticut Light &
Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 525, 530-31 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 835 (1982); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 612 F.2d 1232, 1236 (10th Cir.
1979); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
325. See Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 699 F.2d 1209, 1216
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977).
326. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983); Seatrain Int'l v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 598
F.2d 289, 292-93 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See generally Stewart, supra note 305, at 1756-60.
327. See United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 542
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1977).
328. See Diver, supra note 305, at 420; Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 222, at 1205-06,
1267-89; Sunstein, supra note 320, at 184-86; Note, JudicialReview of Administrative Inaction, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 627, 633-35 (1983).
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Impact of Environmental Values on the Administrative Process

Judicial appreciation of society's increased concern with environmental
protection and resource conservation was a primary impetus behind the
administrative law developments during the 1970's.32 - Beginning with the
33
Supreme Court's decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,

1,

courts took a "hard look" at agency decisions that implicated environmental
concerns. 33 Although the hard look doctrine may in part simply reflect
the judiciary's general concern with agencies implementing vague congressional mandates involving issues of broad societal importance, 332 such
as those invariably contained in environmental laws, 333 other more peculiar
aspects of environmental concerns have been a major factor. Four aspects
stand out most prominently as triggering judicial concern: 33 4 (1) the lack
329. See ,generallyW. RODGERS, supra note 198, § 1.5, at 16-23. Referring to the "disintegration" of administrative law, Professor Elliott has recently argued that the field of
administrative law may not exist apart from certain subspecialities, such as environmental law. See Elliott, The Dis-Integrationof Administrative Law: A Comment on Shapiro, 92 YAL
L.J. 1523, 1528-29 (1983).

330. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
331. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S
87, 97-98 (1983); Small Refiner Lead Phase Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506,
520 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Maryland Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Postal Serv..
487 F.2d 1029, 1037-38 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,
478 F.2d 615, 631-32 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA,
478 F.2d 875, 881 (1st Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d
584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The "hard look" doctrine is simply ajudicial shorthand
expression for a "heightened level of scrutiny" of agency action. Office of Communication of Uni.ed Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1425 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
332. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 222, at 1279.
333. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. ()2603(a)(1)(A)(i) (1982) (Administrator can require testing if chemical substance presents "unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment"); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d)
(1182) ("[TIhe Secretary [of the Interior] shall issue such regulations as he deems necessary
and advisalle to provide for the conservation of [threatened] species .

.

. ."); Clean Air

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (defining "national primary ambient air quality standards"
as those standards "the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the
Administrator... are requisite to protect the public health"); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1982) (defining
remedy with respect to cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste site as "those actions ...
taken . . . to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do
not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or
th,' environment").
334. Many commentators, including judges, recognized the special need for stricter
judicial scrutiny in the context of review of administrative agency decisions affecting the
quality of the natural environment. See, e.g., Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and
the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 514 (1974); Oakes, TheJudicialRole in Environmental Law, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 498, 499 (1977); Stewart, The Development of Administrative ard Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw in JudicialReview of EnvironmenmalDecisionmaking: Lessons
from the Clea Air Act, 62 IowA L. REV. 713, 740 (1977); Stewart, Paradoxes of Liberty, Integrity and Faternity: The Collective Nature of Environmental Quality andJudicialReview of AdministrativeAction, 7 ENVTL. L. 463, 469 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Stewart, Paradoxesof

Liberty].
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of a ready powerful constituency able to represent the interests in en336
vironmental protection, 335 especially the interests of future generations;
(2) the inherent difficulty of measuring the value of environmental protection, let alone assessing the risk of a low probability-high consequence
environmental catastrophe, especially when compared to the more immediate and perceptible economic rewards of resource exploitation; 337 (3)
the relationship of environmental protection to human health; 338 and,
perhaps most importantly, (4) increasing awareness that modem technology
has raised the stakes of incorrect short-term decisions by giving us the
power to destroy irreversibly aspects of our natural environment whose
339
importance we are only beginning to understand.
These same basic concerns are also reflected in modern environmental and natural resources statutes, which now typically rein in agency actions that potentially affect the environment.3 4 The National Environmen-

335. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 222, at 1276; Stewart, Paradoxes of Liberty, supra
note 334, at 478.
336. The concern for the interests of future generations is evident in many environmental
cases. See, e.g., Trustees for Alaska v. Watt, 524 F. Supp 1303, 1308-09 (D. Alaska 1981)
(protection of national wildlife refuge); Hopson v. Kreps, 462 F. Supp. 1374, 1375 (D.
Alaska 1979) (conservation of whales); American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Andrus, 460
F. Supp. 880, 885 (D. Nev. 1978) (protection of horses); Wincamp Partnership v. Anne
Arundel County, Md., 458 F. Supp. 1009, 1026 (D. Md. 1978) (adequate sewage facilities);
United States v. Brown, 431 F.Supp. 56, 61 (D. Minn. 1976) (protection of national parks);
United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 17 (D. Minn. 1974) (prevention
of water pollution); see also Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S.
591, 657 (1944) (upholding control of prices of natural gas because "public interest ...
requires stopping unjust impoverishment of future generations"). Of course, dozens of
opinions recount the language of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) concerning protection of the rights of "succeeding generations" to a healthy environment,
42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (1982). See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 693
(1973). For general discussions of the rights of future generations in the environmental
context, see F.

ANDERSON,

D.

MANDELKER

& A. TARLOCK,

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:

36-38 (1984); O'Toole & Walton, IntergenerationalEquity as It Relates to
Conservation and Coal Extraction Standards, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 53 (1982); Weiss, supra
note 76.
337. See F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, supra note 336, at 38-42, 451-72;
A. FREEMAN III, R. HAVEMAN & A. KNEESE, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
81-107 (1973); Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety, and Environmental Decisionmaking, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473, 483-86 (1980); Bazelon, Science and Uncertainty: A Jurist's View, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 209, 212 (1981); Leventhal, supra note
LAW AND POLICY

334, at 529; Stewart, Paradoxes of Liberty, supra note 334, at 479. For a recent survey of
the various economic approaches toward measuring public environmental goods, see
Brookshire, Thayer, Schulze & d'Arge, Valuing Public Coods: A Comparison of Survey and
Hedonic Approaches, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 165 (1982).
338. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) ("special
judicial interest in favor of protection of the health and welfare of people, even in areas
where certainty does not exist"); see also Center for Science v. Treasury, 573 F. Supp.
1168, 1173 (D.D.C. 1983) (when health at issue, close scrutiny appropriate).

339. See

COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT

340. See Diver, supra note 305, at 413, 415-17, 419 & n.144.

4-11 (1979).
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tal Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 34'buttressed by the ambitious regulations
of the President's Council on Environmental Quality, 342 is the most obvious example of the modern statutes. It requires federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts of proposed actions, which include issuing federal permits, spending federal funds, and managing vast federal
properties, prior to taking any such action.3 43 So too, the inclusion in many
federal environmental laws of provisions that specify those actions that
the agency must consider unlawfu3 4 and that generally impose mandatory
duties on the agencies, 345 coupled with citizen suit provisions empower34 '
ing private suits both against agencies for failing to take required action 1
347
and against other private parties for violating the terms of the statute,
also has dramatically increased agency accountability to the public.
These same triggers are, to be sure, comparable to those Professor
Sax suggested to justify heightened judicial scrutiny in the context of the
public trust doctrine.3 48 But while developments in administrative law in

341. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4374 (1982).
342. See 43 Fed. Reg. 55978-56007 (1978) (codified at 40 C.F.R. %51500.1-.6, 1501.1-.8,
1502.1-.25, 1503.1-.4, 1504.1-.3, 1506.1-.12, 1507.1-.3, 1508.1-.28 (1985)).
343. See generally W. RODGERS, supra note 198, § 7.1 (1977 & Supp. 1984); ENVTL. LAW
INsT., NEPA IN ACTION, A REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1981). A
new federal law, the Farmland Protection Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 97-98, 95 Stat. 1213,
1341 (1981) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 4202(b) (1982)), similarly calls for federal consideration of the impacts of agency action on farmland. Pub. L. No. 97-98, 95 Stat. at 1343.
344. See, e.g., Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982);
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1982); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1301(a) (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(e) (1982); Solid Waste Disposal Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6925, 6928 (1982).
345. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1314(b) (1982); Solid Waste
Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6926 (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(a),
7410(a)(2) (1982). The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, the most recent in a series of comprehensive revisions of federal environmental laws, follows the statutory

patern of strict agency duties, but with the added measure that should the agency not
act within the prescribed deadline, harsh statutory prohibitions on private sector activity

go into effect. See Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 201, 98 Stat. 3221, 3226 (amending section

3004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (Supp. 1985)).
346. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2616(a)(2) (1982); Safe Drinking

Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a)(1) (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1982);
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1982); Solid W.'ste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(2) (1982).

347, See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1) (1982); Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1982); Surface Mining Control and Reclama-

tion Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1982); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1982);

Ocean Dumping Act, 33 U.S.C. § 14 15(g) (1982); Deepwater Ports Act, 33 U.S.C. §

1515 (1982), Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(a)(1) (1982); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 300j-8 (1982); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (1982). See generally Miller, Private Enforcement of FederalPollution ControlLaws (pts. 1-3), 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,309 (1983), 14 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10,063 (1984), 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,407 (1984). Indeed, this type of citizen
suit against other private parties has blossomed recently.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 63-74.
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the environmental context confirm Sax' rationale for heightened judicial
scrutiny, the developments simultaneously undercut any need to rely on
trust doctrine notions. Most simply put, those special considerations related
to environmental concerns have successfully spoken for themselves in the
judicial arena. Thus, in Overton Park3 49 the Supreme Court, without any
need for recourse to the public trust doctrine, effectively accomplished
the doctrine's objective-heightened judicial scrutiny of an administrative
action that failed to consider adverse environmental impacts. 3 0 Indeed,

the import of the Court's reasoning practically endorsed the substantive
35
importance of the relevant environmental considerations. 1
The advantages of not relying on the trust doctrine, moreover, are
substantial. Most fundamentally, the excess baggage that must necessarily be carried by any litigant who wishes to make an argument based on
the public trust doctrine disappears. It is unnecessary to argue at the
threshold that the doctrine attaches to the resource in question. Following
through attenuated chains of title to show that the trust has somehow survived is unnecessary. 352 Similarly, it is unnecessary to work around the
traditional trust purposes of prodevelopmental objectives such as promotion of commerce (which arguably was met by the roads at issue in Over353
ton Park).

349. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
350. See id. at 410-14; see also Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965).
351. See 401 U.S. at 412-13:
[T]he very existence of the statutes indicates that protection of parkland was
to be given paramount importance. The few green havens that are public parks
were not to be lost unless there were truly unusual factors present in a particular
case or the cost or community disruption resulting from alternative routes reached
extraordinary magnitudes. If the statutes are to have any meaning, the Secretary
[of Transportation] cannot approve the destruction of parkland unless he finds
that alternative routes present unique problems.
See Diver, supra note 305, at 414 ("The Supreme Court imposed upon the ambivalent
statutory language an interpretation designed to resolve the conflict by elevating the preservationist objective to nearly absolute preference."); Stewart, Regulation in the Liberal State:
The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1586 (1983) (characterizing hard
look doctrine as "administrative law variants on the public trust doctrine").
352. This was precisely the mistake that the State of California made in Summa Corp.
v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 104 S. Ct. 1751 (1984). In that case the state
premised its ability to restrict the development and provide public access to a navigable
waterbody on a prior sovereign reservation of a public trust easement in the property.
See id. at 1753 & n. 1. In particular the state, relying on the trust doctrine, was forced
to argue that Mexico had reserved the trust interest when it conveyed to private hands
the property ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848,
9 Stat. 922 (1848). That property was turned over to California under the equal footing
doctrine upon the state's admission to the Union in 1850. See 104 S. Ct. at 1753 &
n.1. The California Supreme Court ruled for the state, but the United States Supreme
Court rejected the state's tortured argument because it could find no evidence of any
prior reservation. See id. at 1758. It would have been far preferable had California not
based its ability to protect and maintain the integrity of the navigable waterbody on such
tenuous grounds. See infra text accompanying notes 469-76.
353. As we have seen, the traditional trust doctrine concern with promoting commerce
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Although administrative law has developed significantly since Overton Park,3 4 it has not re-created a need to resurrect the trust doctrine.
On balance, the general thrust of the hard look doctrine clearly has not
been abandoned, even by the Supreme Court,3 55 and the types of considerations raised in environmental cases will necessarily remain those that
will trigger special judicial concern.3 56 The legal requirements are now
in place to ensure that end.
Finally, to the extent that earlier trends have been somewhat curtailed, curtailment is not necessarily unjustified. Legitimate competing
considerations, such as the need to conserve scarce agency resources, occasionally call for less judicial oversight.35

7

So too, the nature of today's

environmental issues are often so exceedingly complex that the judicial
role must necessarily be limited and reliance on administrative agencies
must be great. For this reason, the public trust notion of a legislative remand makes little sense today. The administrative agencies serve an essential function in this area of the law and their work should not be undercut
35 8
lightly.
In all, the public trust doctrine does not further the needed balancing of modern administrative law concerns. Rather, the doctrine is rooted
in the type of common-law notion, the ancient reservation of a trust interest,
that modern administrative law was designed to displace.3

59

The doctrine,

therefore, is not only unnecessary in light of ongoing developments, but
as before, it is theoretically inconsistent with the pattern of the new legal
fabric emerging.
3.

The Government's Role in Protecting the Environment and
Conserving Resources

Finally, the public trust thesis loses vitality because it was based on
a charactcrization of the relationship of the government to the natural
has frequently been invoked to harness the doctrine's weight in support of developmental
activities. See supra text accompanying notes 48-55, 120-28.
354. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
462 U.S. 87, 97-106 (1983); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Delknse Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549-55 (1978). See generally Stewart, Vermont Yankee
and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805 (1978).
335. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 56-57 (1983) (overturning Department of Transportation's
decision not to require airbags in automobiles). See generally 5 K. DAvIs, supra note 322,
at 404-10; Diver, supra note 305, at 422-25; Sunstein, supra note 320, at 184, 194-96,
209-12; Note, Judicial Review of Informal Administrative Rulemaking, 1984 DUKE L.J. 347,
369-76. See also generally Rodgers, A HardLook at Vermont Yankee: EnvironmentalLaw Under

Close Scrutiny, 67 GEo. L.J. 699, 727 (1979) (predicting Vermont Yankee likely to be confined).
356. See Diver, supra note 305, at 431-34.
357. See id. at 428-31; see also Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 222, at 1270.

358. See Butler & Cameron, Book Review, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 228, 231 (1971) (reviewing J.

SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION

359. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 222, at 1273-74.

(1971)).
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environment that bears little resemblance to the role of government today. The public trust thesis was based on a view of government in which
administrative agencies played little or no positive role in environmental
protection or conservation. 360 Those agencies instead mostly promoted
developmental activities. The agencies conveyed fee simple title in public
resources to private developers with few restrictions and engaged in environmentally destructive activities, building unnecessary highways and
water projects, with no regard for the environmental consequences. Accordingly, the task for the law, and the public trust doctrine in particular,
was to rein in the government.
Now, however, the government for decades has maintained ownership of vast expanses of invaluable parks and wilderness areas.3 61 It is
a government with substantial administrative agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Fish and Wildlife Service, and
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Service, whose primary mandates
are to prevent needless environmental degradation and to maintain a
healthy environment.3 62 Widely publicized efforts in recent years to undermine those mandates from within have simply not succeeded. Environmental values are now settled in society and cannot be so easily reversed. Even
more fundamentally, those agencies now possess career staffs whose
technical expertise in environmental matters inevitably surfaces in policy
formulation. Although not always controlling the direction of agency decisions, agency staffers have proved quite able to resist the momentum of
extreme political tides in either direction. The impact of settled agency
expertise is especially significant because under several laws other agencies must consult agencies that possess special environmental expertise,
before the other agencies take any action that may adversely affect the
environment.3 63 This often results in a record of decision that restricts
3 64
the ability of political appointees to disregard environmental concerns.

360. See Sax, supra note 3, at 474.
361. Professor Sax has criticized federal maintenance of the park system, see generally
Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parksand the Regulation of PrivateLands, 75 MicH. L. REV.
239 (1976), while others believe that the reforms he thought necessary were already occurring, see G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW
756 (1980).
362. The inability of the public trust thesis to come to terms with the new emerging
federal environmental agencies was an early focal point of criticism of Professor Sax's
promotion of the doctrine. See Tarlock, Book Review, 47 IND. L.J. 406, 412-13 (1972)
(reviewingJ. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1971)).
363. See Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1982); Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982); National Historic Preservation Act,

16 U.S.C. § 470 (1982); Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)
(1982); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982). But see Secretary
.of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 330 (1984) (narrowly construing state consultation requirement of coastal zone management law).
364. For example, undoubtedly one of NEPA's most significant long-term impacts has

'been the hiring by agencies of personnel with expertise in the environmental area and,
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To be sure, the government is not immune from challenges that it
continues to engage in or permit environmentally destructive activities
that should be halted. The basic assumption that the government possesses
no meaningful check on itself, however, is no longer valid. The laissez
faire prodevelopment government upon which the public trust doctrine
is premised is an apparition of the past. When Sax wrote his public trust
doctrine manuscript, for instance, essentially none of the major federal
environmental laws or their state analogues were on the books. The EPA
did not even exist then.3 65 Today, the government's task is primarily to
translate environmental protection and natural resource conservation goals
into specific legal rules and standards. Implementing these laws has been
a cumbersome, complex task with few easy answers and a task marked
by constant squabbles between interested agencies at both the state and
consequently, personnel usually sensitive to environmental concerns. See S.
BUREAUCRACIES

THINK:

THE

ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT STATEMENT

TAYLOR,

MAKING

STRATEGY OF AD-

MINISTRATIVE REFORM 80-82 (1984); Magat & Schroeder, Administrative Process Reform in
a DiscretionaryAge: The Rule of Social Consequences, 1984 DUKE L.J. 301, 320-21. NEPA has,
in this manner, led to a new process of environmental decisionmaking in the government.
See generally ENVTL. LAW INSTIT., NEPA IN ACTION, ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICES IN NINETEEN
FE-DERAL AGENCIES (Oct. 1981). Professor Sax, who has criticized NEPA, see generally
S;ax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 239 (1973), does not sufficiently
account for this factor. Instead he apparently perceives a model of governmental decisionmaking in which only outside consultants are hired to prepare environmental impact
statements and governmental employees have no interest in the result and mechanically
support the regulated community. See id. at 246-47; id. at 239 ("I cannot imagine a more
dubious example of wishful thinking. I know of no solid evidence to support the belief
that requiring articulation, detailed findings or reasoned opinions enhances the integrity
or propriety of the administrative decisions."). Not only do agencies now often have personnel primarily concerned with environmental impacts, but under the Council on Environmental Quality NEPA regulations the lead federal agency must consult with any
federal agency that has expertise in environmental matters. See Circulation of the Environment Impact Statement, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.19(a) (1985); Inviting Comments, 40
C.F.R. § 1503.1 (1985). In addition, under section 309 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7609 (1982), the EPA must review and comment on all environmental impact statements.
These expert agency comments are typically written by career personnel and provide an
important check on the lead agency impact statement. And, even if not heeded by the
agency, the comments constitute weighty evidence in the record upon which a citizen
may rely in a later challenge to the agency action and may provide the court with grounds
to overturn the agency action. See, e.g., Fritofsn v. Alexander, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL.
L. INST.) 20,266, 20,268, (S.D. Tex. 1984) (comments of Fish and Wildlife Service and
National Marine Fisheries Service); Action for Rational Transit v. West Side Highway
Project, 536 F. Supp. 1225, 1241 (S.D. N.Y.) (comments of EPA, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Marine Fisheries Service), aff'd, 699 F.2d 614, 618 (2d Cir. 1982);
see also Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 19 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1215, 1220-21 (D.D.C.
1981) (agency statement adequate); Reid v. Marsh, 20 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1337,
1344 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (Army Corps consulted with Fish and Wildlife Service). But see
Report Says FederalAgency Neglect CausingExtensive Destruction of New Jersey Wetlands, 15 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 1234 (Nov. 9, 1984) (Fish and Wildlife Service report critical of EPA and
Army Corps consideration of Service concerns).
365. The EPA was established in 1970. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35
Fed. Reg. 15,623, 84 Stat. 2086 (1970).

PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

federal levels. Still, these problems do not deny the major overhaul that
has occurred in the nature of government's role in the environmental area
over the last fifteen years. They merely confirm it.
The public trust doctrine, however, continues to resist the ghost of
narrow-minded prodevelopment-government as it was, not as it is. In
so doing, the doctrine serves no meaningful role in the ongoing debate
on the merits; 366 it has become a relic of the past ready to be discarded.
In sum, the apparent litigation achievements of the public trust doctrine dim considerably, if not diminish altogether, when studied in light
of independent developments in more generally applicable areas of the
law, such as standing, nuisance, the police power, and administrative law.
The doctrine's successes in various cases amount to little more than isolated
reflections of these more fundamental trends, but have a public trust label
prominently attached. In addition, the basic force of the public trust doctrine rests on legal theories fundamentally inconsistent with current notions of sovereignty and property in natural resources. The doctrine's only
independent role remains much where it began in this country, with the
367
narrow concern of access to beaches and beds of navigable waters.
IV.

THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN MODERN
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW

Mere irrelevance is not, of course, enough to justify a call to aban-

don public-spirited invocation of the doctrine. Little in the law, let alone

legal academia, would likely survive such an exacting standard. Rather,
the appropriate remedy depends on whether use of the public trust label
has or potentially could have significant adverse effects. It is to this inquiry that the Article now turns.
366. Comment, supra note 10, at 487; see also Tarlock, supra note 362, at 414 (no consensus about environmental drains exists to answer tough environmental policy issues).
367. Courts often cite growing public demand for beach access to justify expanding
the trust doctrine. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306,
323-25, 471 A.2d 355, 364, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984). It is not at all clear, however,
that the public trust notion is at all necessary to guarantee access. In Appleby v. City
of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926), the Supreme Court, although holding that the public
trust doctrine no longer applied to the submerged bed in question, took pains to point
out that public access still was in order:
Of course we do not intend to say that, under such deeds as these, as long
as water connected with the river remains over the land conveyed and to be
filled, navigation may not go on and boats may not ply over it ....
But it
is a very different thing to say that the city which has parted with thejus publicum
and the jus privatum . .. remains in unrestricted control of navigation with the
right to dredge them, or appropriate the water over them ....
Id. at 397-98. Finally, as one commentator has pointed out, courts can base a finding
that a right of public access exists on several different doctrines, including the trust doctrine, custom, prescriptive easements, and implied dedication. See Livingston, supra note
75, at 679. That author, moreover, forcefully argues that all of these tests generally consider the same factors and courts should apply one unified test that candidly expresses
those factors being considered. See id. at 685.
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Evaluating the public trust doctrine on the basis of the adverse effects criterion leads this author to conclude that continued reliance on the
doctrine is ill advised. Continued use of the doctrine ultimately threatens
to impede environmental protection and resource conservation goals and
possibly render Pyrrhic earlier advances. Most fundamentally, the doctrine's operation exacerbates a growing clash in liberal ideology within
natural resources law-between the need for individual autonomy and
security, traditionally tied up in private property rights, and the demands
of longer-term collectivist goals expressed in environmental protection and
resource conservation laws. In addition, totally apart from destructive
ideological conflicts the trust doctrine creates, relying on the doctrine is
no longer sound strategy. The doctrine no longer reflects current environmental values and unduly relies on a proenvironment judicial bias.
Recent Supreme Court precedent strongly suggests, moreover, that the
doctrine's fiction carries little weight in the legal balance. This Article
discusses these concerns-ideologic and strategic-in turn.
A.

Toward a Liberal Rejection of the Public Trust Doctrine

Natural resources law is currently undergoing a major transformation. Traditionally, natural resources law was a scheme of laws riddled
over time by a bizarre array of formalistic property-based doctrines designed
to achieve specific social goals. It is gradually evolving into a more unified
system of rules in which competing private and social goals in natural
resources are openly debated and limited private rights are assigned by
the government. The public trust doctrine, by inevitably depending on
traditional notions of property law and trusts, 368 conflicts with the direction that current environmental protection and natural resource conservation concerns are leading legal rules. As a consequence, the doctrine
threatens to undermine the important developments in natural resources
law.

368. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Summa Corp. v. California ex tel. State
Lands Comm'n, 104 S. Ct. 1751 (1984), reaffirms the public trust doctrine's inabilit'
to escape itn historical ties to property law and its consequent vulnerability to attack. See
supra note 352. In Summa the Court held that the state's public trust authority, which
the Court repeatedly described as an "easement," was lacking because the state had failed
to assert the interest in a patent proceeding mandated by federal law one hundred years
earlier. The purpose of the proceeding was to remove any clouds there might be on titles
to California lands the private ownership of which derived from earlier conveyances by
the Spanish or Mexican government in accordance with Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 41,
§ 8, 9 Stat. 631, 632. Certainly, as in Suinma, advocates aiming to undercut the viability
of the trust doctrine will emphasize its property rationale. See, e.g., Official Transcript
of Oral Argument at 5 (argument of counsel for petitioner), Summa Corp. v. California
ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 104 S. Ct. 1751 (1984). But see Coquillette, supra note 10,
at 813-14 (arguing that trust doctrine's firmest basis is its strong ties to ancient property law).
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1.

Erosion of a Properly-BasedDoctrine

The thrust of recent developments in environmental and natural
resources law has been to replace already eroding traditional notions of
private property rights in natural resources with a scheme of governmentadministered and defined private entitlements to those resources explicitly
369
The history of
premised on continuing sovereign regulatory authority.
natural resources law in this country, which influenced early environmental
law, has been marked by a series of obscure legal rules rooted in a wide
variety of property law doctrines. Esoteric doctrines such as the rule against
372
the rule of capperpetuities, 37 0 adverse possession, 371 abandonment,
374
373
the English rule of absolute ownerture, the common enemy doctrine,
377
ancient lights (or lack
ship, 375 traditional riparian law, 376 lost grant,

369. Cf. Stewart, supra note 351, at 1556-59 (courts not capable of exercising regulatory
function of allocating entitlements).
370. "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years
after some life in being at the creation of the interest." Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell,
51 HARV. L. REv. 638, 639 (1938). See generallyJ. MORRIS & W. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES (1962).
371. See generally 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 15.1-.2 (A. Casner ed. 1952); Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REv. 135, 135-47 (1918).
372. Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 886-89, 442 P.2d 692, 710-12, 69 Cal. Rptr.

612, 630-32 (1968).
373. The rule of capture basically proposes that the right of a landowner to capture
natural resources, such as wild animals, by traps, or groundwater or oil and gas, by drilling, is absolute. Any injury resulting to neighbors who had expectations of obtaining the
resource for themselves is damnum absque injuria. The leading English case on the rule,
Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843), has strongly influenced the develop-

ment of American property law. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 371, § 10.5.
374. See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 400, 412 P.2d 529, 531, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273,
275 (1966):
Stated in its extreme form, the common enemy doctrine holds that as an incident to the use of his own property, each landowner has an unqualified right,
by operations on his own land, to fend off surface waters as he sees fit without
being required to take into account the consequences to other landowners ....
See generally ad. at 400-02, 412 P.2d at 531-32, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 275-76.
375. See New Albany & Salem R.R. v. Peterson, 14 Ind. 112, 114 (1860). The gravamen
of the English rule is expressed in the maxim reproduced infra at note 377.
376. Under strict traditional riparian law, a downstream riparian was entitled to the
water that flowed past his lands undiminished in either quantity or quality. Any diminution by an upstream riparian entitled the downstream riparian to sue the former for
damages, even without a showing of actual harm. See Elliot v. Fitchburg R.R., 64 Mass.
(10 Gush.) 191, 193 (1852).
377. "Under the lost-grant doctrine the courts instructed juries that they [must] find,
from the fact that a particular use had been made, that a grant of the privilege of making
it had been made and that the grant had been lost." 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 371, § 8.50; see Simonton, FictionalLost Grant in Prescription-ANocuous Archasim,

35 W. VA. L.Q. 46, 47 (1928).
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the law of waste, 379 restraints against alienation, 380 and the

Statute of Frauds, 38 1 and absolute maxims such as cuius est solum eius est
usque ad coleum et usque ad inferno,3 8 2 and primus in tempore, potior est injure 83

dominated the substance of legal rules defining the scope of private rights
in essential natural resources such as land, water, oil, and gas. Each doctrine or maxim sought to influence either the initial allocation or the subsequent distribution of the affected natural resources in a manner designed
384
to promote identifiable social goals.

The last one hundred years, however, have been marked by a constant struggle to free natural resources law of the older, often rigid property rules and maxims. 335 Many of the rules once served important functions; time, however, has since passed them by. Three primary reasons
for this development prevail. First, society has greatly changed and social
values have changed accordingly, rendering obsolete the objectives of the
378. "[Alt common law, the land owner had no legal right, in the absence of an easement or uninterrupted use and enjoyment for a period of 20 years, to unobstructed light
and air from the adjoining land." Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five,
Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
379. "The law of waste is concerned with the extent to which a holder of a limited
interest in land is restricted in use and enjoyment of his land by the rights of holders
of other interests in that land." 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 371, § 20.1,
at 71. See generally id. § 20.1, at 71-75; Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 14344
(1829).
380. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 371, §T 26.1-.132.
381. The Statute of Frauds requires, inter alia, written evidence for conveyances concerning the creation or assignment of certain interests in land. The basic purpose of the
requirement was to redress a fear that "because of perjury ... people might be held
on promises which they had never made." Willis, The Statute of Frauds-ALegal Anachronism,
3 InD. L.J. 427, 427-29 (1928).
382. "Whoever owns the soil owns all the way to heaven and all the way to the depths."
383. "First in time, first in right."
384. See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 371, § 20.5 (role of public policy
in fashioning law of waste); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 371, § 26.1 (role
of public policy in fashioning law favoring freedom of transfer); Cohen, supra note 238,
at 22; Donahue, supra note 211, at 33-34, 37-38; Horwitz, supra note 210, at 279, 287-88;
Philbrick, supra note 211, at 395. Professor Rodgers sees the common law of waste doctrine as supporting a general legal principle of a duty between succeeding generations
of good husbandry toward natural resources. See W. RODGERS, supra note 198, at 248-51;
see also Frug, Why Neutrality?, 92 YALE L.J. 1591, 1594 (1983) (arguing that creation and
interpretation of a property right are never value-neutral).
385. Set, e.g., Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 231 Ala. 511, 517, 165 So.
764, 769 (1936) (English rule of absolute ownership has given way to doctrine of "reasonable
use"); Sprecher v. Adamson Companies, 30 Cal. 3d 358, 371, 636 P.2d 1121, 1128, 178
Cal. Rptr. 783, 790 (1981) (overturning common-law rule that landowner liable for harm
caused by "natural" conditions of land); Weldin Farms, Inc. v. Glassman, 414 A.2d
500, 504-06 (Del. 1980) (rejecting natural flow standard in favor of reasonable user stan(lard); Murbarger v. Franklin, 18 Il. 2d 344, 348-49, 163 N.E.2d 818, 820-21 (1960)
(rejecting rule of capture); Tucker v. Badoian, 376 Mass. 907, 916-18, 384 N.E.2d 1195,
1201 (1978) (Kaplan, J., concurring) (rejecting "common enemy rule"); County of Clark
v. Powers, 96 Nev. 497, 502-04, 611 P.2d 1072, 1075-76 (1980) (rejecting natural flow
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old rules.3 86 These rules, like many property law rules, are weighed down
by historical baggage of little continuing relevance.3 8 7 Second, several of
the earlier doctrines were based on assumptions about the physical
characteristics of resources and the limits of technology that advances in
science have since discredited.3 88 Third, the pace of change in recent decades
has quickened to such a level that we now require a flexibility in our legal
rules that the older doctrines do not admit.389
The steady erosion of these traditional property law doctrines,
however, is not an isolated event. It is part of a much wider trend in the
law that challenges the very notion of private property rights in natural
resources. Most simply put, as a result of dramatic and accelerating social,
economic, and scientific changes in this country over the last one hundred years, the public interest in protecting natural resources and ensuring the most efficient or socially optimal distribution of products has increased exponentially and has overtaken individual interests. 390 Most persons no longer live in rural settings with ready access to private ownership rights in basic natural resources and thus most must rely on others
standard in favor of reasonable user standard); Cline v. American Aggregates, 15 Ohio
St. 3d 384, 387, 474 N.E.2d 324, 326-27 (1984) (rejecting English rule of percolating
water); Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 240, 321 N.W.2d 182, 191 (1982) (holding
interest in solar access deserving of consideration in nuisance balance); State v. Deetz,
66 Wis. 2d 1, 18, 224 N.W.2d 407, 416 (1974) (overturning common-enemy doctrine);
see also Horwitz, supra note 210, at 264-65, 279-80, 287-88; Walker, Property Rights in Oil
land Gas and Their Effect upon Police Regulation of Production, 16 TEX. L. REv. 370, 373-79
(1938); Wiel, supra note 280, at 439; cf. E. FREUND, supra note 215, §§ 372-373 (governmental power should depend upon peculiar condition of object of regulation, not fictional
grant). But see Wiggins v. Brazil Coal & Clay Corp., 452 N.E.2d 958, 963-64 (Ind. 1983)
(arguably reasserting English rule of absolute ownership for "percolating" waters); Argyelan
v. Haviland, 435 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Ind. 1982) (adhering to common-enemy doctrine).
386. See Donahue, supra note 211, at 57.
387. See Philbrick, supra note 211, at 696, 723-24; Stevens, supra note 10, at 195; Yandle,
supra note 238, at 7-8; see also R. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATER

211 (1983).
388. See Horwitz, supra note 210, at 251-52, 263; Outer Space, supra note 297, at 545-46;
Pejovich, Towards an Economic Theory of the Creation and Specification of Property Rights, 30
REv. Soc. EcON. 309, 314 (1972); Walker, supra note 385, at 370-71, 374-76. New
technology may also create new conflicts over resource simply by providing new opportunities for their exploitation. For instance, conflicts over water, which traditionally had
been utilized for domestic and agricultural purposes, increased dramatically once advances
in technology led to industrial demands on the resource as well; indeed, it led ultimately
to governmental reformulation of private rights in the water resources. Fly, supra note
22, at 286-94.
389. Common-law doctrine similarly fell short at earlier times in the wake of the
"awesome nature and pace of the changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution ....
[I]t was no match for the social problems spawned by industrialization." McLaren,
Nuisance Law and the IndustrialRevolution-Some Lessonsfrom Social Histoy, 3 OXFORD J. LEG.
STUD. 155, 220 (1983).
390. See H. BERMAN, supra note 230, at 36-37; Philbrick, supra note 211, at 724-25;
Pound, supra note 249, at 234 ("[Iln a crowded world the social interest in the use and
conservation of natural media has become more important than individual interests of
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to exercise rationally those rights. 3 9 1 Private ownership of natural resources,
moreover, does not reside as in the past with individuals often very concerned about the need to preserve sufficient resources for their children
and their children's children. Increasingly, it is in the hands of corporate
giants, which are guided in their decisionmaking by short-term profit maxirmization. 392 Technology does not provide an outer limit on resource exploitation, but instead it has advanced to the stage that threatens exploitation of monumental proportions. At the same time, advances in other.
more subtle areas of the physical, chemical, and biological sciences only
recently have begun to suggest the full extent of the fragile interdependencies in our natural environment. These advances reveal the possibly irreversible consequences of manipulating the environment to meet im393
mediate demands.
The most obvious implication of this increased public interest has
been greater demand for direct governmental involvement in decisions
that affect the relative availability and quality of important natural
resources. 3 94 The most pernicious implication is that the most central
justification of private property rights in those resources is undermined. 395
Private property rights today are justified principally on the market theory
that a rational profit maximizer who owns natural resources will utilize
those resources in a manner that not only optimizes his or her own insubstance."); Wiel, supra note 280, at 456-57 (fundamental nature and need for basic
natural resources, totally apart from their physical characteristics, will mean erosion of
private property rights, despite dangers inherent in communism); see also Sax, supra note
235, at 493.
391. See Philbrick, supra note 211, at 723-24.
392. Thi. has been the precise concern behind the recent enactment of state laws restrict-

ing corporate ownership of farmland. See Absentee Ownership of Farmland: Hearing Before the
House Subcomm. on Family Farms, Rural Development, and Special Studies of the Comm.on Agriculture,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980) (testimony of Iowa Attorney General Thomas J. Miller);

see also supra note 302.
393. See generally COUNCIL ON ENVTL.

QUALITY,

TENTH

ANNUAL

REPORT (1979) (protec-

tion of environment has become strong American value); see also L. BECKER, supra note
225, at 109-10 (resources viewed as inexhaustible centuries ago are in imminent danger
of being exbausted); Elliott, Anthropologizing Environmentalism (Book Review), 92 YALE L.J.

888, 894 (1983) (scientific evidence of environmental damage distinguishes modem pollution beliefs from those of primitive cultures based on supernatural); Furrow, Governing
Science., Publ*c Rights and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1403 (1983) (scientific

advances create risks with unknown probabilities faster than the risks can be assessed).
For a general discussion of the important relationship between the acquisition and ap-

plication of scientific and technical knowledge and substantive policy thoughout American
legal history, see J.

HURST,

supra note 222, at 157-213 (1977).

394, See supra text accompanying notes 360-66; see also Friedman, Exposed Nerves: Some
Thoughts on Our Changing Legal Culture, 17

SUFFOLK

U.L.

REV.

529, 545 (1983) ("This

is a society of strangers. We depend on each other to a fantastic degree; but the people
we depend on are, by and large, people we never see face to face, over whom we have
no control.... We rely on the state-on rules
of law-to protect us.") (emphasis in original).
395. See H. BERMAN, supra note 230, at 34-35; Philbrick, supra note 211, at 724; Sax,

su/pra note 235, at 484.
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terest but also society's overriding interest in the efficient use of the
resource.3 96 Notions of individual personality and security, although still
present, are generally mere incidental justifications for private property
rights. The clear implication of these changes in social demographics and
advances in science is that society cannot so easily rely on the free market
premise that a private decisionmaker acting in his or her own best interest will also act in society's best interest. The private decisionmaker
will be unaware of the social costs of the decision. Although this has always
been true, the notion of externalities, reflected in the concept of rights
created by dependencies between various property owners, has generally
been a minor concern of property law, or at least it has been left largely
unstated. 397 Today those unconsidered social costs may be tremendous
in the natural resources context.3 98 For example, the cost to future generations is of special concern, particularly in light of our growing exploita3 99
tion abilities.
Of course, to an economist this is just a lawyer's (perhaps simplistic)
restatement of the impact of externalities on the efficacy of private markets
and the rationale for governmental regulation. 40 0 Be that as it may, the
396. See Anderson & Hill, EstablishingPropertyRights in Energy: Efficient v. Inefficient Processes, 1 CATo J. 87, 89-91 (1981); cf Friedman, The Economics of the Common Pool. Property
Rights in Exhaustible Resources, 18 UCLA L. REv. 855, 880 (1971) (owners of scare resources
seek stable long-term profits and will not increase production for short-term gains); Grey,
The Disintegrationof Property, in PROPERTY: NoMos XXII 177-78 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1980) (property owner's pride and concern for reputation among his neighbors
encourages him to take good care of property); Horwitz, supra note 210, at 260-61, 290
(in mid-nineteenth century, government began encouraging private ownership and
monopoly to promote efficiency).

397. See, e.g., 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 371, at 229-31 (neighboring
property owners have rights in one another's land under certain circumstances). The sufficiency of private contractual arrangements to address these types of externalities is implicit in Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal. See supra text accompanying notes

245-61.
398. SeeJ. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES 39-57 (1968); Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 211, at 1106-10; cf. Coquillette, supra note 10, at 778-79 (changes in nuisance
law a response to increasing population of urban areas and increasing conflicts as competition for space intensified); Comment, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutionality of Intrastate Ground Water Management Program, 62 TEX. L. REv. 537, 540-41 (1983)
(no incentive to extract groundwater at efficient rate under traditional property rules).
399. See d'Arge, Schulze & Brookshire, CarbonDioxide and IntergenerationalChoice, 72 AM.
ECON. REv. 251, 255 (1982); D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND EQUITY: A REGULATORY
CHALLENGE 13-14 (1981); see also Steiner, Slavery, Socialism & PrivateProperty, in PROPERTY:
NoMos XXII 252-53 (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1980) (user of existing exhaustible
resources cannot know the loss his use will cause future generations and therefore cannot
compensate them). The problem of leaving future generations with scarce natural resources
is not, of course, just a modern concern. The rule of perpetuities, it has been argued,
primarily reflected a public policy to strike" 'a fair balance between the desires of members
of the present generation, and similar desires of succeeding generations, to do what they
wish with the property which they enjoy.' " SeeJ. MORRIS & W. LEACH, supra note 370,
at 17 (quoting SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 58 (1955)).
400. For a discussion of the impact of environmetal externalities, see Davis & Kamien,
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essential point remains that, at least for natural resources, the problem
of traditional
of externalities has become so acute that the very notion
40
private property rights in those resources is in doubt. '
2.

The Rise of "New Properly" in Natural Resources Law

The clear trend in environmental law and natural resources law toclay is to replace traditional notions of private property rights in natural
resources with an intricate scheme of government-administered entitlements
and permits. 40 2 This trend is most evident in developing governmental
programs respecting resources that have traditionally been the object of
exclusive private ownership, such as land, groundwater, and fossil fuels.
Detailed land use plans restrict private decisionmaking; 4 3 and even when
development such as mining is allowed by law, subsequently restoring
land to its approximate natural condition may be required.40 4 Groundwater, under the common law, was the absolute property of the overlying
Externalities, Information, and Alternative Collective Action, in R. DORFMAN & N. DORFMAN,
EcONOMIC3 OF THE ENVIRONMENT 69, 73-77 (1972); Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243-48 (1968); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN.
1, 15-19 (1960).
401. See L. BECKER, supra note 225, at 1, 116-18; see also Sax, supra note 235, at 485,
489. Even stalwart supporters of private property rights such as John Locke recognized
that essential natural resources involved special considerations and, accordingly, apparently
have justified their private property rights in those resources on the presence of minimal
negative externalities. See T. ANDERSON, WATER RIGHTS 16 (1983). Critics of Locke's general
labor theory of property, moreover, have stressed its inapplicability to scarce natural
resources and its failure to account for the impact of private property on future generations and the exhaustibility of certain natural resources. See L. BECKER, supra note 225,
at 42-43, 43, 94-95; Steiner, supra note 399, at 251-53, 257-59. They also forcefully argue
that because the value of natural resources is not initially "produced" by labor; they are
less susceptible to a claim based on fruits of labor. See Steiner, supra note 399, at 250;
Yandle, supra note 238, at 4. More broadly, others have argued that once society becomes
industrialized and urbanized and highly interdependent, the labor theory of property loses
meaning, because almost no individual effort is unaided by society. See Cohen, supra note
238, at 16-18.
402. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 396, at 79-81 (trend in modem capitalist societies toward
gradual dissolution of private property rights); Oakes, supra note 224, at 583 (importance
of individual property rights depends on political philosophy popular at any given time);
see also Reich, supra note 283, at 737 (citizens already depend upon government to
redistribute wealth); Freyfogle, Land Use and the Study of Early American History, 94 YALE
L.J. 717, 736 (1985) (inquiring whether complete ownership of property in natural resources
may be replaced with usufruct, with ultimate ownership in public). Professor Grey argues
that once the theory of property as a bundle of interests was firmly substituted for thingownership, the ultimate consequence was the cessation of property as an important category
in legal thcory. See Grey, supra note 396, at 81. Arguably, this is precisely what we are
witnessing in natural resources law.
403. For reviews of the development of land use controls in the United States, see F.
BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, supra note 297, at 1-5; Large, This Land is Whose Land? Changing Conceptions of Land as Property, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 1039, 1050-58.
404. See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)
(1982); Grossman, supra note 297, at 226-28.
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property owner 405 and is now the object of strict state regulatory allocation under new laws.4 0 6 The production and exploitation of fossil fuels
40 7
but also the object of
is not only the subject of massive regulation,
wealth of the resource
economic
the
transfer
effectively
that
substantial taxes
40
public.
general
the
to
This same trend extends to those natural resources historically considered incapable of private ownership, such as air, oceans, arctic zones,
405. "[T]he land immediately below is his property, whether it is solid rock, or porous
New Albany & Salem R.R. v.
ground, or venous earth, or part soil part water .
Peters, 14 Ind. 112, 114 (1860).
406. Extraction of groundwater is now associated with several substantial negative externalities for which traditional common-law property rules did not account. The externalities include overdraft, subsidence, saltwater intrustion, reduced surface stream flow,
increased pumpage costs, and general social and economic disruption. Comment, supra
note 398, at 540-42. Accordingly, a host of new state laws, particularly in the West, are
taking a new look at the groundwater resource and strictly regulating its extraction and
use. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-401 to 45-637 (Supp. 1985); NEB. REv. STAT.
§§ 46-656 to 46-673.01 (1984). See generally R. DUNBAR, supra note 387, at 173-91; Kyl, The
1980 Arizona Groundwater Management Act: From Inception to Current Constitutional Challenge,
53 U. CoLo. L. REv. 471 (1982); Pascoe, Plans and Studies: The Recent Questfor a Utopia
in the Utilization of Colorado's Water Resources, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 391 (1984); Smith,
CentralizedDecisionmakingin the Administration of GroundwaterRights: The Experienceof Arizona,
California and New Mexico and Suggestions for the Future, 24 NAT. REsOURCE J. 641 (1984);
see also generally Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 131 Ariz. 78, 82, 84, 638 P.2d
1324, 1328, 1330 (1981) (upholding Arizona Groundwater Management Act on due process and taking grounds), appeal dismissed, 457 U.S. 1101 (1982); Clark, A Proposed Water
Resources Code or Statute: Arizona Water Resources Management Act of 1977, 19 ARIZ. L. REv.
719, 730-41 (1977). Clark also quoted the 1976 UN Conference on Water Law and Administration Recommendations: "Some legal systems have now abandoned the concept
of ownership in favor of use rights to be exercised under specified terms and conditions.
See id. at 847.
407. For example, consider the requirements just for coal under the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982); Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7441 (1982); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 8301-8484 (1982), as well as the host of state laws regulating storage and transportation
and, to the extent that coal is used to produce electricity for the public and thus falls under
the indirect supervision of state public service commission, price; see also Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (1982). Of course, because the federal government has retained ownership over massive amounts of territory, primarily in the western United
States and Alaska, and has jurisdiction over the outer continental shelf, all with vast amounts
of this nation's natural resources, governmental control over natural resources in fact extends far beyond its extensive control over private lands. See generally Sax, supra note 238.
Indeed, even where the federal government has previously granted private property rights
in public lands, it has in recent years retroactively restricted those preexisting rights. See,
e.g., United States v. Locke, 105 S. Ct. 1785, 1798-99 (1985) (upholding, in face of takings challenge, Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784
(1982), retroactive requirement of recording and annual filing of mining claims, with
forfeiture of claim in absence of compliance).
408. See A. CHURCH, supra note 232, at 7, 9, 42-54; see also United States v. Ptasynski,
462 U.S. 74, 76-77, 79-80 (1983) (upholding Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1980,
26 U.S.C. §§ 4986-4998); Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 636-37
(1981) (upholding Montana coal severance tax).
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and space, but no longer so viewed in light of recent technological advances that allow, if not exclusive possession, then irreversible despoliation. 40 9 Current laws direct the government to allocate rights in those
resources"10 and, in the case of pollution control laws, allow private markets
in these "new property" rights in natural resources. 4 1 The goal of the
new property rights is to reemphasize the importance of private markets
in achieving allocational efficiency once the government has had the op412
portunity to set the initial ground rules.

Finally, the trend toward legislative replacement of common-law rights
with limited entitlements defined by the government in the first instance
extends to traditional common-law tort rights as well as common-law property rights. 4 13 In the environmental area, for example, statutes limit or
409. Hardly any identifiable resources are outside the potential embrace of technological
advances aimed at harnessing their value for exclusive use. Recent years have even witnessed
Idaho suing Wyoming for alleged "cloud rustling." Minoque, The Concept of Property and
Its Significanre, in PROPERTY: Nomos XXII 12 n.19 (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1980)
410. That the government now effectively distributes property rights in these resources
follows from the government's assertion of power, in the first instance, to require a permit for activities that may affect the resource. See supra text accompanying notes 277-87.
411. Recently a two-column ad ran in the Wall Street Journal offering the services of
a brokerage firm for the sale and purchase of air pollution rights. See Air Emission Offset
Available, Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1982, at cols. 5-6. EPA also allows gasoline refiners to
store and sell rights to use lead in federally regulated products. See Extension of Lead Trading
Rights to 1987for Gas Refiners Issued As Policy By EPA, 15 [Current Developments] ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 2084 (Mar. 9, 1985). Even more recently, the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service has approved a project in which a developer is awarded credits for investment
in wildlife habitat protection and restoration that the developer may "bank" and either
withdraw on its own to support a later destructive developmental project or sell to another
developer who wishes to apply the credit to its own proposal. To date, the availability
of this banking of credits has been relevant to issuing a federal permit under section 404
of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982), for wetlands development. See M. Zagata.
Mitigation by "Banking" Credits-A Louisiana Pilot Project at 2 (unpublished paper on file
with the Iowa Law Review). See generally T. ANDERSON, supra note 401, at 318-20 (water
quality); R. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION 166-67 (1983) (same); J.
DALES, supra note 398, at 77-100 (water and air pollution rights); Comment, Who Owns
the Air? Emission Offset Concept and Its Implications, 9 ENVTL. L. 575, 591-92, 599-600 (1979)
(discussing impact of 1970 Clean Air Act on property rights in air resources); Comment,
Markets in Air: Problems and Prospects of Controlled Trading, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 377,
377, 379, 399-403 (1981) (same).
412. See generally Yandle, supra note 238. at 8-11 (discussing the transition from publicly
held to privately held property rights). What is especially interesting about the trend in
private property rights in natural resources is that rights in resources such as land, traditionally a matter of exclusive private ownership, and rights in resources such as air, traditionally a iratter of communal ownership, apparently converge to a middle ground at
which the government attempts to accommodate society's interest in environmental quality
and resource conservation and its simultaneous interest in providing for some level of
private property rights. The end product will likely be a scheme of limited rights in natural
reources originating in the government.
413. Traditional common-law tort principles simply cannot cope with the conflicts that
occur between individuals in our industrialized society. The formalistic legal rules established
to handle traditional tort cases fall far short when applied by courts ro the types of in-
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prescribe liability for harm caused by certain environmental catastrophes. 414
According to the courts, a "person has no property, no vested interest,
4 15
in any rule of the common law."1

The public trust doctrine simply has no place in this emerging scheme.
The doctrine finds its home in the legal analytical framework supported
by traditional property dogma currently (and appropriately) being abandoned. It was essentially the public property analogue to those private
property concepts, which are now eroding. The doctrine's main purpose,
like notions of "qualified property" and "property affected with a public
interest,' 416 long since discarded, was to provide the sovereign with a ready
answer to claims of the sanctity of private property rights at a time when
governmental power was itself rooted in its own property holdings. 4 17 To
be sure, the public trust doctrine has tremendous mystical and romantic
appeal, 418 which no doubt partly explains its revival in recent years. It
must be every litigating lawyer's dream to uncover that ancient case with
still-binding precedent that turns the tide by establishing in the client some
invincible right. From that perspective, what is better than a right grounded
in Roman law that purported to protect the quality of the natural environment and the rights of unrepresented future generations in its preservation? 41 9 Still, just as notions of absolute private property rights in natural
juries, for example, caused by exposure to toxic chemicals wherein proof of exposure and
causation are well-nigh impossible under traditional norms. See Rosenberg, The Causal
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L.
REv. 851, 855-59 (1984); Note, Tort Actions for Cancer; Deterrence, Compensation, and Environmental Carcinogenesis, 90 YALE L.J. 840, 847-48, 851-55 (1981); see also Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REv. 575, 588-607 (1983) (faulting existing statutory
framework for modeling its approach to toxic victim compensation on traditional tort law
objectives of compensation, deterrence, and corrective justice).
414. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 87-88
(1978) (Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982), limiting industry liability in event
of nuclear accident); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 8 (1976) (Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1982), modified common-law
liability of coal mine operators from black lung disease of miners); Alabama By-Products
Corp. v. Killingsworth, 733 F.2d 1511, 1516-18 (11th Cir. 1984) (upholding constitutionality of agency presumption that once employed in coal mine for longer than 10 years,
disability due to black lung upon showing of certain health effects); Urited States v. ChemDyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 807-08 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (under evolving principles of federal
common law of torts, liability under Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982), is not only strict, but joint and several
for indivisible harm arising out of abandoned hazardous waste sites).
415. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32
(1978).
416. See E. FREUND, supra -note 215, § 373; Walker, supra note 385, at 377-79.
417. See H. HARTOC, supra note 214, at 101-42, 264 (1983).
418. See Deveney, supra note 10, at 29; Stevens, supra note 10, at 232 (public trust doctrine related to myth of our creation). See generally Smith & Weisstub, Introduction, to THE
WESTERN IDEA OF LAW (J. Smith & D. Weisstub eds. 1983) (discussing law as fulfilling
man's mythical and dramatic needs).
419. In this way, the trust doctrine clearly benefits from an "emotive force of pretense"
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resources have been and are being eroded in the wake of modern environmental and natural resources laws, so too it is only appropriate that
their public property analogues be similarly abandoned. 4 0 Absolutist claims
on either side of the ledger are, at best, unhelpful. 421 At an earlier time,
the doctrine no doubt served the -quite useful function of focusing legal
analysis on a growing public concern-preserving and conserving natural
resources. That inital task of refocusing has been accomplished. The difficult problems that beset the development and implementation of modern
environmental and natural resources law are no longer aided by resort
4 22
to a legal doctrine, such as the public trust.
3.

The Need for Candor and Protection of Individual Rights in Natural
Resources Law

Undoubtedly, the most difficult problem facing environmental and
natural resources law is to reestablish some level of certainty and security
in private interests in natural resources. 423 While traditional notions of
absolute private property rights are no longer in order, defining the scope
of the emerging new property rights in those resources is critical to the
long-term viability of the environmental protection movement. Reliance
on the private market is not only a relentless theme in political life that
cannot be ignored, but even more fundamentally, the total erosion of private

that adds to its persuasiveness. L. FULLER, supra note 164, at 54.
420. The history of property rights in natural resources has suffered from extreme claims
at either end of the spectrum that either the public sector or the private sector possess
absolute rights. See Cohen, supra note 238, at 21; Philbrick, supra note 211, at 708-10.
One should not, " 'seeing the perversion of principles, follow the besetting fallacy of men
and seek salvation from one evil in its opposite, as if the means of escaping death by
fire were freezing to death.' " Philbrick, supra note 211, at 731 (quoting F. LIEBER, ON
CIVIL LIBERTY AND GOVERNMENT 19 (3d ed. 1911)).
421. See L. TRIBE, supra note 179, at 538; Philbrick, supra note 211, at 731.
422. Professor Trelease has ably criticized the use of trust doctrine notions as a basis
for settling conflicts over water rights. See Trelease, Government Ownership & Trusteeship
of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 638, 645-49 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Trelease, Government
Ownership]; fee also Trelease, Choices for Hawaii's Future Water Code-The Lessons of
Past Experience 23-30 (Sept. 27-28, 1984) (remarks before Conference on Water Regulation in Hawaii: The Proposed Statewide Water Code) (copy on file with the Iowa Law
Review). Professor Trelease argues that the doctrine impedes open debate on the merits
by injecting irrelevant property law considerations into the analysis. Trelease, Government
Ownership, supra, at 639, 654. Trelease added that it would be far better to describe the
nature of sovereign authority over waters as an exercise of state police powers. See id.
at 643-45. The same concerns are multiplied now that the public interest in natural resource
conservation is even greater and utilization of the doctrine appears to be on the rise. See
also Rosen, vupra note 16, at 612 (recommending abandonment of public trust doctrine).
423. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 237, at 1-5; Coquillette, supra note 10, at 763. Compare Oakes, supra note 224, at 596-97 (arguing protection of private property rights currently on rise) with Sax, supra note 235, at 481 (arguing protection of private property
rights currently on demise). At present, a persistent school of thought suggests a return
to exclusive reliance on the marketplace to allocate natural resources. Under this view,
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property rights ultimately would threaten individual liberty. 424 A time may
have once existed when using complex technical legal doctrines, such as
the public trust doctrine, allowed society to maintain the facade of economic
security while "new property . . . swe[pt] away old.' '425 So too, once
perhaps "the uncertainties of human existence reinforced a culture of low
hopes and demands from law and government. ' 426 That is no longer the
case. Changes today are simply too many and too quick, and they routinely
come within the span of individual human memory. And in this country
a legal culture has developed that prompts private individuals to look to
the law to meet their demands for justice and compensation when they
4 27

suffer losses.
Consequently, environmental and natural resources laws cannot depend for long on vague notions of "public interest" any more than they
can rely on property-based notions such as the public trust doctrine to
justify their impact on private expectations. As in the past, liberal ideology,
exclusive, well-defined private property rights to those resources must be assigned and
honored by the legal system. See generally T. ANDERSON, supra note 401, at 119-30, 145-47,
197, 223-36, 274-78; Anderson & Hill, supra note 396; Yandle, supra note 238, at 10.
Proponents argue that governmental regulation inevitably leads to gross inefficiencies.
See T. ANDERSON, supra note 401, at 4-5, 88, 131-33; see also De Vany, Eckert, Meyers,
O'Hara & Scott, A PropertySystem for Market Allocation of the ElectromagneticSpectrum: A LegalEconomic-EngineeringStudy, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1499, 1507 (1969). Some even contend that
the Sierra Club and similar organizations can buy land for preservation, if they so choose,
to remedy the problem of future generations being unrepresented in the marketplace. See
A. CHURCH, supra note 232, at 8. The purchase of land has been a traditional approach
of the Nature Conservancy, a national organization dedicated to the preservation of areas
of significant value in their natural condition. There is, however, a competing school of
thought that private property rights are unnecessary. Proponents of this view argue that
common rights to certain communal resources historically have not been inefficient. See
Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, supra note 76, at 717-24; Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property
and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 711, 714 (1980); see also Coquillette, supra note
10, at 809 & n.232. The truth, no doubt, lies somewhere in the middle. The proper approach for each resource depends first on its physical characteristics and second, on its
relation to human and other needs. These two constraints will not allow either absolute
private rights or total communal rights. Indeed, at times each side appears to admit as
much. The former admits that because of externalities associated with overpumping of
aquifers some groundwater must remain unallocated, see T. ANDERSON, supra note 401,
at 239-41, and the latter approves of governmental quotas of certain traditionally "shared"
resources like fish, see Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, supra note 76, at 723.
424. "Property does not have rights. People have rights.... In fact, a fundamental
interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic
civil rights has long been recognized." Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538,
552 (1972). Professor Pound saw property as essential to individual security. See Pound,
supra note 249, at 222-24; see also L. BECKER, supra note 225, at 75-76, 79-80; Oakes,
supra note 224, at 624; Philbrick, supra note 211, at 713-14; Reich, supra note 283, at
787. See generally Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
425. Horwitz, supra note 210, at 251.
426. Friedman, supra note 394, at 544.
427. Id. ("over the course of a century or so there has developed a general expectation
of justice, and a general expectation of repayment for loss") (emphasis deleted).
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having once thrown off the yokes of feudalism, will ultimately rebel unles
a more narrowly circumscribed justification is offered that preserves
minimum standards of individual security.4 2 Individual liberty and security
was clearly the concern of Justice Holmes when he wrote the majority
opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 429 which struck down a state law

restricting coal mining activities. 430 Pennsylvania Coal continues to cast a
shadow over environmental causes. 43 1 Individual liberty and security now
appears to be a growing concern of Justice Brennan in the environmental
property law context, which is worthy of especial reflection, because he
is undoubtedly the member of the Court most sympathetic to environmental
432
concerns.
428. L. BECKER, supra note 225, at 74 ("[I]f property rights are to mean anything, surely
they must mean that one can refuse to use the property to approximate the ideal of
everyone's rational self-maximization.") (emphasis in original); Reich, supra note 283,
at 774 ("Liberty is the right to defy the majority and to do what is unreasonable. The
great error of the public interest state is that it assumes an identity between the public
interest and the interest of the majority."). Professor Reich, in his classic article on the
increasing reliance of the individual on governmental largesse, warned of the dangers to
individual liberty inherent in the "public interest" standard. See Reich, supra note 283,
at 756-74. Reich compared the rise of the public interest state, in which nothing is said
to be "owned" or "vested" in individuals, to feudal times. See id. at 768-71; cf. Snare,
7'he Concept of Property, 9 AM. PHIL. Q. 200, 205 (1972) (comparing rights of individuals
in a corporation to rights of serfs in feudal system). Although Reich was not concerned
directly with private property rights in natural resources, his discussion is extremely pertinent. Firt, his entire thesis was based on the stated premise that traditional property
rights were on the decline as government was becoming the sole supplier of those rights.
See Reich, supra note 283, at 733-34. Second, rights in natural resources are becoming
a matter of governmental largesse, both because government has retained property rights
in vast public lands to which it only issues limited leases and in the wake of extensive
governmental permitting schemes. Consequently, Reich's concerns are now equally applicable to individual rights in natural resources. In both cases, property originates in
the state. The problems with answering disappointed private expectations with the simple
rationale that "government largesse" is not a "right," exist equally in both circumstances.
Id. at 778-79. Thus, just as Reich faults reformers in the 1930's for going too far in reacting to excesses of private property, see id. at 772-73, environmentalists must now take
care to avoid similar excesses in the context of natural resources. The need for balance
is, of coure, on both sides of the equation. See Frug, supra note 229, at 1088-89, 1090
(faulting liberalism for excessive stripping of power of towns in response to perception
that towns restricted individual liberty); see also Shaffer, Men and Things: The Liberal Bias
Against Propery, 57 A.B.A. J. 123, 125-26 (1971).
429. 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see supra text accompanying notes 245-49.
430. Perhaps the most telling example is Justice Holmes' recognition that "the natural
tc ndency of human nature is to extend the [police power] qualification more and more
until at last private property disappears." See 260 U.S. at 415.
431. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 399, at 38-54.
432. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636-61 (1981) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Stewart, and Powell, JJ., dissenting). In particular, Justice
Brennan's strongly worded dissent showed his willingness to subject those who, in the
name of environmental quality, violate constitutional guarantees of security in private
property rights, to the same type of monetary remedies appropriate for police officers
who violate personal liberties. See id. at 661 & n.26. Significantly, Justice Rehnquist, while
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This should not be surprising. Individual autonomy and security have
traditionally been concerns of liberal members of the Court in the context
of "new property" rights in matters such as social security and welfare
benefits.4 33 Indeed, liberal thought, in particular concern for private
autonomy and security, was the main impetus behind the framers' inclusion of the just compensation clause in the fifth amendment.4 34 No valid
reason supposes that liberal ideology will tolerate governmental deprivation of individual expectations on the basis of general public interest standards or conclusory labels of subordinate interests in the natural resources
context any more than it has tolerated governmental deprivation in the
context of these "traditional" new property rights. 435
concurring in the majority decision that no final decision was reached in the lower court
and thus the Court should not reach the merits, see id. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., concurring), added that he "would have little difficulty agreeing with much of" Justice Brennan's dissent. See id. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Moreover, even the majority
added that the constitutional merits of the taking claim were "not to be cast aside lightly." See id. at 633.
Several courts of appeals have subsequently read Justice Brennan's dissent as representing the view of a majority of the Court. See Hamilton Bank v. Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm'n, 729 F.2d 402, 408-09 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 105 S.
Ct. 3108 (1985); Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141, 1148 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 847 (1983); Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F.2d 476, 482 n.5 (7th
Cir. 1982); Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138, 142 (7th Cir. 1981); Hernandez v. City
of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1199-1200 (5th Cir. 1981), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 901
(1982); see also Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105
S. Ct. 3108, 3124-25 (1985) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring) (adhering
to views expressed in San Diego Gas dissent). But see Citadel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway
Auth., 695 F.2d 31, 33 n.4 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817 (1983) (refusing
to read San Diego Gas dissent as reflecting majority view of Supreme Court). See generally
Kmiec, Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court Runs Out of Gas in San Diego, 57 IND. L.J.
45 (1982) (arguing in favor of damages remedy); Stoebuck, San Diego Gas: Problems
Pitfalls and a Better Way, 25 WASH. U.J. URBAN & CONTEMP. L. 3, 5-7 (1983) (arguing
dissent in San Diego Gas misguided). More recently, however, in a regulatory takings case
in which the Court again stopped short of reaching the damage remedy issue, Justice
Stevens filed a concurring opinion in which he took issue with the San Diego Gas
dissent. Justice Stevens argued that damages were not a constitutionally compelled remedy
for a police power regulation deemed a taking, even for the period of time between the
regulation's enactment and its ultimate invalidation. Instead, one must assume good faith
of regulators and so long as fair procedures are available to challenge the regulation, no
independent damage remedy arises under the takings clause for the interim harm caused.
See Williamson County, 105 S. Ct. at 3125-27. In the 1985 term the Court has accepted
another takings case that potentially raises the damage remedy issue. See MacDonald v.
County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 244 (1985) (probable jurisdiction noted).
433. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 355-61 (1976) (White, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); id. at 361-62 (Blackmun, J., joined by
Brennan, J., dissenting); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349-50 (1976) (Brennan,
J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 206-31 (1974)
(Marshall, J., joined by Douglas and Brennan, JJ., dissenting). See generally L. TRIBE,
supra note 179, at 514-39; see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487,
1493 (1985) (explicitly rejecting Arnett v. Kennedy plurality "bitter with sweet" theory).
434. Comment, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 694, 708-10 (1985).
435. Professor Alexander has recently argued forcefully for the rejection of the tradi-
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To appreciate and accommodate the precise nature of this conflict
necessitates a candid formulation of the competing values at stake. 436 At
the outset this formulation will require determination of the relative weights
to give to different aspects of environmental quality, ranging from purely
aesthetic concerns to severe public health hazards. Nothing justifies the
failure to recognize that these objectives vary in social importance and
37
thus deserve varying weight in the judicial balance.1
In addition, a formulation of competing values will require assessing
the weightiness appropriate for different aspects of private expectations,
tional judicial analysis for determining whether a legally protected property interest exi:its. See Alexander, supra note 239, at 1597-98. As he sees it, that test essentially inquires
whether the interest in question is in any way "subordinate" to a preexisting governmental interest. See id. at 1575, 1585-87. Alexander argues that the subordination test
makes little sense in the context of new property rights when the government is the source
of property in the first instance. In that case, the analysis would deny any meaningful

protection to individual security and thus ignores an essential purpose of private property. Id. at 1597-98. When the government is a player, Alexander argues, the concept
of property must be approached on a more teleological basis. See id. at 1599.
Commentators have already signaled out the federal navigation servitude, a close relative
of the trust doctrine. See supra text accompanying notes 23-44. The servitude depends on
a fictional reservation of a prior superior interest, rather than on an honest and candid
assessment of the competing values at stake. See Costonis, Presumptive and PerSe Takings:
A Decisiona! Modelfor the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 465, 525 (1983); see also Alexander, supra note 239, at 1587-88 &n.127, 1594-98. A recent Tenth Circuit ruling reflects
similar concern about the navigation servitude. See Cherokee Nation v. United States,
No. 84-2355, slip op. at 11 (10th Cir. Jan. 1, 1986) ("When the [navigation servitude] affects privat.2 ownership not connected to navigational use, the court must balance the public
and private interests to decide whether just compensation is due.").
436. The need for explicit consideration of the underlying values and competing social
policies at stake, especially in confrontations between assertions of governmental power
and private property rights, has been a relentless theme among the commentators and
its demand is arising in the environmental arena. See Alexander, supra note 239, at 1552,
1592; Oakes, supra note 224, at 626; Reich, supra note 283, at 787; Rose, supra note 245,
at 598; Co;tonis, supra note 435, at 496, 499-501, 524-25; Yellin, Scimce, Technology, and
Administratwe Government: InstitutionalDesignsfor Environmental Decisionmaking, 92 YALE L.J.
1300, 1333 (1983) (must make "commitment throughout our educational system and

government to exposing the real complexities of [technological] decisions" facing the nation); see also Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10

CORNELL L.Q.

17, 26 (1924) ("Failure

to recognize that general legal rules and principles. . . [need] to be constantly tested by
the way in which they work out in ... concrete situations, explains the otherwise paradoxical fact that the slogans of liberalism of one period often become the bulwarks of reaction
in a subsequent era."); Donahue, supra note 211, at 58 (future of property depends on
resolution of tension between individualism and communalism); Frug, supra note 229,

at 1088 (failure of liberalism to discern which aspects of municipal authority truly infringed upon individual freedoms led to excessive stripping of legitimate and necessary
role of municipalities); Philbrick, supra note 211, at 693, 730-31; cf. Kelman, Trashing,

36

STAN.

L. REv. 293, 321-26 (1984).

437. Although Justice Brennan rejects a takings test based on a noxious use analysis,
see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133 n.30 (1978), clearly
at bottom, whether the purpose of a police power measure challenged as an unconstitu-

tional taking is to promote aesthetic concerns or to prevent a threat to public health and
safety, the analysis must affect the judicial outcome. See Costonis, supra note 435, at 496
n. 126. Justice Brennan's desire not to endorse such an analysis in Penn Central, a case
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ranging from those rooted in individual security and personality to those
more related to economic power. 438 In today's industrialized society, property increasingly is accumulated as a source of power and often extends
to substantial control over the means of production, the proper utilization
of which is essential to all society. The personal liberty implications of
regulating the exercise of this latter type of property right are less clear
or at least less compelling.4 39 Accordingly, the interest in property as a
440
source of power should be entitled to less weight in the judicial analysis.
The Supreme Court's refusal to place significant weight on loss of profits
involving historic preservation, is understandable, but does not detract from the logic of
differentiation. Certainly, the Court already performs just such a differentiation in other
areas of constitutional adjudication, most prominently in its identification of "compelling"
state interests as opposed to merely "legitimate" governmental objectives. See L. TRIBE, supra
note 179, at 580-84 (free speech); id. at 891-92 ("rights of personhood"); id. at 1002-03
(equal protection). Of particular pertinence, the Court has already begun to differentiate
between different sorts of state interests in natural resources in its recent commerce clause
cases, see Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982), placing conservation, and health and safety highest, see Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court,
the Commerce Clause, and State Control of NaturalResources, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 51, 60; Tarlock,
So Its Not "Ours"- Why Can't We Still Keep It? A FirstLook at Sporhase v. Nebraska, 18 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 137, 162-63 (1983). Justice Brennan, moreover, appears willing to
endorse this approach to consider environmental objectives in the first amendment context when he places less weight on assertions of aesthetic concerns than on other environmental concerns, such as health and safety. See Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2138 & n.3 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 528-30 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring). So
too, to determine the validity under the contract clause of state police power regulation
that substantially impairs contractual expectations, the Court inquires whether the regulation
furthers a "significant and legitmate public purpose ... such as the remedying of a broad
and general social or economic problem." See Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power
& Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983). Finally, Justice Rehnquist, joined by two
other members of the Court dissenting in Penn Central, has already endorsed the concept
in the context of a takings challenge, going so far as to assert that police power measures
that forbid uses of property "dangerous to the safety, health, or welfare of others" cannot
be deemed unconstitutional takings, regardless of economic impact. See 438 U.S. at 145
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). At least implicitly the Court takes into account such considerations in its takings analysis when it considers both the nature of the governmental action
challenged and the reasonableness of the investments being frustrated by that action. For
example, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984), the Court dismissed
a takings challenge primarily on the grounds that any investment-backed expectations
Monsanto had were unreasonable. See id. at 2875. The gravamen of the Court's ruling
was that Monsanto should have known that its activities in the pesticide area would be
subject to increasing governmental regulation given the tremendous public interest in such
oversight.
438. In archaic law and in the writings of certain philosophers, most notably Kant,
Hegel, and Mill, property rights represent an important extension of individual personality
and their sanctity a matter of morality and natural rights. See L. BECKER, supra note 225,
at 62-64, 102-03; Radin, supra note 424, at 1002-13; Rodgers, Bringing People Back: Toward
A Comprehensive Theory of Taking in Natural Resources Law, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 205, 208-11
(1982); Smith, supra note 225, at 35; Soper, supra note 225, at 64.
439. See Cohen, supra note 238, at 12-14; Donahue, supra note 211, at 57; Philbrick,
supra note 211, at 696-97, 726; Reich, supra note 283, at 771-74; see also L. BECKER, supra
note 225, at 40.
440. See Costonis, supra note 435, at 499-501, 518 & n.214.
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occasioned by a governmental restriction may reflect these considerations. 441
Most clearly reflecting these concerns, however, is the Court's recent decision to uphold a state law that utilized eminent domain power to break
up monopolistic land holdings in Hawaii. In Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Mlfidkiff 44 2 the Court agreed that it was entirely proper for a state to address the "perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly" by
redistributing fees simple in the land. 4 43 According to the Court, it was
a "rational approach to . . . correcting market failure. "444
Finally, the coherent development of natural resources law will require explicit recognition of the special relationship of the natural and
physical environment to man. In particular, the law must reflect the fundamental importance of natural resources in their virgin state, 445 the
physical characteristics of the resources, 446 and the physical characteristics
of the earth's inhabitants. 447 To be sure, this is no small task nor one
likely to be achieved soon. Indeed, when one adds to these three basic

factors the changing nature of human values, knowledge, technology, and

441. See supra note 261.
442. 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
443. See id. at 2330.
444. See id.; see also United States v. Locke, 105 S. Ct. 1785. 1793 (1985) ("[Vested
economic rights are held subject to the Government's substantial power ... to redistribute
the benefits and burdens of economic life."); Comment, The Sherman Act and Land: The
Interstate Commerce Requirement, 3 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 306, 312-13 (1977).
445. Simply put, our natural resources and physical environment are the source of all
human sus,:enance and wealth. They provide the source of energy, materials, and nutrients
upon which all current and future life on the planet depend, including human beings.
See Wiel, supra note 280, at 456-57.
446. "The principles of the decalogue may be applied to the conduct of men in every
country and clime, but rules respecting tenure of property must yield to the physical laws
of nature. . ... " Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 553 (1872). See generally OuterSpace, supra
note 297, at 547-48, 563, 567, 569, 572, 578-79; Wiel, supra note 280, at 431, 439, 456;
Note, Thaw in InternationalLaw? Rights in Antarctica Under the Law of Common Spaces, 87
YALE L.J. 804, 846-47 (1978). Our natural resources may be necessary to satisfy certain
fundamental needs, but their own physical characteristics define at the outset how we
may in fact utilize them to satisfy those needs. Natural resources theoretically may break
down into a chemist's periodic table of elements, but in the natural environment those
elements find expression in myriad physical forms exhibiting infinite physical characteristics.
Moreover, the resources are arranged in a complex ecological web in which the continued
maintenance of some are highly dependent upon the presence or absence of another.
447. The physical characteristics of human life, in particular its fragility, in turn also
define the relationship of man to the natural environment. While homo sapiens are a
self-propagating species, each individual is mortal and thus has limited time horizons.
Individual mortality and health generally, moreover, do not depend solely on internal
limits but depend principally on the presence or absence of external environmental factors, such as temperature, pressure, or certain chemical compounds that interact with
our biologic functions. Finally, existing and future generations are not discrete, nonconcurrent groups that can be isolated by clear temporal boundaries, like yearly corn harvests.
See Steiner, supra note 399, at 253; see also L. BECKER, supra note 225, at 72. They represent continuous, concurrent, and overlapping groups.
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social demographics, and the inherent complexities of our legal system,
it is no wonder that the assignment of private property rights in natural
resources has proved to be so intractable a task. Whether pursuing the
goal of allocative efficiency through market mechanisms or of individual
integrity through secure territory, the notion of private property runs into
overwhelming obstacles in the context of natural resources. The fundamental importance of the resources and their own physical characteristics coupled with those of humans dictate the potential enormity of the externalities
associated with the exercise of individual rights in the resources. Modern
technology and the erosion of traditional family values exacerbate the
problem-modern technology by increasing the potential impact of individual decisions both geographically and temporally, and traditional fami44 8
ly values by decreasing ties between existing and future generations.
Flexibility is becoming an essential ingredient in the makeup of laws
governing private and public rights in natural resources to respond to these
varied physical and sociological demands. This is especially true given
the rapid pace at which new knowledge is nowadays acquired and the
high costs at stake in preventing needless environmental degradation.
Granted, flexibility in legal rules is often at the expense of stability that
is iniportant to individual security. So too, flexible laws are susceptible
to accusations that they are vague, and thus they suffer from infirmities
akin to those of the public trust doctrine. The question, though, becomes
who should and how to accommodate these competing concerns. 449 Who,
in other words, is the appropriate manager of a given resource? It is here,
perhaps most of all, that we find the public trust doctrine's greatest flaws-a
lack of candor and a lack of an established institutional framework for
lawmaking.
45 0
First, like other already abandoned property-based legal fictions,
the trust doctrine finds its strength and tenacity in its resistance of candor
448. Still, rather than simply justifying a total denial of private property rights in natural
resources, the stated premises and additional considerations serve a much less extreme
and more constructive task. They justify a strong role for the government in resolving
the sorts of conflicts that, as these premises indicate, inevitably arise with vital natural
resources. In addition, they support the threshold assumption that the aim of the government will be to resolve those conflicts in a manner that minimizes needless degradation
of natural resources because only in that manner will the government be acting to minimize
future conflicts. The significance of these premises, accordingly, is twofold. First, they
suggest a framework for evaluating the validity of governmental restrictions that limit
the exercise of private rights in resources. Second, they reflect the underlying rationale
for heightened judicial scrutiny of governmental measures that themselves threaten the
natural environment with needless degradation.
449. Cf Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1353, 1366 (1982) ("[Gjiven the pervasive ignorance over the trade-off between

the virtues of flexibility and certainty, and between the vices of indefiniteness and rigidity, there is simply no persuasive reason to embrace one extreme to the exclusion of the
other.").
450. See S. MILsoM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAAv 60-70 (2d ed. 1981);
P.

OLIVIER, LEGAL FICTIONS IN PRACTICE AND LEGAL SCIENCE

88-91 (1975).
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and its refusal to compromise its principles. In this way, promoting public
trust analysis runs counter to the compelling need for self-examination,
candor, and flexibility in the reshaping of natural resources laws. 451 Sec-

ond, unlike the emerging scheme of new property rights in natural resources
that is developing largely at the administrative level (generally instigated
by the legislature and overseen by the courts), the public trust doctrine
provides no ready framework for the assignment of lawmaking authority.
The legal doctrine is inherently suspicious of legislative and administrative
lawmaking regarding natural resources; yet, at bottom, it offers nothing
much in its place. By addressing none of the critical tasks currently facing
the development of natural resources law, and indeed potentially resisting
those efforts, the public trust doctrine threatens to fuel the growing conJlict in liberal ideology and impede the fashioning of a unified system of law.
B.

Toward a Strategic Retreatfrom the Public Trust Doctrine

Finally, even apart from its failure to provide needed candor, and
its inflexibility in the face of changing values and knowledge, reliance on
the doctrine should be abandoned because it offers too tenuous a basis
for protecting important environmental protection and resource conservation objectives. Three separate factors, discussed in turn below, favor
such a strategic retreat. First, trust values will never adequately reflect
modern environmental concerns. Second, the doctrine unjustifiably relies
on the judiciary to further its environmental goals and, consequently,
ultimately depends on a proenvironment judicial bias that is not enduring. Third, recent judicial decisions, in particular those of the Supreme
Court, make it clear that any special legal status the trust rationale has
enjoyed in the past is waning.
1.

The Failure of the Trust to Reflect Modern Environmental Concerns

The strength of the public trust doctrine necessarily lies in its origins;
navigable waters and submerged lands are the focus of the doctrine, and
the basic trust interests in navigation, commerce, and fishing are the object of its guarantee of public access. Commentators and judges alike have
made effbrts to "liberate," "expand," and "modify" the doctrine's
scope, 45 2 yet its basic focus remains relatively unchanged. Courts still

repeatedly return to the doctrine's historical function to determine its pres-

451. Judge Oakes recently stressed the importance of identifying value judgments in

judicial analyses in the property rights context and in particular the great need to avoid
the "tyranny of labels." See Oakes, supra note 224, at 626. The public trust doctrine certainly epitomizes such an uncontrollable label. Indeed, that the doctrine has been invoked

historically to promote developmental activities as much as environmental quality objectives suggests the danger of environmentalists embracing the public trust label.
452. See Sax, supra note 10, at 192-93; Stevens, supra note 10, at 221-23.
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ent role. 453 When the doctrine is expanded, more often than not the expansions require tortured constructions of the present rather than repudia45 4
tions of the doctrine's past.
Achievement of modern environmental protection and resource conservation goals, moreover, ultimately depends not so much on an "expansion" of public trust values as it may require a repudiation of the doctrine's focus and traditional values. Today, societal concerns with environmental protection and resource conservation extend beyond navigable
waters to include far-ranging elements of our ecosystem, such as the ozone
layer, unheard of in Roman times. Our economy no longer depends so
exclusively on water navigation.4 5 5 Our economy "navigates" by air, by
motor vehicle, and, indeed, by way of the electromagnetic spectrum. So
too, the promotion of commerce, a traditional public trust doctrine objective, 456 is hardly a focus of resource protection values. Indeed, more often
than not it serves as a counterweight to those values in the formulation
of public policy because of its prodevelopment bias. Finally, public access, undoubtedly the single most important public trust guarantee,4 5 7 is
often at odds with modern environmental conservation and protection
4 9
laws. 458 Increasingly, those laws must restrict access to protect resources.
One telling sign of a legal fiction's demise is that the words they represent
change meaning to such an extent that, as with the trust doctrine currently, the fiction's application and substance are simply a matter of in4 60
dividual discretion.
In short, the way we and our laws look upon natural environment
has changed fundamentally since the development of the public trust doctrine. The legal categories and social values upon which the doctrine is
453. See, e.g., San Diego County Archaeological Soc'y, Inc. v. Compadres, 81 Cal.
App. 3d 923, 925-26, 146 Cal. Rptr. 786, 787-88 (1978).
454. See, e.g., Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 285 Or. 197, 200-03, 590 P.2d
709, 711-12 (1979) (en banc); see also Sax, supra note 10, at 185-86.
455. Today, moreover, the governmental interest in waterways is not so much navigabil-

ity as the critical ecological role of the specific aquatic resource. See Zabel v. Tabb, 430
F.2d 199, 201-03 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). Still, the extent of
sovereign authority over the resource continues to focus on old categories of navigability,
leading to costly, time-consuming, and essentially irrelevant litigation over the proper
application of those categories. Rosen, supra note 16, at 561-62 & n.6. Clearly it makes
far more sense for the extent of governmental authority to turn on the true focus of public
concern.
456. See supra text accompanying note 84.
457. See supra text accompanying notes 138-43.

458. See e.g., Bradford v. Nature Conservancy, 224 Va. 181, 190, 294 S.E.2d 866,
870 (1982) (hunting club members desiring to walk through Nature Conservancy land);

see also People v. El Dorado City, 96 Cal. App. 3d 403, 405-07, 157 Cal. Rptr. 815, 816-17
(1980) (trust doctrine invalidates prohibition on use of navigable waters by nonresident
boaters when prohibition based on alleged pollution and fire hazards).
459. For example, the ironic consequence of increased public appreciation of wilderness
areas is greater need to restrict public access to those areas. See R.
317-41 (3d ed. 1982).
460. L. FULLER, supra note 164, at 145.

AND THE AMERICAN MIND
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based have little to do with modern concern. Ultimately, the public trust
doctrine does not need to be "liberated," so much as our natural resources
laws, including the trust doctrine, must be freed from the past.
2.

Undue Reliance on ProenvironmentJudicial Bias

A second long-term weakness that counsels abandonment of the public
trust doctrine is its implicit assumption that the judiciary is in the best
position to safeguard environmental concerns and that it will in fact do
so. 461 For this reason, critics typically complain that the public trust

doctrine is antidemocratic and a historical "sham" or "mask" for
judicial usurpation of legislative and executive branch power. 462 Even more
fundamentally, however, good reason suggests questioning the validity
of the assumption that the judiciary will lean toward environmental protection, apart from philosophical concerns about the proper workings of
a democracy.
First, although it is true that judicial concern is naturally triggered
by the typically unrepresented environmental interests in the political process,163 the courts also have demonstrated considerable concern with governmental impingements on individual security interests.1 64 Environmental
concerns are not guaranteed a victory in the courts should a collision with
individual security interests occur.
Second, the favorable bias toward environmental protection, exhibited
by the courts in the 1970's, might not continue. In the past, courts have
used the public trust doctrine to support developmental activities they
favored. 41-1 The vagueness of the doctrine's mandate lends to the risk that
the doctrine could still further those interests. Certainly, environmental
interests deserve and require a firmer and more secure position in our laws.
Finally, regardless of judicial bias or desire, courts may lack sufficient competence in the environmental arena. Questions arising in the
environmental and natural resources law field can be so inordinately complex and the competing societal concerns at stake so fundamental that at
some level judicial second-guessing of administrative agency action may
not be particularly productive. 466 Better solutions, suggested by critics of
461. Sax supra note 3, at 566; see also Sax, supra note 10, at 193.
462. See Deveny, supra note 10, at 13-14; Comment, supra note 10, at 457; see also Coquillette, supra note 10, at 799 (judicial balancing of utilities in tort cases provides courts

with too much discretion to evade democratic processes); Walston, supra note 272, at 81.
463. See ,upra text accompanying notes 335-36.
464. See supra text accompanying note 433.
465. See .eupranotes 250-56 and accompanying text. Notably, in one of his earliest
writings, Justice Brandeis criticized the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for this
type of ruling, characterizing it as "judicial legislation . .. of doubtful expediency." See
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 250, at 211.
466. See Stewart, supra note 351, at 1586 (courts "ill-equipped" to discern appropriate

allocation or distribution of natural resources).
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the judicial function in environmental matters, may reside in new modes
of administrative decisionmaking that are less dependent on effective judicial
oversight of agency action to ensure full representation of competing considerations 467 One possibility suggested is to establish surrogate representatives of varying interests within regulatory agencies. 4 68 Whatever the
merits of these proposals, their relevance to the wisdom of the public trust
doctrine is clear. They stand for the proposition that the solutions to the
sorts of difficult problems society faces in environmental areas do not lie
with the judiciary, while the trust doctrine ultimately depends on the contrary thesis.
3.

Contrary Direction of Recent Supreme Court Cases

Finally, in recent cases, the Supreme Court has severely undercut the
public trust doctrine rationale. In particular, the Court has plainly forecast
its view that the public trust doctrine expresses no more than the sovereign's
469
special interest in an aspect of its general police power authority.
According to the Court, claims of sovereign ownership are but legal fictions that offer no special immunity to challenges of transgressing constitutional limits. The Court's recent decisions in the context of commerce ,470
467. See Yellin, supra note 436, at 1302-05, 1325. For a listing of cases in which courts
made fundamental scientific errors, see id. at 1325 n.150.
468. Id. at 1328. Of course, this is not a new idea. Professor Stewart discussed several
methods of furthering "interest representation" in administrative lawmaking in his classic
article on the reformation of administrative law. See Stewart, supra note 305, at 1790-1802.
Recently, however, some efforts have been made in this direction. On a trial basis, the
EPA has begun a new method of rulemaking based in large part on a process of "regulatory
negotiation" in which the agency invites potentially affected parties to come together to
develop a consensus rule. The agency is not bound to accept the rule, but the proposal
certainly carries weight as part of the administrative record of the agency decision. See
generally Anderson, Negotiation and InformalAgency Action-The Case of Superfund, 1985 DuKE
L.J. 261, 343-44 & nn.321-22.
469. In a revealing dissent, Justice Brennan recently paused to characterize the Illinois
Central decision, describing it as standing merely for the basic proposition that "all private
rights of property, even if acquired through contract with the State, are subordinated to
reasonable exercises of the States' lawmaking powers in the areas.of ... environmental
protection." See United States Trust Co. v. NewJersey, 431 U.S. 1, 50 (1977) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
470. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 951 (1982) (sovereign
ownership of water); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 334-35 (1979) (sovereign
ownership of minnows). In both cases, the Court rejected the states' arguments that their
laws were exempt from the negative implications of the commerce clause because they
owned the natural resources being regulated in their sovereign capacity. The Court described
their ownership claims as legal fictions and characterized the state power in question as
an exercise of police power and the ownership claim as but representing the special state
interests in the resource. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 950-52; Hughes, 441 U.S. at 333-38.
In Hughes, the Court overruled Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), in which the
Court had previously exempted a state wildlife law from commerce clause strictures on
ownership grounds. Notably, the Geer decision, a contemporary of Illinois Central, had
described the state power in terms of the public trust doctrine and had alluded to prin-
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supremacy, 47' and takings clause challenges 472 are all consistent in this
regard. In a 1984 ruling, moreover, the public litigants' decision to rest
their case on a public trust property interest rationale led to their eventual
undoing in the Supreme Court as the Court looked in vain for
some actual
47 3
evidence of a prior reservation of a real property interest.
In addition, the Court's recent case law is inconsistent with the basic
trust doctrine principle that courts should promote environmental conservation by narrowly reading the requirement that legislative enactments
must promote a "public purpose." 4 74 The clear trend in the Court's opinions is to provide states with the broadest leeway to determine what constitutes permissible public purposes. 475 That the trust doctrine is ultimately
a matter of state and not federal law, moreover, does not alter the import

ciples of Roman law that certain resources are common property owned in trust by the
state. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 325, 341. But see Hellerstein, supra note 437, at 88-89 (different
commerce clause test may apply to tidelands than to wildlife).
471. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 672-78 (1978). While the State
of California prevailed in this case, the Court did not indicate that the state powers at
issue, involving the control over state waters, amounted to anything more than the normeal exercise of state police powers. See generally Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken,
357 U.S. 275 (1958); Trelease, Government Ownership, supra note 422. The California
Supreme Court has held that the public trust doctrine applies to navigable waters. Natural
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 437, 658 P.2d 709, 721, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 346, 357 (1983). Also, in Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273 (1983), the United
State& Supreme Court rejected a state's argument that its title to sovereign trust lands
was entitled to special protection in a quiet title action brought by the United States. Se
id. at 287. Justice O'Connor, dissenting, appeared willing to attach weight to the trust
nature of the sovereign ownership of the lands. See id. at 294-96 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Eighth Circuit and the district court, both reversed by the Court, each had
based its contrary ruling on the public trust doctrine. See North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ.
& School Lands v. Andrus, 506 F.Supp. 619, 624-25 (D.N.D. 1981), aff'd, 671 F.2d 271
(8th Cir. 1982). Finally, just as the Supreme Court has held that the supremacy clause
does not allow the federal government to avoid the strictures of the takings guarantee
by claiming it is just "pre-empting" state property law, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
104 S. Ct. 2862, 2878 (1984), state law cannot avoid the supremacy clause simply by
claiming that its power is a matter of property law and not state police power.
472. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 172 (1979). In KaiserAetna the
Supreme Court rejected the United States' argument that its requirement that an otherwise private pond be open for public access was immune from takings challenge because
the requirement merely represented an exercise of the sovereign's navigation servitude.
The Court described the federal navigation servitude, a historical companion of the public
trust doctrine, see supra text accompanying notes 23-44, as simply an expression of the
government's "important public interest in the flow of [navigable] interstate waters."
See 444 U.S. at 175. In this manner, the Court treated the governmental interest not as
an absolute property right, but simply as a consideration deserving of great weight in
the judicial balance. The interest, however, was not enough under the facts of that particular case to overcome the equities weighing in favor of the private party.
473. See Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 104 S. Ct. 1751,
1758 (1984); supra note 352.
474. See supra text accompanying notes 116-28.
475. See supra text accompanying notes 233-35.
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of the Court's rulings. Federal constitutional restrictions, of course, apply
to the doctrine and, in considering the merits of state governmental actions under the doctrine, state courts can be expected to look to recent
Supreme Court cases for guidance. Indeed, the steady infusion of the
"lodestar" public trust decision, Illinois Central Railroad, into state laws
ably illustrates the process. Consequently, it makes little strategic sense
for environmentalists to continue to base important resource conservation and environmental protection objectives on a legal doctrine that
promises to be soon undermined by the High Court. This is especially
true when traditional legal doctrine offers an alternative, more viable, and
certain basis of legal
authority that does not depend on an increasingly
476
shaky legal fiction.

CONCLUSION

Lifting the patch we may trace out the patterns of tension that
tore the [law's] fabric [of theory] and at the same time discern
elements in the fabric itself that were previously obscured from
view. In all this we may gain a new insight into the problems
involved in subjecting the recalcitrant realities of human life to
the constraints of a legal order striving toward unity and
4 77
systematic structure .
Over the last fifteen years, the public trust doctrine has been the object of a remarkable revival in natural resources law. At the time of its
"Renaissance" it served to highlight important societal values not then
in focus. Accelerating changes in the law suggest that it is now time to
bring that revival to a close-to lift the public trust doctrine "patch" from
the emerging fabric of modern natural resources law. Operation of the
doctrine inevitably depends on the judicial application of labels that obscure
the true factors behind the judicial decision. Moreover, those legal categories
upon which the doctrine inexorably relies may have been meaningful once,
but they have become arbitrary and wooden with age. Natural resources
law has for too long been inflicted with a host of such false legal categorizations, inhibiting its developments in times of new information and changing social values. Indeed, the recent history of natural resources law is
most prominently marked by a continuous struggle to be freed of historical
shackles so that natural resources law can properly be fused with and into
modern notions of tort and property law.
Simply put, the public trust doctrine, even if aimed at promoting
needed resource conservation and environmental protection goals, is a
step in the wrong direction. The doctrine amounts to a romantic step

476. The historical underpinnings upon which the public trust doctrine is based,
especially Roman law, have in recent years come under sharp attack by commentators,
thus further weakening the long-term viability of the doctrine. See supra note 10.
477. L. FULLER, supra note 164, at viii.
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backward toward a bygone era at a time when we face modern problems
that demand candid and honest debate on the merits, including consideration of current social values and the latest scientific information. The complex and pressing resource allocation and environmental protection issues
we currently face will continue to tax severely the most concerted societal
efforts and the best legal and scientific minds. Dramatic shifts in legal
rules, primarily in traditional notions of private property, will continue
to be necessary, challenging the patience and understanding of the public,
to whom the law must ultimately justify its legitimacy. Although perhaps
unfortunate, short of a major redirection of this nation's social and economic
infrastructure, 478 little, if any, room is left in these tasks ahead for the
mythopoeism of the public trust doctrine.
4.78. Theoretically, the need for trust-like property law fictions could return in the future
should, as suggested recently by Professors Piore & Sabel, a second industrial divide occur in the United States, and an economy and society based on "mass production" and
"market liberalism" be displaced by "flexible specialization" and "yeoman democracy,"
in which notions of community and common properties, once prevalent, might return.
See M. PIORE & C. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE 305 (1984).

